# INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

**The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.** Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA

UMI®
800-521-0600

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

# Security Discourse and the End of the Cold War: The *New York Times* Coverage on US National Security

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Field of Political Science

Dissertation Advisor: Professor Benjamin I. Page

By

Ihnhwi Park

Evanston, Illinois

December 1999

## ABSTRACT

**Security Discourse and the End of the Cold War:**

***The New York Times* Coverage on US National Security**

Ihnhwi Park

The analysis of *The New York Times*'s coverage of US national security identifies that the end of the Cold War has significant consequences for how the elite newspaper has delivered the stories about US national security. Most importantly, the amount of coverage about US national security has dropped half after the end of the Cold War both in the front page and editorial page. The military issues are still dominantly portrayed as political discourse throughout the media coverage in terms of "national security" concerns. Even though Russia no longer plays a security threat to the United States as the former Soviet Union did during the Cold War, many other regions and countries have been referred as new US security concerns in the post Cold War era. Disagreeing with common wisdom, the priority given to US interventionist policy over isolationist policy has not decreased even after the end of the Cold War. The analysis of *The New York Times*'s articles also shows that subjects of security, such as economic security or environmental security, have become salient in the coverage since the end of the Cold War, though the occurrences of those articles are not very significant yet.

Within the culture of the Cold War, the use of the word "social" with "security" emerges along with the increased role of the state in providing certain types of services.

In the post-World War II world, this is followed by the language of national security, defining an explicitly protective relationship between a state and its citizens. Therefore, conventionally formulated security is about the protection of some form of political community, with community understood as a population with attributes in common. The Cold War highlighted certain events as international problems, identified sources, offered normative judgments, and recommended particular policies. With the disappearance of Cold War framing, the cultural prism for issues on national security has been changed, and consequently, its media coverage has also changed. In the post-Cold War era the security is affected in numerous ways: not only by military issues, but also economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights.

## CONTENTS

## Lists of Tables and Figures

# Chapter One: Introduction

## 1. Where Are We?

The Cold War is over, we are told, but even a causal reading and viewing of the dominant Western media suggest that threats to security continue to proliferate. In academic journals new threats are analyzed and new dangers assessed. The catalog of dangers requiring state interventions to monitor and control continues to attract analytical attention and generate expert prognoses. Intelligence agencies have partly converted themselves into collectors of economic information; the discourses of competitiveness suggest that economic innovation is now a matter of national importance. Environmental concerns as threats to regional if not global security percolate in the bureaucracies of many Western states. These policy themes are connected to recent attempts to reformulate foreign and security policies by many states, and noticeably by the NATO alliance.

These policy debates have been paralleled by discussions within the academy in general and within the international relations field in particular, about how security should be reformulated in order to adapt to new circumstances. The global security problematic, it is often argued, now encompasses much more than the contest for political supremacy in the processes of superpower rivalry. Often under the rubrics of 'common security' or 'cooperative security,' the themes of nonoffensive defense, economic security, environmental security, societal insecurities, drug threats, even human rights and the

autonomy of civil society have been added in attempts to reformulate security policies to encompass many new items on the global political agenda. Simultaneously, one prominent scholar with a theoretical inclination has suggested that the reformulation of security to encompass various aspects of human liberation.[1] Another recent analysis shifted the focus from state to societal security, although without apparently resolving many of the difficulties that a solely state-centric formulation traditionally posed.[2] Simply put, security studies within the post-Cold War are heading in all directions. This dissertation begins with this very fundamental realization.

## 2. Research Purpose and Questions

*"Have the conceptions of US national security portrayed within elite media changed since the end of the Cold War?"*

Alleged changes in "national security" concepts suggest the need for an in-depth analysis of media content. How did the media present coverage on "US National Security" during the Cold War? And presently how do they do so now?

The main purpose of this dissertation is to illuminate how far the current nature and scope of "security" discourse has departed from the traditional neorealistic worldview. The substantial significance of this work is that expanding the subject of security without a clear understanding of the reconceptualization may end up contributing more to the neorealistic militarization of current issues, such as environment, than to the

---

[1] Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17(4), 1991: 313-26.
[2] Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993).

demilitarization of security policies. In doing so, the study focus on one specific set of discursive practices--the interpretation, highlighting, and emphasizing of the media coverage on "national security" discourse.

This dissertation is a work that transgresses academic boundaries; in that sense it is undisciplined. Throughout this work I try to transplant a discourse practice to traditional IR themes, in particular into 'security' studies. It is true that from the late 1970s one particular boundary-transgressing movement in philosophy and literature developed its own interest in, and understanding of, language, text and discourse.[3] The prestige of French post-structuralism and deconstructionism gave inspiration to a self-styled postmodernist discursive practice, which has become a kind of inward-looking orthodoxy in certain milieu. Scholars writing in this vein certainly encroached upon and challenged the traditional rationalist certainties of those who called themselves realists and neorealists in the study of international politics. However, although I take cognizance of their activity and undoubted insights, it seems to me that their work has often abstracted away, much too far away, from the material detail of language and communication. In particular, there has been a paucity of analytic description of language and of texts, despite a plenitude of reference, mention, allusion, pastiche, paraphrase and exegesis. Therefore, this research is designated to validate a substantial analytic description of textual approaches.

---

[3] Michael J. Shapiro, *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices* (New Heaven: Yale University, 1981); M. Shapiro, *Language and Politics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); John V. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: A Critic* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, 1983); Paul A. Chilton, ed., *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate* (London: Pinter Publisher, 1985)

Based on this perspective I have two main research purposes with this dissertation which are closely interdependent. The first purpose associates with security studies in general. Within the terrain of security studies there are two identifying problems resulted from the legacy of the Cold War. First, neorealistic disciplines in IR studies made "security" studies synonymous with "strategic" studies, which have been characterized by militarily-oriented security studies during the whole post-War era. Second, neorealistic disciplines in IR studies made 'security' concerns synonymous with "national security" concerns in which the subject to be most predominantly secured is states. I argue that militarism is not equivalent to security studies and that "national security" should not be identified with security in terms of the subject of security. Through this work, I will try to solve these two synonymous issues in the field of security studies.

At this moment it is necessary to indicate the difference between "classical realism" and "neorealism." Within the simplest explanation, a classical realist argues that states should attempt to maximize its power in international politics and that this pursuit of power would serve its national interest. A particular state's national interest would depend on its power and geographical circumstances. It emphasizes the concept of the balance of power and argues that states tend to ally against more powerful and more threatening states, although their writings remained ambiguous about whether roughly equal balances tend to form in international politics and whether balanced power made war or peace more likely. To the contrary, structural realism or neorealism is largely

identified with the writings of Kenneth Waltz.[4] According to Waltz, the essential feature of international politics is its anarchic structure--the absence of a common sovereign. The condition of anarchy--not human nature--shapes the basic patterns of international politics. The explicit rejection of any assumptions about an innate lust for power due to the evil inherent in human nature distinguishes structural realism from classical realism.

With the second purpose, I argue that the three characteristic features of US foreign policy during the Cold War are "militarism," "globalism," and "interventionism." These characteristic features have centered on US foreign policy in both ideological and practical basis during the entire Cold War period. This is primarily due to the global hegemonic competition between the super powers, the Untied States and the Soviet Union. A detailed discussion about this idea will be in chapter 3. My research's second purpose of this research tests if these features are still prevailing or not in the post-Cold War period.

Despite its consistent invocations of the concept of structure, the neorealist theory of IR is fundamentally grounded in a particular conception of states and state action.[5] The sovereign nation-state is declared to be the subject within international relations, although this claim is never justified. It is simply taken as apparent or sufficiently demonstrated elsewhere.

Following Hobbesian tradition, the state becomes the primary focus of security, and with it, authority and obligation. Obligations between citizens represent the limit--

---

[4] See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
[5] Richard K. Ashley's "The Poverty of Neorealism," in Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), Pp. 255-300, remains an especially clear treatment of this theme. Realism and Neorealism as key analytical vies in IR studies are explained in detail at ch. 2.

underwritten by the authority of the state--of effective coordination of collective action, or community. Either way, the security of citizens is identified with that state. By definition, those who stand outside it are threats, whether potential or actual. Relations between states are, on this basis, thereby rendered purely strategic, in the instrumental sense of the word. It is from this theoretical conception that neorealist security studies begins with its claim to construct an objective theory of security.

At the same time, anarchy becomes an objective fact because international relations are defined by the absence of what is necessary for political order: the state. Anarchy, then, is derivative: it is a conclusion based on an a priori claim about the nature of the individual human subject and the kind of political order that this subjectivity necessarily requires. The essence of the neorealist conception of international relations is not simply the postulate of anarchy, positing a world of self-regarding states operating under the security dilemma and autonomously defining their own interests, but the assumption of a particular form of individual rationality in state action as both the source and the outcome of that anarchy. Both the state and anarchy, as the foundations of the neorealist conception of security, are premised on these more fundamental claims.

This constitutes a substantially important and basic premise to my research. Because, reading social texts, in this case media, for security study necessitates an understanding of the Cold War frame in which the US foreign policy's foremost priority has been given to underscore US predominant power by the hegemonic competition against the Soviet threat.

The rest of this chapter presents an introductory explanation of the end of the Cold War and US national security, then a theoretical framework for this research. "Security" and "security discourse" are separately discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this dissertation in detail. I only briefly cover here the basic understanding of "security" and "security discourse" to raise the necessity of this work. I am considering the relationship between US "national security" and media framing, making use of literature on security and media framing, and noting that key newspapers in the United States are major players within "security" discourse.

### 3. Ending the Cold War and the US National Security

The post-Cold War world has swiftly become a thoroughly uncomfortable and volatile place. We never seem to know what to expect next or what to do when the unexpected happens. This is not surprising since our mental maps were formed during the Cold War's fifty years and are now in uncharted terrain. It has reached the point where some analysts who were quick to crow about the "Triumph of the West" cannot handle the cognitive insecurity and now yearn for the regular and regulated nastiness that we knew with the words "superpower," "supremacy," and "security." Such nostalgia is neither healthy nor sensible.[6] Nine years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there is no consensus on the hierarchy of threats or the proper focus or issue for analysis within the realm of "security."

---

[6] The most frequently mentioned article on this proposition is, John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15(1), Summer 1990: 5-56.

The ultimately most important shift with the end of the Cold War may be that the Cold War will no longer dominate domestic political discourse in the United States.[7] If this is the case--if the Cold War no longer overhangs the American economy and American politics--fundamental issues that have been obscured for more than four decades are likely to resurface. In particular, the "security" arena of the United States has not lost the adversary that defined its role in the world for most of the post-War period, as we have witnessed in many US foreign policies such as the Panama invasion, the Gulf War, and most recently the NATO expansion. Indeed during the Cold War period "geopolitics" was about a ideological basis of constructing spatial, political, and cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space as separate from the threatening "Other": to simultaneously exclude "otherness" and to discipline and control the domestic political sphere.[8] It is perhaps possible that the mere collapse of adversaries in other parts of the world will have only temporary impact on the use of the phrase "national security." The terms are, after all, part of a rhetorical history that reflects and sustains a national consensus, accommodating the beneficent view of national intentions as witnessed in the Panama invasion and the war in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, it may be that

---

[7] According to Schlesinger, from the 1940s onward, the Cold War played an important role in at least three fundamental areas: It proved the rationale for major, economy-stimulating arms spending, thereby concealing deeper problems in the economic system; it repeatedly occupied center stage in America's media-dominated politics, thereby preempting other important domestic political debates; and it distorted our understanding of the real choices available to developing Third World countries, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 1992. "Some Lessons from the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 16(1), Winter 1992: 47-53.

[8] For the discussion about "geopolitical" proposition of U.S. foreign policy, see, Richard Ashley(1987), "Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," *Alternatives* 12(4), 1987:403-34; Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991). And, to control the domestic political sphere in the perspective of 'security discourse' is discussed in detail at Ch. 3 of this dissertation.

"national security" has served its purpose, thus new "commanding ideas"[9] may be necessary.

In this research, I will argue that US foreign policy during the post-war era was marked by three characteristic features--*globalism, interventionism*[10]*, and militarism.* These three features are the most critical basis for US foreign policies regarding national security. Again, I will explain on what rationale these findings are identified in chapter 3 of this dissertation. In that chapter I will show how US foreign policies have been focused on national security concerns since World War II. Indeed, US foreign policy has exclusively focused on "security" concerns due to the bipolar rivalry with the Soviet power in the post-war era. Therefore, these characteristic features of US foreign policy are the nature of US national security after WWII. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and communism were perceived as threats to both American "security" and values, though we had not experienced any major war against the Soviet Union. Huntington pointed this out as "a happy coincidence existed between the demands of power politics and the demands of morality."[11] However, the post-Cold War era has led the American foreign policy establishment to search frantically for new purposes that might justify a

---

[9] Here, the concept of "Commanding Idea" comes from Kane's analysis. He insists that, the Cold War functioned as a "commanding ideas," which absorbed all other frames of references into the Cold War discourse: see, Thomas Kane, "Foreign Policy Suppositions and Commanding Ideas," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 28(2), Fall 1991: 80-90.

[10] As has often been noted, finding an adequate and useful definition of the term "intervention" is quite challenging. In fact, as James Rosenau points out, "there appears to be no agreement whatsoever on the phenomena designated by the term.": see, James Rosenau, "Intervention as a scientific concept," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13(2), June 1969: 149-171; for similar argument, see, R. J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974). One of the major difficulties is the general vagueness of the term. It is most often used to designate a set of behaviors, but at other times it has been used to refer to actions motivated by particular intentions, at still other times to the consequences of actions, and sometimes even to the normative standards used to judge actions.

[11] Samuel Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs* 76(5), Sep/Oct 1997, p. 28.

continuing U.S. role in world affairs comparable to that during the Cold War. Therefore, while the "nature" and "scope" of national security is under reformulation, we may anticipate that its main features remain the same.[12]

National security is the most characteristic feature of the all-purposive political sphere in the United States after WWII. The rapid growth of state functions in capitalist states since WWII, both in terms of their increased role in national and international economic management in the Keynesian era and in terms of their role in the provision of the welfare state, as well as the growth of the "security state," in a perpetual condition of partial military mobilization, has expanded the need for ideological justifications of the functions of capitalist states. These perpetual military preparations require the creation of a permanent adversary, and other whose threatening presence requires perpetual vigilance.

Ideas about the security state have been the basis of the realism dominated discussion of international relations in the post-war period; its key theme of interest understood in terms of power is omnipresent in post-war political discourse.[13] The Cold

---

[12] Many international political theorists and policy makers have suggested ideas about new nature and scope of "security" after the end of the Cold war. In particular, "extended sense" of national security introduced by Rothchild is frequently being discussed: Emma Rothchild, "What is security," *Daedalus* 124(3), Summer 1995: 53-99; and, within the similar view, Baldwin discusses to determine new value of security in the post-Cold war era for conceptual analysis of 'new thinking' about security, see, David Baldwin, "The concept of security," *Review of International Studies* 23(1), 1997: 5-26.; Richard Bates, "Strategic Studies," *World Politics* 50(1), October 1997: 7-33.

[13] For instance, the two most penetrating American foreign policy thinkers of this century, the diplomat George Kennan and the journalist Walter Lippman were convinced that much of America's Cold War security policy was to gain power and security based on strategic considerations and perceptions of external threats. But, at the same time, critical theorists, such as Ashley has argued, the realist discourse also acted to limit the possibilities for critical political intervention precisely by its definitions of community and anarchy; by how it specified the realm of power: see Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics"; "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17(2), 1988: 227-62.

War's conceptualization of "security" was enshrined in the Truman Doctrine of 1947. However, with the Cold War over, we are suffering from intellectual confusion evidenced by the typological divergence of security concerns between, during, and after the Cold War. Like the development of all-pervasive social stereotypes, it is difficult to study the origins and gradual evolution of ideas on "national security." From 1945 to 1989, the Cold War frame prevailed on the media about American foreign policy, providing a cultural prism to explain complex political and military issues such as "Sovietology,"[14] "nuclear strategy" or "overseas intervention." Therefore, the "Cold War highlighted certain events as international problems, identified sources, offered normative judgments, and recommended particular policies."[15] However, with the disappearance of Cold War framing, the cultural prism for issues on national security may have been changed, and consequently, its media coverage may also have changed. This is the topic of my research.

## 4. Understanding Security and Security Discourse

In this part I will propose a basic theoretic conceptualization on "security" and "security discourse." The more specific discussion on security studies will be discussed in chapter 2. An understanding of "security" helps conceive how the US media have framed their news coverage regarding the subjects of "national security."

---

[14] According to Dalby, "Sovietology was created at the time of the McCarthyist crusades in the USA when considerations of loyalty and security were important"(p. 65): see, Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War* (London: Pinter Publisher, 1991).

[15] Pippa Norris, "The Restless Searchlight: Network News Framing of the Post-Cold War World," *Political Communication* 12(4), Oct-Dec 1995, p. 358.

***Understanding Security***

Works about theories of security start with a seemingly simple issue. The rapidity of change in the international system, as well as the inability of international theory to make sense of that change, raises this question: What is the exact concept of "security"?

Literatures on security studies identify the following three features. First, what is it that is being secured? Almost a decade after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the demise of Soviet empire, the answer to this question is by no means clear. Is the international system being secured? The nation-state? The "West?" Societies? No one seems to be sure.

Second, what sorts of threats constitute the conditions of security? They might be protection against enemies, whether external or internal ones, suppression of individuals of a particular color or religion, insulation against economic pressures and competitors, or economic sustainability. All of these threats have been proposed.

Finally, how do ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse and eventually become institutionalized in hardware, organizations, roles, and practices? Do they arise, as the conventional wisdom might suggest, from objective threats and conditions inherent to an anarchic world? Are they generated within, a consequence of notions about multiple selves and feared others? Or, are they socially constructed, the worst-case result of a dialectic form between what is observed and what is imagined?

With these questions in mind, what might security mean? Security is a word with multiple and contested meanings; and as Barry Buzan points out in *People, States &*

*Fear*, security is an "essentially contested concept."[16] Analysts and policymakers contest the definition of the term because at its core, claims Buzan, there are moral, ideological, and normative elements that render empirical data just conclusive and prevent reasonable people from agreeing with one another on a fixed definition.[17]

The contested concept of security has been under a serious reformulation by every security referent since the Cold War ended. During the 1990s we witnessed a general move to broaden the security agenda.[18] One approach was to move from a strict focus on the security of the state (national security) toward a broader or alternative focus on the security of people, either as individuals or as a global or international collectivity. The security of individuals can be affected in numerous ways; indeed, economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights may be germane more often than military issues. The major problem with such an approach is, however, deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable. Then how, can we get a clear sense of the specific nature of security issues, as distinct from other problems that beset the human condition? To what extent can we apply any of the methods and lessons of security studies to this broadened agenda? This is the very theoretical rationale of my research, which combines security study, discourse, and media framing.

---

[16] The notion of an "essentially contested concept" originally comes from W.B. Gallie, "Essentially contested concepts," in Max Black, ed., *The Importance of Language* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 121-46. Cited in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991), p. 7.

[17] Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 7.

[18] See, e.g., Buzan, *People, States and Fear*; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Ken Booth, ed., *Statecraft and Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press,

However, expanded concepts or agendas of "security" might be dangerous since, without clear understandings of the nature and scope of post-Cold War security, the simplistic inclusions in terms of concepts and agendas will only lead to the expansion of the outdated security discourse in which 'militarization' is most likely to occur. The most important legacy of the Cold War security is that every subject under security concerns formerly equalized with military concerns. At the same time, a widening along the referent object axis--that is, saying that "security is not only military defense of the state, it is also x and y and z"--has the unfortunate effect of expanding the security realm endlessly, until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda. This is not, however, just an unhappy coincidence or a temporary lack of clear thinking. The problem is that, as concepts, neither individual security nor international security exists.

"National security" refers to the security of the state and signals an ongoing debate, a tradition and an established set of practices. Conversely, the "security" of whomever/whatever is a very unclear idea. What radical term, there is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of "security" in non-state terms. It is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning. Of course, this identifying security with national security is a result of neorealism dominating IR studies during the Cold War. Because, as described before, a state-centric approach as a unit of acting and anarchic world view are the two prominent ideas of neorealism. An abstract idea of "security" is a less analytical term bearing little relation to the concept of security implied by national or state security.

---

1996); David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Gearoid O Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds., *Rethinking Geopolitics* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

***Security Discourse***

Security as a discourse has an everyday meaning. The term "security" has acquired a number of connotations, assumptions, and images derived from a variety of discussions. The label "security" has become the indicator of a specific problematic, a specific field of practice. To put it differently, it is a socially constructed term. Security is, in historical terms, the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on. Security, moreover, has not been a constant field; it has evolved and, since World War II, has been transformed into a rather coherent and recognizable field. In this process of continuous, gradual transformation, the strong military identification of earlier times has been diminished--it is, in a sense, always there, but more and more often in metaphorical form, as other wars, other challenges--while the images of "challenges to sovereignty" and defense have remained central.

The "language games" of a specific culture, with the fact that they are shared games rich with meaning, tell us something about the contours of the world. According to Wittgenstein, the preoccupation with the "rhetorical" construction of political "reality" is shared with those writers who have sought to theorize their linguistic and philosophical assumptions.[19] Within the culture of the Cold War, security is the glue by which multiple language games are bound. The use of the word social with security emerges along with the increased role of the state in providing certain types of services or care traditionally left to the family, and in the post-World War II world, it was followed by the language of

[19] See L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).

national security, defining an explicitly protective relationship between a state and its citizens. The elevation of security to the state level involved conceptualizing states in terms of families, homes, and the protection and security they are presumed to provide.

Therefore, as conventionally formulated security is about the protection of a political community of some sort, with community understood as a population with attributes in common. These attributes are usually articulated in terms of territorial community having commonalities that external "Others" imperil in ways that require violence or the threat thereof to dissuade.[20] Difference is posited as threatening when identity is premised on supposedly vulnerable sameness. The question then arises, can security be rethought in terms that do not necessarily equate difference with threat and that recognize the possibility of conducting foreign policy in terms of, for instance, "ethics of heteronomous responsibility"?[21] Among other things, this requires a recognition of the flows and the interconnections of transboundary interactions with the formulation of political identity and responsibility.

Security, in this sense, is meaningless without an "other" to help specify the conditions of insecurity especially during the Cold War. Der Derian, citing Neitzsche, points out that this "other" is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference--the state of fear--rather than a preferable coming to terms with positive potentials of differences.[22]

---

[20] R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
[21] David Campbell, *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1993).
[22] See, James Der Derian, "The Value of Seucrity: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," Lipschutz, ed., *On Security*, pp. 24-45.

According to Ole Waver, security is a socially constructed concept: it has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.[23] It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them. To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a non-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."[24] But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions.[25] The security that is socially constructed, of course, does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threat, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is "intersubjective." To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words,

---

[23] For a specific application of the notion of social construction to policymaking, see Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politic and Policy," *American Political Science Review* 87(2), June 1993: 334-47.

[24] In other words, the enemy, and the threat it presents, possess characteristics specific to the society defining them. See, e.g., Campbell, *Writing Security*, ch. 1.

[25] To this, realist would argue, states exist and the condition of anarchy means that there are no restraints on their behavior towards others. Hence, threats must be material and real. As Nicholas Onuf, Alex Wendt, and others have argued, even international anarchy is a social construction inasmuch as certain rules of behavior inevitably form the basis for such an arrangement. See Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making-Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics," *International Organization* 46(2), Spring 1992: 391-425; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society," *Review of International Studies* 21(3), 1995: 389-420.

nuclear-tripped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs.

In a more specific form of the discussion, to the perspective of "security discourse," there are two reflections on IR theories that affect the structure of this research. The first is a philosophical, but also linguistic, reflection: the nature of relations between nations is not independent of the way people, probably some particular group or groups of people, think, write and talk about those relations. I am not adopting a subjectivist position that ignores all physical, and historical, constraints, but I am suggesting that alternative interpretations are possible for the same of circumstances.

The second refection bears on this point: many of those who have thought, written, and spoken about international relations have either been political actors with the power to shape international relations, or they have advised or sought to advise political actors. Knowledge, power, and action are inter-linked, a relationship which, after the influence of Foucault, is now taken seriously by IR theorists.[26] For instance, the fact that theorizers of international relations also counsel statesmen is simply a fact of political culture that first becomes evident in Renaissance humanism, in the emergence of territorial states in Western Europe, and in the various modern forms of symbiosis between the state and the academy. It is an integral part of the culture of states that constitutes one familiar international political reality, the one privileged by, and in part

---

[26] For an excellent work about Foucault's influence on IR, see R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jan Aart Scholte, *International Relations of Social Change* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).

produced by, political science and IR. This cultural production cannot fully be grasped without a critical understanding of the texts and utterances that constitute it.

## 5. Media Framing

The last theoretical aspect for this work is about "media framing," which needs separate consideration. As I will show in chapters 2 and 3, at the core of Cold War discourse lie the three concepts of security, state, and sovereignty. Although the three concepts are woven together in political discourse, I have taken the concept of security to be crucial. One of the chief aims of this dissertation is to try to understand how such an abstract concept is constructed and mediated. A closely related aim is to indicate ways in which "security discourse" is contributing to the making of media coverage, which is one of the most important outlets of political discourse. Discussions on "media framing" explain this process as follows.

Framing addresses the power of the media to influence the shape of thinking in a society. Within a heavily dependent political system, I argue that the media, playing a very critical role in political discourse, have heavily depended for their news sources about national security on government officials during the Cold War. Historically speaking, within in a similar vein, Cohen empirically showed that the media cannot tell us what to think, but they can tell what to think about.[27]

---

[27] Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963).

Understanding media coverage through the concept of framing has become increasingly important. The term "media framing" refers to an interpretation structure that sets particular events within a broader context. Information processing research suggests that people have cognitive schema that organize their thinking, linking substantive beliefs, attitudes, and values. For journalists and readers, these frames guide the selection, interpretation, and evaluation of new information by slotting the new into familiar categories.

Yet remarkably little attention has focused on how news frames alter over time in response to external events, such as the end of the Cold War. One of the central aims of this dissertation is: if the media coverage on national security have changed as result of disappearance of the Cold War frame, then how another dominant news frames evolve, change, and adapt, focusing on American elite journal coverage of the articles including the term "national security" after the end of the Cold War.

The concept of framing is complex and elusive, so first we need to clarify our terms. The theory of framing suggests that journalists commonly work with news frames to simplify, prioritize, and structure the alternative flow of events. News frames bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and stereotypical images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments. The essence of framing is to select and to prioritize some facts, events, or developments over others, thereby promoting a particular interpretation. News developments are understood within regular patterns. Frames represent stereotypes, which slot particular events into broader interpretive categories that may or may not be appropriate. Because news frames can be expected to reflect broader social norms,

political minorities challenging the dominant culture are likely to prove most critical of such treatment.

Dominant frames are so widespread within a journalistic culture that they come to be seen as natural and inevitable, with contradictory information discounted as failing to fit preexisting vies. Like paradigms guiding scientific understanding, dominant news frames can be seen as "journalism as usual." Yet just as paradigms can, long-established frames sometimes break down, producing a period of confused rivalries between alternative interpretations of news frames.

Within a core frame, media serves as a primary mechanism by which elite opinions are communicated to the public. Research on media agenda settings testifies to this influence.[28] However, this is accomplished through the sheer amount of attention given by media outlets to various political issues; the more coverage an issue receives, the further up the agenda it supposedly moves. Agenda setting, then, may explain why certain issues in the information environment are considered to be more important than others by the public.[29] However, the traditional agenda-setting concept, also referred to as the "first level" of agenda setting, attempts to only explain why one issue becomes more important than another issues in the public's mind; it does not explicitly focus on the nuances of coverage within an issue. The traditional model of agenda setting overlooks the idea that controversy is the underlying basis of any issue that becomes a topic of

---

[28] Maxwell McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, "The agenda-setting function of mass media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 361(2), Spring 1997: 176-187; Shanto Iyengar & Donald Kinder, *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

[29] Maxwell McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, "The evolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas," *Journal of Communication* 43(2), Spring 1993: 58-67.

media coverage. How different conceptions of issues emerge and evolve over time, not merely their increased presence in media, is important for understanding change in public opinion.

Framing analysis, then, provides a means of describing the power of communication to direct individual cognitions toward a prescribed interpretation of a situation or object. Several empirical examples testify to the insights that the framing approach can provide regarding media effects on opinion.[30] Giltin defines media frames as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual."[31] By framing issues in certain ways, the media influence the way people perceive a problem or issue and its consequences, possibly altering their final evaluation of the issue. But most studies on framing do not focus on the nature of the controversy within a more discreet issue. Therefore, further investigations need to consider the differing political language used to characterize a single issue and to explore in combination with the amount of coverage the issue receives and the impact of these news frame on the importance assigned to that issue by the public.

***Cold War Media Frame***

---

[30] See Shanto Iyengar, *Is anyone responsible?: How television frames political issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); John Zaller, *The Nature and origin of mass opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[31] Thomas Giltin, *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkely: Univ. of California Press, 1980), p. 9.

A frame also refers to both the constitutive elements of an issue around which details are built and borders of discourse on the issue.[32] Frames help define which elements of an issue are relevant in public discourse, which problems are amenable to political action, which solutions are viable, and which actors are credible or potentially efficacious. Therefore, in terms of US foreign policy, an example is the "cold war" frame that dominated US news of foreign affairs until the end of the Cold War. The Cold War frame highlighted certain foreign events as problems, identified their source, offered normative judgments, and recommended particular solutions.

The frame of the mainstream American media can be expected to reflect and reinforce the dominant frames in American culture. This has certain significant consequences for the presentation of news in terms of the priority given to international news, regional coverage, and thematic coverage. In particular, the Cold War frame could be expected to have an agenda-setting effect by prioritizing the selection of certain events and countries as newsworthy. International conflicts perceived to affect US interests are likely to receive greater priority in news coverage than unrelated global events. If armed conflict, ethnic rivalry, violations of human rights, or civil unrest in countries like Algeria, Liberia, or Burma is not perceived as affecting vital American national security interests, we might expect little news coverage of these events.

The end of Cold War may also be expected to influence the regions and countries that are regarded as newsworthy, notably with a decline in coverage of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Moreover, we may expect a significant change in the themes of

---

[32] Maxwell McCombs & Donald Shaw L. "The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas."

international news stories, with a shift away from stories about military conflict. Maybe greater attention is likely for a more diverse range of social, economic, and political issues, including competition and cooperation in the global economy. Therefore, the end of the Cold War frame may not be simply about the way news stories are interpreted, although this is one important component. For example, the pace at which the frame changed can also be gauged by trends in the priority given to international or domestic news stories, in the coverage of the Soviet Union/Russia compared with other regions, and in whether international news stories about the global economy have overtaken traditional concerns about military conflict. In this sense, the breakdown of a dominant frame can be expected to determine not only how journalists interpret events, but also what events they choose to interpret.

The task of reporting international politics became increasingly complex following the breakdown of the Cold War. This raises certain central questions considered in this research in order to help us understand the framing process. Did the elite American media abandon the dominant Cold War frame in response to events in Eastern and Central Europe? Was this frame replaced by an alternative schema? And what have been the consequences for American media coverage of international affairs?

As explained above, the concept of framing may be useful in explaining the portrayal or presentation of official US foreign policy regarding national security issues. Framing appears to be useful to researchers as a means of referring to how an event is portrayed in a particular story or article. Through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one

basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others. Thus, to compare the media coverage about US national security between, during, and after the Cold War will show one of the major discussions on "security" discourse.

A few recent studies have begun to examine changes in international relations discourse, using a framing perspective to analyze media texts. For example, after accomplishing an extensive content analysis on network news in the pre-and-post Cold War period, for example, Norris showed that by 1995, there were fewer international news stories, and they were shorter and farther down the running order.[33] This suggests that over the last two decades there have been significant fluctuations in the priority given to international news, the coverage of different regions, and the themes of international stories that are judged newsworthy. Again, Meyer analyzed the framing of "national security" in elite discourse on nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union and its relationship to the broader political climate, including peace movement activism.[34]

***Who Is Framing in the Media?***

One important question regarding "framing" is about who is framing the coverage of "national security" news in the media. If we say, no dominant framework or metanarrative stands ready to replace the organizing and authorizing powers of the Cold War framing. In this rudderless context, reporters and academics have proposed alternative frameworks for describing how the US media covers the world in terms of US

---

33. Pippa Norris, "The Restless Searchlight: Network News Framing of the Post-Cold War World."
[34] David S. Mayer, "Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War," *Political Communication* 12(3), Fall 1995: 173-192.

national security interests. There are two theories. For some theorists, the media stands at an unusual crossroads of rich opportunity. With US foreign policy purposeless and with US correspondents forced into reflection about their world role, some scholars see the opportunity for a form of journalism on global justice. They see the chance for a humane journalism that gives overdue attention to the suffering of people who fell unnoted outside the media's former Cold War framework.[35]

Some observers have suggested that a chance toward humanitarian news values is already underway, that press and television coverage of international tragedies--"the CNN effect"--is driving US foreign policy. Hoge says, "Foreign policy-makers speak as if they are bedeviled by the nature of post-Cold War press coverage, often alleging that it is television film footage that dominated agenda-setting."[36]

Other theorists, however, offer a bleaker model. They suggest that the dissolution of the Cold War framework has rendered the press even more vulnerable to US foreign policy dictates.[37] Chomsky finds only confirmation of his decades-long struggle to demonstrate that "the major media other ideological institutions will generally reflect the perspectives and interests of established power."[38] Indeed, he affirms: "Case by case, we find that conformity is the easy way, and the path to privilege and prestige; dissidence

---

[35] Johan Galtung & Richard Vincent, *Global Glasnost: Toward a New World Information and Communication Order* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1992); Michael Traber, "Communication ethinis," in G. Gerbner, Howard Mowlana & K. Nordenstreng, eds., *The Global Media Debate* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993).

[36] James Hoge, "The End of Predictability," *Media Studies Journal* 7(4), Fall 1993, p. 6.

[37] Daniel Hallin, "Hegemony. The American News Media from Vietnam to El Salvador: A Study of Ideological Change and Its Limit," in D. L. Paletz, ed., *Political Communication Research: Approaches, Studies, Assessments* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993), Pp. 3-25; Hallin, *We Keep America on Top of the World* (London: Routledge, 1994).

[38] Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions: *Thought Control in Democratic Societies* (Boston: South End Press, 1989).

carries personal costs that may be severe, even in a society that lacks such means of control as death squads, psychiatric prisons, or extermination camps. The very structure of the media is designed to induce conformity to established doctrine."[39]

In a similar vein, other scholars see the news media withdrawing from the international scene, giving over foreign affairs to the policymakers. Unwilling to articulate national interests and unable to find a coherent fame of reference for organizing costly foreign coverage, these scholars argue that the press increasingly focuses its attention on domestic matters, venturing off-shore only for the most dramatic disasters or when US foreign policy is already directly in play. News images of the struggle against communism will be replaced, Hallin fears, by dizzying, unstructured images of a world in conflict, images of disorder, images ultimately of anarchy and chaos, resulting in an overarching "image of 'Forest American,' island of civilization in a sea of political barbarism."[40]

My work is also designated to test these two conflicting models. If the end of the Cold War has brought any change to the conception of the US national security in the media coverage, then, the new conception may change the patterns of news sources covering US national security policy.

## 6. Hypothesis, Methodology, and Data

---

[39] *Ibid*, p. 10
[40] Hallin, *We Keep America on Top of the World*, p. 76.

***Hypotheses***

Following this theoretical framework, I have five hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the end of the Cold War should have changed the amount of the media coverage on US national security. With the Cold War over, one of the common wisdoms in political discourse is that Americans have discussed national security less in the post-Cold War period. The disappearance of Soviet threat and the predominance of US military power as its result have lead them to conclude that the United States need not worry about its national security as much as it did during the Cold War. Based on this understanding, I hypothesize that the *New York Times* coverage about the US national security during the Cold War should be larger than that of the post-Cold War period. Chapter 4 is dedicated to test this hypothesis.

The second hypothesis is about from where the national security news sources are coming. To test this subject, I hypothesize that during the Cold War, media coverage primarily relied on government officials' statements. However, in the post-Cold War era, I anticipate that this tendency should have changed because the United States primary security concern in the Cold War frame, the super power rivalry with the Soviet Union, has disappeared. Thus, the government may no longer dominantly provide news source on national security concern to the media. This test is discussed in chapter 4.

Third hypothesis is that the breakdown of the Cold War changed the subjects of news coverage about US national security. "Military" or "defense" issues, such as armament, nuclear weapons, arms control, or secrecy, should dominate the discussions on US national security portrayed on the *New York Times* during the Cold War. This trend

should have changed after the end of the Cold War, with other issues such as economic, social, or cultural topics becoming to be seen as "national security" concerns. This hypothesis is tested in detail in chapter 5.

Fourth, I expect changes in the countries and regions that were once considered noteworthy. In terms of the Cold War frame, "Sovietology" presumably provided the dominant themes for US foreign policy, particularly national security policy during the entire post-War period. During the Cold War the first question in relation to overseas crisis was presumably, "is the Soviet Union behind?" With the Cold War over, however, Russia, former Soviet Union countries, or old communist countries no longer constitute much of a threat to US national security. Therefore, I expect that the *New York Times* articles referring to other countries for US national security concerns should have decreased since the end of the Cold War. Chapter 6 deals with this hypothesis.

Finally, we may expect an idea that the US no longer needs a role of "world-leadership" as the country did during the Cold War. As we consider the recent election, President Clinton and Bob Dole hardly mentioned foreign affairs. A large portion of Americans might believe that proposing another world-leadership role in the post-Cold War is meaningless. I hypothesize that during the Cold War news articles about the US national security have primarily dealt with United States interventionist roles. But, after the end of the Cold War, the *New York Times* articles should have focused more on domestic affairs. This hypothesis is tested in chapter 7.

***Methodology***

The task in this dissertation is to trace a change in the meanings political actors have attached to practices of security. One of the main aims of this research is to try to make sense of how realism passed into practice via policy, how the collection of meanings that constitutes realism reproduced itself in the discourse of the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, and how much that collection of meanings attached to realism may have waned in the mainstream security discourse. Here, it is necessary to consider the complex processes of communication among officials, experts, and politicians that led to public commitments and their subsequent execution. Recent work on 'epistemic' communities is relevant to answer these processes. My own approach has been to focus on specific cognitive processes, reflected in language, communicative discourse, and texts, specifically within the media.

Many current political scientists rely on procedures adopted from natural science, which brings a set of meanings to the world he or she analyzes. The scientist begins by positing the object of explanation (identifying the body), then fixing the meaning of terms, and establishing relationships, after which he looks at the world. To fix is to hold the meaning of words in place on the basis of the scientist's definitions. However, another way of proceeding, more appropriate to the analysis of change, is to approach the context, that is, the social relationships in which meanings are directly embedded. This involves examining the positioning of subjects or objects in relation to others, their meaning within a whole: how the actors themselves establish boundaries and act within a particular time and place, what kinds of distinction are made, what kinds of relationships

are contrasted, what types of language games are played, what actors in different positions do, and the meaning of these acts within a context.

The reason why discourse in crucial in social theory, including political theory and IR theory, is that such theories in general consist of words. In other words, theories use textual material in a communicative context. Physicists use mathematical symbols to construct theories; so do many economists. Using natural language, on the other hand, inevitably involves would-be theorists in some recourse to metaphor. It also involves them in historically and socially constituted discourses, as well as numerous other communicative phenomena, whereas mathematical notations can at least limit such complications. It is erroneous to argue analogically from theorizing in physics to theorizing in IR. The same point holds for arguing metaphorically from the economic theory of markets to international theory, when the source domain is presupposed to be objectively and uniquely true. It is not that economics is irrelevant in understanding international politics--it is on the contrary. But to exclusively use microeconomics as a metaphor for conceptualizing a construct termed "international system" may well be contrary.

The analysis is presented in a narrative form in which I attempt to demonstrate the forms of action characteristic of each player at particular points in time and how the discursive explanation begins to change as actors make different moves, drawing on the possibilities belonging to one social context or the other. Only direct quotations have been documented, but all references to attributes or actions belonging to one grammar or the other are based on their recurrence in text after text by different authors at particular

points in time. It is not possible for purposes of publication to include detailed references, but the overall body of data will be described. The exercise is primarily descriptive in nature, attempting to trace changes in language games related to security and thereby to say something about the context from which current questions about redefining security have emerged.

Both for this narrative material and for some quantitative measures, I conducted an extensive content analysis of 1980-1997 news articles from the *New York Times* that included the phrase "national security" using the LEXIS-NEXIS electronic database.[41] First of all, my research was conducted by a yearly base in order to show the general trends about any possible changes on the discussions on "national security." I will use the "comment" including the phrase "national security" by a single source about national security discourse as the unit of analysis, then code the comment article in terms of the source, subjects, countries, and US interventionism.

***Data***

The contents of elite media are relevant for assessing prevailing foreign policy discourse because reporters and editors generally accept the assumptions and consensus of the foreign policy establishment. Even though this is a debatable issue, many scholars have proved the voices and viewpoints of the media coverage on foreign policy that mostly come from members of mainstream government. These assumptions include the definitions of the nature of the foreign threats and opportunities the United States faces

[41] Coding sheets are attached in the 'appendix.'

and the role of the US in the world. By accepting assumption, reporters are disposed to accept the particular foreign policies that address those threats and opportunities as officially designated. They generally accept the official definitions of what is important for "national security," based on national interest, designation of goals, and selection of strategies.

For example, Bennett found that in the case of American policy toward Nicaragua in the 1980s, when debate between Congress and the White House intensified, the *New York Times* introduced a wider array of non-elite, non-official voices and perspectives. After 1986, however, when the Reagan administration won substantial congressional support for the Contras and official debate collapsed, opposition voices in the *Times*, including those from congressional quarters, disappeared from the news.[42] Bennett identified that his test on Nicaraguan case shows that "opinions voiced in news stories came overwhelmingly from government officials."[43] Bennett and Jarol Manheim found a similar dynamic in the debate leading up to the Persian Gulf War.[44] In addition, as Berry states "the patriotism or cultural bias of journalists makes them congenial to foreign policies designed to meet the nation's problems."[45]

Among elite media, the *New York Times* is a particularly appropriate medium to

---

[42] Bannett labeled reporters' coverage on foreign policy as "index theory." He explained that, when reporters approach subjects on national security or foreign affairs, they index them according to their weight, and these weights are determined usually by government officials' statement or established expert's analysis: see Lance W. Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States," *Journal of Communication* 40(2), Spring 1990: 103-125.

[43] *Ibid*, p. 122.

[44] W. Lance Bennett and Jarol Manheim, "Taking the Public by Storm: Information, Cueing, and the Democratic process in the Gulf conflict," *Political Communication* 10(4), Oct/Dec 1993: 331-351.

[45] Nicholas Berry, *Foreign Policy and the Press: An analysis of the New York Times coverage of U.S. foreign policy* (NY: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. xiii, xiv.

study foreign policy discourse. They reflect official thinking, as well as possibly influencing and reflecting public views. It uses its own correspondents almost exclusively. It publishes relatively more foreign affairs news than other elite American newspapers and serves as a reference newspaper for other media.[46]

According to Page, "The *Times*, particularly on issues of foreign policy, is one of the most prestigious and authoritative publications in the United States."[47] He continues,

> "it is read by foreign-policy decision makers and experts, as well as by the editors, reporters, and commentators who decide what will appear in other mass media. Thus the opinions voiced in the *Times* also tend to find their way--directly, or through syndication, or by trickle-down processes involving editors, writers, and commentators in other media--to a mass audience. The quality of deliberation in such a forum could affect the quality of debate generally."[48]

Cohen cites statements from State Department officials and concludes that, "the *New York Times* is read more generally by foreign policy decision makers than any other newspaper, owing to its more extensive coverage."[49]

The 1980-1997 period is well suited for this analysis. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the processes of superpower détente, arms control, and the US withdrawal from the Vietnam imbroglio had suggested the possibility of reducing the military dimension in

---

[46] For the discussion of the way how the *New York Times* serves as a reference newspaper for other media, see, James Potter, "News from the three worlds in prestige U.S. newspaper," *Journalism Quarterly* 64, Spring 1987: 73-80.
[47] Benjamin I. Page, *Who Deliberates?* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 17.
[48] Page, *ibid*, p. 17.
[49] Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy*.

global politics. But the processes of militarization were again accelerated in the late 1970s by the renewal of the Cold War geopolitical contest between the superpowers. In particular, "the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the American reaction to it marked a watershed in American-Soviet relations, sharply dividing the previous decade of détente (admittedly, faltering badly by that time) from the ensuing years of containment and confrontation."[50] The unstable regimes in Central America around 1980 also contributed to the discourse of Communist threat. Superpower détente came to an acrimonious end amid vociferous arguments concerning the danger of the "Soviet threat" to "Western" security.

Thus, the beginning of 1980s, especially with Ronald Reagan's entrance to White House, sharply marked a "second Cold War" posture. Therefore, stories from the 1980s should contrast with those of the 1990s in discussions about "national security." In a practical term, in any case, the LEXIS-NEXIS database has a usefully indexed database on the *New York Times*, but it includes full text stories only after the year 1980. All articles including the phrase "national security" were searched. Among those articles I only examined all of the articles beginning on the front page, plus those in the editorial and op-ed section that wrote about US national security. Practically, I could not analyze all the articles. Even though some of the important contents may be missed, most of the explicit discussions of "national security" are studied. Articles with capital letters such as 'National Security Council,' 'National Security Advisor,' 'National Security Committee' in the House, or 'National Security Agency' were not included.

---

[50] Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon and Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 977.

## Chapter Two: National Security: Concepts and Studies

In this chapter a general theoretical background on security studies is introduced. First, to analyze the media coverage about national security between 1980 to 1997, it is necessary to understand the conditions and processes in which the ideological complication between the two superpowers during the Cold War has deformed security studies in general. It is, because I expect that most of the stories shown in the media substantially reflect the mainstream governmental statements and academic positions. The three most important components of the Cold War security, anarchy, sovereignty, and militarism will be discussed. Second, to study news articles for a research text, it is also necessary to realize in what way "security discourse" has been emerged and conceptualized within a specific social condition, and in what ways "security discourse" has been rationalized in a process of "securitization." In this chapter, in particular, American hegemonic security discourse will be explained.

### 1. On Security Studies

#### *The Concept of Security*

*Security as A Term*

In this part, I will first explore some negative and ambiguous nuances of the security concept, then focus on Berry Buzan's explanation of the concept, which has been the most frequently discussed topic in security studies since the end of the Cold War. The term "security" is ubiquitous, in part because it refers to a series of widely held desires to

be free from threat. It is crucial to note the *negative* use of the term. Security is a term limited in usefulness for denoting desirable political situations because it is formulated as protection from some threat or danger rather than as promoting a desirable situation. Despite the positive value weighting usually ascribed to the term, analyzed even this simply, it appears a very limited term. It is defined in reaction to threats, and usually specifically to threats to the state.

The critical literature on security goes further than this. Leonardo Paggi and Peiro Pinzauti argue that, like peace, security is defined in negative terms.[1] To them state authority, according to contract theories of the state, provides a state of order in turn for the abrogation of citizen responsibility for the provision of security. Security is something achieved by states. There is no obligation or moral duty of citizens to provide security. In this sense, security is essentially empty. For all the verbiage devoted to the concept, it is not a sign of positive political initiative. Coupled to the modern conception of territorially sovereign states, a dominant theme of international political reasoning is the protection of state boundaries from military incursion from another state. The conventional military understanding of security represents security in geopolitical terms as the spatial exclusion of military threats.

Security also refers to a guarantee or a certainty of something. Security is then understood as assuring particular arrangements into the future. This usually implies stable political arrangements; social change that might upset these arrangements is then easily targeted as a threat to security. In its extreme version, this mode of reasoning also seeks

---

[1] L. Paggi and P. Pinzauti, "Peace and Security," *Telos* 68, 1985: 79-92.

forms of absolute military security in the technological provision of complete assurance of protection from any military eventuality. The American Strategic Defense Initiative in its public guise as a space shield or protective dome promised just this kind of security from nuclear missiles.[2] This metaphysical construction of security as stasis and spatial exclusion fundamentally contradicts a predominant theme of modern society, which is change, interaction, and acceleration. This understanding of security is inherently politically conservative precisely because it emphasized permanence, control, and predictability, and, it should be noted, it can easily invoke the use of violence to maintain the desired stability.

The more sophisticated political analyses of security in IR suggest that although at an immediate level the concept is accessible, in fact it usually is a particularly fuzzy and ill-defined term, and nowhere more so than in discussions of international politics.[3] What is clear from both the discussion of the wide range of concepts of security and the difficulties of defining security in any stable sense is that security is stretched to cover a multiplicity of meanings open to many interpretations and uses, not all of which are immediately compatible.

All these difficulties with the term led Barry Buzan to argue that security is an essentially 'contested concept,' one whose meaning is flexible and the object of many

---

[2] See J. Chase and C. Carr, *America Invulnerable: The Search for Absolute Security 1812 to Star Wars* (New York: Summit, 1988); and Jon Connell, *The New Maginot Line* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1986) on the fallacies of military technology as the provider of absolute security.

[3] On the origin of the ambiguity of security, see Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Arnold Wolfers, *Discourse and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

competing claims and attempts at definition.[4] The utility of these concepts stems in some paradoxical way from whatever it is that makes them inherently ambiguous, and it is their ambiguity that normally stimulates theoretical discussion about them. They encompass a whole domain rather than a fixed point within the landscape of social science. Barry Buzan's work is a standard source for many recent discussions of the theme of security in international relations. He attempts to clarify the contestability of security by elaborating in detail in many of the meanings and uses of the term and investigating their relationships. His analysis simultaneously critiques conventional approaches to international relations and attempts to transcend the limitations of the idealist approach to peace and the realist focus on power. Buzan argues that neither gives an adequate account of international relations and that taken together they obscure much that an approach based on the concept of security can reveal. Drawing on Waltz's classic treatment of these themes, Buzan argues at length that the term requires consideration of all three levels, individuals, states and international system, for any adequate comprehension of the dilemmas implicit in its formulation. States supposedly render their citizens secure, but they do no necessarily do so.[5] Alternatively, states may directly violate citizens' security by locking them up or killing them, ironically often in the name of preserving national security. Individual security may not be threatened by political changes that drastically alter the structure of the state. Likewise, changing patterns and arrangements in international politics may render both citizens and their states insecure.

---

[4] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear, p. 7.*

[5] See, Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997): 121-148.

Buzan's suggests that the framework of international anarchy offers the potential for a stable security structure if the states in it are stable. Stability requires that internal security threats are manageable without spilling over borders and that the states are politically cohesive. This political maturity comes supposedly from Western-style "economic development" and participation in the liberal capitalist global economy. Increasing density of interactions, he argues, eventually leads the makers of statecraft in each state to recognize that their security interests are best served by cooperative ventures and support for the international order. Buzan's argument is, however, very much an argument for the political status quo, as it has emerged immediately after the events of 1989. He argues for the triumph of Westernization, liberal capitalism, territorial states, and the inevitability of technological progress, backed up by the willingness to use force to maintain this international order.

But for all its eloquence and its optimistic prognosis of the possibilities of international security community building, Buzan's analysis is vulnerable in a number of important ways. Most importantly, his claim lacks of a historical contextualization of the emergence of the modern state. His choice between a state of nature and the state is no historical choice at all. States are simply taken for granted as the inevitable and sole providers of security arrangements for humanity. Other forms of community are not considered. In terms of the potentials for peace-making, Buzan himself as a realist downplays the possibilities of non-state actors in the process of community building; focusing on states as the providers of security limits the possibilities of active intervention by NGOs, social movements, and individuals in the process of international

politics. Second, despite his rhetorical admission of the ethnocentric limitations of the international relations enterprise, its role as an ideological reflection of the interests of first British and subsequently US hegemony, his accounts of non-Western societies are crude and dismissive.[6] They are rendered as "people without history," and in being so rendered questions of intercultural relations and the legacy of Western imperial violence are downplayed.

*Securitization*

The answer to what makes something an national security issue can be found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented and posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats. Traditionally, by saying 'security,' a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.[7]

---

[6] Ken Booth made a very similar point on this subject. See Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs* 67(3), July 1991: 527-45; and Ken Booth and Michael C. Williams, "From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997): 33-60.

[7] On this see Ole Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

When we consider the wider agenda, what do the terms existential threat and emergency measures mean? How, in practice, can the analyst draw the line between processes of politicization a processes of securitization on this basis? Existential threat can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question.

"Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). In principle, the placement of issues on this spectrum is open: Depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum. In practice, placement varies substantially from state to state (and also across time). Some states will politicize religion (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Burma) and some will not (France, the Untied States). Some will securitize culture (the former USSR, Iran) and some will not (the UK, the Netherlands). In the case of issues (notably the environment) that have moved dramatically out of the nonpoliticized category, we face the doubt question of whether they have merely been politicized or have also been securitized. Based on this process of

securitization, I argue that one of the main roles of media in a democratic society is to function as a place to securitize social issues. As I have shown in chapter 1 and 2, since security is socially constructed concept, its role of securitizing issues is critical to both policymakers and general public.

*Whose Security?: States?*

One important issue regarding the concept of security and the process of securitization is the question about security for 'whom.' Governments usually refer to national security as the highest stated value of their state's existence, if not its essential raison d'etre. The implicit assumption in this claim to legitimacy is that in providing "national security" states really do render their citizens secure, at least most of the time. This is the essential presupposition in conventional security discourse, as it is in Buzan's analysis. It is thus a key point for beginning a critique of security as conventionally formulated in neorealist perspectives. However, in the nuclear age, with the possibility of major nuclear war ever present, it is clear that states are incapable of fully guaranteeing their citizens' safety and the security situation of many third world countries is often far more concerned with internal factors: threats to state security arising from various combination of ecological, economic, military, ethnic, and secessionist difficulties.[8] In Buzan's term, there are weak states, lacking the social cohesion and institutional structures, that many Western states

[8] Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon, "Third World National Security: Toward A New Conceptual Framework," *International Interactions* 11(2), 1984: 103-135.

have evolved. They are victims of "structural violence," in Johan Galtung's term, where poverty and inequity are the most immediate threats.[9]

According to Buzan, this is a issue on the state as the 'referent of object' of security.[10] The referent object is the thing that is to be secured. While strategic studies focused on the question of military threats and their responses, it further assumed that such military security meant the security of states, and so the referent object of security in strategic studies is the state. If pressed, this assumption seemed to rest on a political theory of the state as a 'container' of security. While strategic analysts might accept that the security of people was what ultimately mattered, the state was the only institution capable of providing that security in the face of an anarchical international environment of armed states. Therefore, states' security was all that was needed to be discussed. Buzan rejected this argument, suggesting that the relationship between states and individuals was rather more problematic: "The security of individuals is locked into an unbreakable paradox in which it is partly dependent on, and partly threatened by, the state. Individuals can be threatened by their own state in a variety of ways, and they can also be threatened through their state as a result of its interactions with other states in the international system."[11]

During the Cold War, strategic security studies were mainly concerned with the security of the state. As argued above, this is founded on the belief that the state acts as a container of security, ensuring the security of the people within its borders. Security for

---

[9] Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8(1), 1971: 81-117.
[10] Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 17-20.
[11] Buzan, *ibid*, p. 364.

individuals, in other words, is guaranteed by their citizenship of a particular state—as long as the state is secure its citizens are secure. Given this view of the state, it makes sense for international security to be concerned with threats to the security of that container, and thus security means state security. Put another way, the referent object of the study and practice of security is the state.

### *Beyond Cold War Security*

#### *During the Cold War*

Within the ubiquitous political utility of the theme, 'security,' US and, more generally, Western attempts to reformulate security in the last few years can be read to reveal much about the construction of international political life. The challenges to US conceptions of security from the World Order Models Project, the Worldwatch Institute, and others in the late 1970s,[12] not to mention the Carter administration's efforts to develop an energy policy that was "the moral equivalent of war," were swept aside by calls for a reinsertion of the Cold War geopolitical premises as the terms for political debate.[13] But these categories and the policies that went with them were even more problematic in their second incarnation.[14] The Reagan agenda of unilateral military superiority and geopolitical confrontation ran into opposition from the arms control fraternity dedicated

---

[12] R. Barnet, *Real Security* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980); G. Mische and P. Mische, *Toward a Human World Order: Beyond the National Security Straightjacket* (New York: Paulist Press, 1977); D. Pirages, *The New Context for International Relations: Global Exopolitics* (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978).

[13] Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War.*

[14] In Jerry Sanders' phrase, for example, the agenda of the Committee on the Present Danger "founded on the shoals of reality," Jerry Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston: South End, 1983).

to international limitations on weapons of mass destruction. In the 1980s most of the US population supported ideas of nuclear freezes and renewed attempts at superpower cooperation while opposing military interventions abroad. The European allies of the United States were, to a large extent, more interested in detente and 'Ostpolitik' than nuclear confrontation, and they developed new ideas about security to articulate these concerns. In Moscow, with the arrival of reformist times and foreign policies dedicated to reducing the dangers of war, geopolitical competition became less and less acceptable as the dominant narrative of US security policy.[15] While set back by the jingoism associated with the Gulf War, the growing recognition of the limits of military power also helped to thwart the unquestioned application of military solutions to social problems.

These developments are linked intellectually to developments within the discipline of international politics, where in the 1980s a debate raged over the theoretical and methodological premises and purposes of the enterprise.[16] Neorealism came under attack from a variety of intellectual directions, and its inadequacies and ideological function as apologies for the status quo were heavily criticized.[17] World society and peace studies perspectives intruded on the agenda of the mainstream IR studies. More critical and "postmodern" approaches challenged the theoretical formulations of realism and the presumptions of the academic field as the sources of policy "advice to the Prince."

---

[15] Michael MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991).

[16] K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

[17] Neorealism is different from Classic realism. Neorealism works with structuralist notion of "system," and they seek to account for changes in the system in terms of the system itself. That is, they try to explain the

All of these modifications of security discourse distance it from the traditional concern with external military threats and domestic order. In the aftermath of the Cold War, writers and environmental activists in Western states are once again rushing to rearticulate conceptions of security. But many of the calls for enhancing and enlarging the scope of the concept of security are made while the ambiguities, inconsistencies, and persistent lack of clarity concerning its use, identified both in the critical political literature on the Cold War and within the discipline of international relations, remain.

This contradictory situation provides a point of departure for the present work. Using insights drawn from contemporary critical theorizing in international relations, this research explores the political implication and the limitations of the traditional discourse of security, then, illuminates the possibility of new security discourse. In the next part, the two most common approaches in security studies are considered in detail.

*Neorealism vs. Neoliberalism in Security Studies*

The end of the Cold War and the new issues of international politics that are emerging as central make this a propitious time for rethinking established analytical approaches to national security. Neorealism insists that shifts in the balance of relative capabilities are the main determinants of international politics. Yet it is difficult to link the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union causally to dramatic changes in power capabilities.[18] It is undoubtedly true that the relative economic and military decline

---

behavior of states in terms of "international system," while its predecessor, classical realism, postulates the existence of a universal human nature whose essence is a drive for power.

[18] John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in Richard N. Rosecrane and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, pp. 48-62 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Richard

of the Soviet Union convinced the Soviet military of the need for fundamental reform. While neoliberalism helps us understand the importance of institutions at the end of the Cold War, it is of less use in making intelligible the central features of international politics after the Cold War. During the Cold War, it may have been reasonable to take for granted state identities, at least on the central issues of national security along the central front that divided East from West. Definition of identity that distinguish between self and other imply definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on national security policies. Furthermore, such definitions of identity are rarely captured adequately with the language of symbolic resource sought by self-interested actors.

In sharp contrast to the realist view of the international system as Hobbesian state of nature, neoliberalism offers a theory of the cultural-institutional context of state action. The dominant neoliberal application--regime theory--captures only what in a statistical sense is "normal" about norms. But norms reflect also the premises of action. While above a certain threshold behavioral violations invalidate norms, occasional violations do not. Critics of neoliberal institutionalism have made this their central point. These critics insist that social change engenders a process of self-reflection and political actions that are shaped by collectively held norms.

Self-reflection does not occur in isolation; it is communicated to others. In the process of communication norms can emerge in a variety of ways: spontaneously evolving, as social practice; consciously promoted, as political strategies to further specific interests; deliberately negotiated, as a mechanism for conflict management; or as

---

Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization* 48(2), Spring 1992: 249-77.

a combination, mixing these three types. State and strategies thus are shaped by a never-ending political process that generates publicly understood standards for action. According to them, international and domestic environments also shape state identities. The international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways. The state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors.

Neorealist and neoliberal theories adhere to relatively sparse views of the international system. Neorealism assumes that the international system has virtually no normative content. The international system constrains national security policies directly without affecting conceptions of state interest. Neoliberalism takes as given actor identities and postulates ideas and beliefs as intervening variables between assumed interests and behavioral outcomes. In this view states operate in environments that create constraints and opportunities.

Both analytical perspectives overlook the degree to which social environments and actors penetrate one another. The domestic and international environments of states have effects; they are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities. The cultural-institutional context and the degree to which identities are constructed both vary. In some situations neorealist and neoliberalist assumptions may be warranted. But these perspectives soften overlook important political effects that condition international politics and thus affect issues of national security.

It is worth paying our attention to neorealists' counter-arguments to this criticism. By presenting an evolutionary vision of knowledge that draws on a particular conception of science, and by identifying neorealist theory as the expression of this process within security studies, Walt, a typical traditionalist, attempts to anchor the legitimacy of neorealist security studies to a claim to authority within the field.[19] This unarticulated foundation then provides the conceptual context within which the debate takes place. Threats are what prevailing conceptions say they are, and security follows suit. This claim to authority, in turn, is justified by a commitment to a form of knowledge that is presented as self-evident and authoritative, but never fully articulated. The most important of neorealist tradition concerns the centrality of the state as the subject of security and provides the basis for the exclusion of issues other than those of traditional military diplomacy from the field. Walt, for example, defines the scope of the discipline as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force. . . . it explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war."[20]

No one would deny the significance of these issues. Yet given the challenges that have been raised to thinking about security in these narrowly traditional terms (not to mention the broader claims that so state-centric a conception of IR is no longer tenable), how is it the Walt and the vision of security studies he represents are so easily able to

---

[19] See Stephen Walt, "Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35(2), June 1991: 211-39.
[20] Walt, *ibid*, p. 212.

present these as the preeminent facts and concepts generated by the historical evolution of knowledge about security? The answer involves a conceptual foundation based on anarchy and states.

### *Critical Security Approach*

Within this section, 'critical security studies' are closely considered. Most of the main arguments concern how to improve neorealistic security approaches.

#### *Challenging Neorealism*

Two conceptions challenge the traditional neorealist approach. The first one is about citizenship. The neorealist vision of security effectively makes it synonymous with citizenship. Security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from citizens of other states. Threats are directed toward individuals qua citizens, and the study of security accordingly strives to mitigate threats through concerted action by the representatives of the citizenry--the state leaders. This underlying rationale allows neorealism to call for the continued restriction of the agenda of security studies. Yet, while to be a people without a state often remains one of the most insecure conditions of modern life (witness of the Kurds or the Palestinians), this move obscures the ways in which citizenship is also at the heart of many structures of insecurity and how security in the contemporary world may be threatened by dynamics far beyond these parameters. One way to grasp these challenges is to link them to analogous debates over the nature of subjectivity, the state,

and security that have become among the most vibrant and diverse areas of debate in contemporary International Relations.

One set of challenges has been united by a common desire to treat the object of security not as the sovereign state but as the individual: security is a condition that individuals enjoy, and they are given primacy both in the definition of threats and of who is to be secured. Rather than presuming an identity (by means of sovereignty) of the individual with the security of the state (as in neorealism), concentrating on individual security exposes the ways in which this may conflict with claims of state security. But from this basic reorientation, three overlapping arguments have emerged that treat individuals as rights-bearing persons, as citizens or members of society, or as members of a transcendent global community.

First, making individuals qua persons the object of security, opens up the state for critical scrutiny. Protection of individuals within a community is with support for states, and this leads to a focus on individual human rights and the promotion of the rule of law, which protects persons from each other and from predatory state institutions. The focus then becomes the security of the person, a theme that finds its most prominent expression in a stress on the rights of individuals against their own states in areas such as freedom from torture or wrongful imprisonment, or protection from everyday violence and privation.

The second possibility illuminates a central dynamic in contemporary life that is consistently obscured by neorealism: the way in which the most direct threats to individuals can come not from the anarchic world of international relations and the

citizens of other states, but from the institutions of organized violence of their own state. This has been highlighted in the work of scholars such as Mohammed Ayoob, who argues that the state-centric and contractarian tenets of the classic neorealist conception obscure the fact that in many places the states is not the guarantor of security but is rather the greatest threat to its citizens.[21] It is also echoed in the notion of "societal security" developed by Ole Waever.[22] The doctrine of sovereignty and national security become a justification for the use of state institutions against political opposition: citizenship paradoxically becomes a source of insecurity, and the claims of citizenship become the justification of violence. The claims of the state to authority over citizens as citizens provide a source of its ability to exert violence against them. The national security state is the extreme, if unhappily familiar and oppressive, outcome as the situation in many Central American or Middle Eastern states, for example, has historically illustrated. Conversely, the identification of "us" becomes a precondition for actions against "them".

The third aspect of individuals as the objects of security treats them as members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns. Shifting the focus of security to the individual paradoxically allows an engagement with the broadest global threats. This allows issues such as environmental security to emerge from the neorealist shadows as threats to the security of humankind, and often as threats that cross political boundaries. Environmental degradation poses threats to individuals that transcend

---

[21] Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 121-46; Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1995)

[22] Ole Waever, "Societal Security--A Concept and Its Consequences," *Conflict and Cooperation* (Summer 1995).

particular states and exclusive conceptions of national security. Proponents of broadening the definition of security in this fashion almost always suggest that external threats of organized violence are far less urgent than, for example, the consequences of continued environmental degradation or economic growth and transformation.[23]

However, it is necessary to be alert that treating the individual as the object of security risks simply replicating the Lockean and Hobbesian alternatives of contract theory that it seeks to replace. Moreover, treating abstract individuals as the foundational objects for thinking about security may lead to an inability to grasp the dynamics of ethnic conflict and the fragmentation of existing sovereignties. In these cases, the neorealsit assumption of the state is inadequate, but so, too, is the appeal to abstract individuality as that which is to be secured. Rather, these conflicts must be seen in part as conflict over the constitution of collective identity that provides much of their impetus. Similarly, the dilemmas over how to think about them are part of the reason for the international discord and ineffectiveness in dealing with them, as evidenced in Bosnia and Somalia, more recently in Kosovo and East Timor.

The second set of challenges to the neorealist approach is raised by the argument that the appropriate referent for thinking about security is identity and its connections to community and culture.[24] Individual security cannot be severed from the claims of group and collective structures within which individuals find their identity and through which

---

[23] On this discussion see Patricia Mische, "Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty," *Alternative* 14(4), 1989: 389-427; Daniel Deudney, "The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 19(3), 1990: 461-76.

[24] See especially ch. 2 of Ole Waever et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993).

they undertake collective projects. Although this is one of the insights of classical realism, it was subsequently reified into an unreflective assumption by neorealism, and it also appears to have dropped out of the analysis in other approaches.[25] The competing claims to identity, and the argument that legitimate sovereignty lies in the ability of the group to govern itself, are at the heart of many current nationalist conflicts.

As with the focus on individuals, this way of looking at things also challenges the assumption of the state as given, but it does so in significantly different ways. Most prominently, it is the existence of competing claims to sovereignty, rather than the competition of existing sovereignties, that provides the source of conflict and the appropriate understanding of what is to be secured. In opposition to the empiricist predilections of neorealism, the source of conflict in these cases is an idea. This is not to say that material elements are unimportant, but such conflicts simply cannot be reduced to the competing interests of pregiven political objects. They are about the creation of thee objects, and the way in which different identities are constitutive of them.

*Broadening the Concept of Security*

With regard to security studies in the post-Cold War it is necessary to examine two contradictory positions, the military strategic approach and a more broad security approach. One position in the debate between optimists and pessimists regarding the nature of security studies by the end of the Cold War argues that the proper umbrella and

[25] See Yosef Lapid, "Theorizing the 'National' in International Relations Theory: Reflections on Nationalism and Neorealism," in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward Mansfield, eds., *International Organization: A Reader* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 20-31; Ronan Palin and Brook M. Blair,

title should be security studies, but that it should retain a relatively narrow (or only slightly enlarged) understanding of its scope and purpose.[26] Another position argues that the shift from strategic to security studies ought to expand the categories and areas of analysis considerably beyond their traditional purview, with strategic studies retaining its more narrow purpose and scope while being embedded within the broader ambit of security studies.[27] These two contradicting positions are also the legacy of the Cold War.

Contemporary debates over the nature of security often float on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical issues concerning to what and to whom the term security refers.[28] It is even difficult to gain a perspective on how the central claims and assumptions of the various strands of debate are related to controversies over the theory and practice of security.[29] As Barry Buzan has noted, although few today defend a narrow definition of national security, "that advance does not, however, mean that a consensus exists on what a more broadly constructed conception should look like."[30] Or, as Helga Haftendorn notes, there is no "common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research questions are."[31]

---

"The Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 19, October 1993: 385-99.

[26] This is the position staked out by Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies": 211-39; Richard Schultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, eds., *Security Studies for the 1990s* (New York: Brassey's, 1993).

[27] Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear* is the most clearly exponent of this view.

[28] For an excellent illustration of this, see the list of definitions collected by Barry Buzan, and his commentary on them. Buzan, *ibid*, pp. 16-18.

[29] Central contributions to the debate have been Buzan, *People, States and Fear*; Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, 1991: 3-17; Stephen Walt, "Renaissance"; Edward Kolodziej, "What is Security and Security Studies? Lesson from the Cold War," *Arms Control* 13(1), April 1992: 1-31.

[30] Buzan, *op, cit*, p. 14.

[31] Haftendorn, *op, cit*, p. 15.

To understand the debates surrounding so-called new threats to security, it is useful to historicize the concept. Security, after all, is a historically variable condition: while one might perhaps agree with Thomas Hobbes's claim that the fear of death is the one truly human condition, the sources of this fear (not to mention less fatal threats) vary drastically across time and space. Grasping the contemporary meaning and nature of security, then, means coming to terms with the historical dynamics that constitute contemporary world politics, and the way in which security is understood within the dominant modes of contemporary thought. Then, we must ask: Is the concept of security really broadening with the Cold War over?.

Now my final task regarding security studies in the post-Cold War era is to illuminate how much the concept of security has been expanded. In a prescient article published in the early 1980s Richard Ulman made a general case for broadening the concept of security.[32] Ulman viewed national security as more than a goal with different trade-off values in different situations. He insisted that national security be threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life of state and nonstate actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of political choice.[33] But as the height of the second Cold War in the early 1980s, security specialists did not consider seriously the arguments of European peace researchers.

---

[32] Richard Ulman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 18(1), Summer 1993: 129-53.
[33] Ulman, pp. 130-35.

With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed.[34] In distinguishing between traditional, narrow definitions and recent, broad conceptions of security studies, Stephen Walt, Edward Kolodziej, and Barry Buzan, among others, have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security, as well as about the scope of analytical approaches and empirical domains appropriate to security studies.[35] The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use of control of military force by states.[36] This contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats that affect not only states but also groups and individuals, as well as other nonstate actors. Those interested in the state and in traditional issues of national security tend to favor established realist and liberal approaches developed during the last decades. A new generation of scholars built on these approaches in reinvigorating the field of security studies as an intellectually challenging field of academic scholarship during the 1980s. In contrast, those interested in unconventional, broader definition of national security--such as economic competitiveness, human rights, or human rights--as

---

[34] One often-cited survey of the field of security studies from 1987 illustrates this point very clearly. See Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference of the State of the Field," *International Security* 12(4), Spring 1988: 5-27.

[35] Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Security Quarterly* 35(2) January 1991: 211-39; Edward A. Kolodziej, "What Is Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War," *Arms Control* 13(1) April 1992: 1-31; Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*; Barry Buzan, "New Pattern of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs* 67(3), July 1991: 431-51; Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemma of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17(1), Winter 1992: 95-134; Ole Waever et al, *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); Emil Kirchner, Christoph Bluth, and James Sperling, eds., *The Future of European Security* (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996): Ken Booth, ed., *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).

[36] Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," p. 212.

affecting not only states but also non-state actors tend to favor alternative analytical perspective.

However, extending the boundary of security without simultaneously investigating the formulation of what it is that is being rendered secure is a particularly tempting strategy for analysts and practitioners of national security, now that the certainties of the Cold War confrontation have evaporated, but it is one that begs precisely the questions that should be asked. The question then is whether, in the process of extending the boundary of threats requiring a military response, one is not further militarizing society rather than dealing more directly with political difficulties. As Lothar Brock puts it in discussing the possibilities of environmental security as a policy focus, "defining environmental issues in terms of security risks is in itself a risky operation. . . . we may end up contributing more to the militarization of environmental politics than to the demilitarizaiton of security politics."[37] It is the reason why we need a clear conceptual reformulation on security before the expansion of the subjects of security.

## 2. On Security Discourse

Recent social theory is particularly concerned with issues of power and knowledge, with the role of language and particularly, discourse, in the maintenance of political arrangements of domination. In particular the current postmodern concerns are with questions of power and discourse drawing on concerns in linguistics, philosophy and literary theory to critique the contemporary cultural practices of modernity. This shift of

---

[37] Lothar Brock, "Security through Defending the Environment: An Illusion," in Elise Boulding, ed., *New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 98.

focus from positivist approaches and epistemological concerns with correspondence rules of truth, involves conceptualizing social existence as human practice. Social life is active creation, albeit within created frameworks of custom, economy, power and language. Social life is understood in the through language, and hence the structures of language reflect and create social life. Based on this understanding, this dissertation focus on one specific set of discursive practices--the interpretation, highlighting, and emphasizing of the media coverage of "national security" discourse.

The poststructuralist dissidents in international relations question the whole operation of security as a discourse for making sense of contemporary politics.[38] They argue that discourse implicates practitioners in the practices that they claim to be only observing from some detached, neutral vantage point. More so than most, security has been a state policy practice as much as an academic activity. Among other themes, the critics point to the politics of security discourse and the importance of media representations in legitimating political orders in numerous locations.[39]

Academic tools of analysis are often closely related to the social institutions that manage social phenomena, formulate state policy, and oversee its administration. This was particularly so in matters of strategy and security during the Cold War, where expertise involved a series of security discourses that structured analysis and policy prescription.[40] David Campbell has shown that security is a policy discourse that has

---

[38] James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Toronto: Lexington, 1989).
[39] For a critical overview, see Sankaran Krishna, "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory," *Alternatives* 18(3), 1993: 385-417.
[40] Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* (New York: Guilford and Pinter, 1990).

frequently worked to constitute political order rather than to initiate social change.[41] "National Security" has very often been a conservative formulation equating the political status quo with desirable order. Likewise, the assumption that Western political identities are unproblematic, not to mention universally desirable, and that all political matters are to be judged by their criteria leads all too quickly to the attribution of difference as a threat. Formulating social problems other than direct violence in terms of security too easily results in miniaturization or violence as a solution to what is defined as a problem. Thus, social theory is a political practice in that it situates actors, articulates identities, and legitimizes organizations and institutions. Then, how was the security discourse in the United States designed and substantiated after WWII.

### *Cold War Security Discourse*

At its height the Cold War was simply portrayed as a confrontation between totalitarianism and the free world, but the reality was much more complex. Stephen J. Whitfield has shown in detail how the United States in the 1950s took on characteristics of its adversary.[42] Whitfield has described how the United States in the 1950s lurched to the right ideologically and imposed unprecedented cultural constraints; how left-wing activities were closely and vigorously monitored by the FBI; how Congressional hearings ruined careers with innuendo and the blacklist; how a 'boxed-in' press and television stood aside when the CIA arranged the overthrow of the government of Guatemala; how

---

[41] David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
[42] See Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

paranoia led to and was fed by nuclear air-raid drills and high-publicity spy trials. In these circumstance comfort was found in familiar refuges; these included the cornucopia of US technological consumerism, evangelizing Christianity (judiciously mixing a redemptive cocktail of fear of god, fear of communism and fear of Armageddon), and a popular culture which demonized and brutalized the "Reds", made "squealing" mandatory and showed that the gun-slinger in the white hat always wins in the end.

Within this logic what enmity promises is the clarification of one's own identity. Enemies in a Cold War are undoubtedly real--they pose a material threat and have hostile intent--but enemy images can also be an effective resource in domestic and foreign policy. For individuals and groups, identifiable villains ('diabolical enemy images') perform psychological, sociological and political functions.[43] Psychologically, enemy imaging serves several possible functions: it may help sublimate frustration, justify improper behavior, serve to focus aggressiveness, divert attention from other problems, and provide a contrast by which to measure or inflate one's own worth or value. Sociologically, enemy images may help foster solidarity and cohesion, improve the definition of objectives and make it easier for individuals to accept training and socialization in group norms. Politically, enemy images can assist in the identification of interests, the definition of goals, the planning of programs, the socialization of citizens, the maintenance of an ideology, and, by polarizing good and evil, can intensify orthodoxy and dogmatism and so help create heightened nationalism and consensus. In short, enemies can be useful.

---

[43] On this discussion, see David Finlay, Ole Holsti and Richard Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Cambridge: Rand McNally, 1976).

Interestingly enough, under Cold War pressures crude enemy images often served better than sophisticated ones. Mary Kaldor has argued that the dynamics of the Cold War and the nuclear arms race were not simply to be found in the international arena, in the interaction of mutual threat systems, but more importantly in the domestic political and socio-economic ambitions and fears of the major protagonists.[44] From this perspective the Cold War can be seen as a mechanism for managing domestic problems. Because of this, Kaldor argues that the East-West confrontation was an 'imaginary war.'

None of the above is intended to deny the heroism and good sense demonstrated on all sides in relation to some aspects of the Cold War; nor is it to suggest that important issues were not at stake or that everywhere there were moral equivalencies. What it does suggest is that what passes in the books for the 'Cold War' in the contemporary Western mind is far from that which is likely to become commonplace in the far future--separated from the late twentieth century by critical distance and historical imagination. For the moment, however, complacency rules in Cold War studies. Perhaps we will never know how close the world came to suffering the war to end all wars, because those who participated did not know at the time, and still less so with hindsight they know how they would have reacted if there adversary had taken the next escalatory step in a particular crisis. We are now learning that there were many more risks than was assumed in the power-serving strategic studies literature of the time; we are now clearer about the malfunctions in the three Cs (command, control and communications) systems of the strategic forces of both superpowers, the possibility of inadvertent war, and the mistakes

---

[44] Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

in crisis mismanagement.[45] Clearly, there were positive sides to the Cold War for the west--no world war, no communist expansion westwards, unprecedented prosperity and so on-but nobody is served by ignoring the dark side. What if it had all gone horribly wrong, as the record is now showing was far from impossible? We have not yet made a full accounting of the costs of the Cold War, either as individuals societies or as a potential global community of victims.

### *American Security Discourse*

#### *Discourse of Otherness: Geopolitics*

The theme of the 'other' is important in contemporary critical social theory. It provides a focus for this study precisely because of 'Other' involves questions of demarcations between realms of knowledge: how the knower relates to the known; how cultural and political identities are structured; and how discourses are articulated in hegemonic arrangements.

The discourse on and about 'other' is concerned with the perennial philosophical debates within the Western tradition concerning identity and difference. In Western thought a bifurcation of reality involves a conception of the other as difference against with the 'I', 'we' or 'the same' is defined. In particular, in Derrida's terms, self-identity is defined in terms of 'difference', a spatial and temporal deferment of the other, a move

---

[45] On this research, see Michael MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991); Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993); Steve Smith, "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 1-37; Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

which privileges identity over difference. Derrida's concern is with the structure of Western thought which relies so heavily on dichotomies and polarities.[46] These frequent polar opposites--good versus evil, being versus nothingness, nature versus culture--have distinct valuations built into their formulation. And, formation of 'other' inevitably tangles with the central role of dichotomizing and dualism in social theory, and in particular debate is enmeshed in specific conceptions of space and time. In political relations, conceptions of space and time can be articulated by 'geopolitics,' which has been the key determinant of American security discourse.

The exclusion and the other and the inclusion, incorporation and administration of the Same is the essential geopolitical moment. The two processes are complementary; the Other is excluded as the reverse side of the process of incorporation of the Same. Expressed in terms of space and power, this is the basic process of geopolitics in which territory is divided, contested and ruled. The ideological dimension is clearly present in how this is justified and explained and understood by the populations concerned; the 'other' is seen as different if not an enemy. 'We' are the same in that we are all citizens fo the same nation, speak a similar language, share a culture. This theme repeatedly recurs in political discourse where others are portrayed as different and as threats; it is geopolitical discourse. The way how discourse of 'otherness,' 'geopolitics' in a more specific term in terms of foreign policy was incarnated in the United States is explained in the following part.

---

[46] J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated by G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); and *Dissemination*, translated by B. Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

*American Hegemonic Discourse*

Although security as a political concept of 'Geopolitics' has a lineage that can be traced back through the history of Western political theory, since the mid-1940s the term has been particularly prevalent in US political discourse.[47] Its genesis is directly related to the dramatic changes in international politics caused by World War II. The United States emerged as the preeminent power presiding over a new world order. Lessons learned from World War II were incorporated into the new political situation. Isolationism was no longer feasible as a foreign policy. The rapid expansion of US interests also saw a rapid expansion of potential threats to these interests. Attempts to render all these newly acquired interests safe from political or military disruption necessarily involved a vast effort. They also required the amalgamation of the concern of the diplomat, soldier, and economic manager; the term "national security" quickly came to encompass most of the external environment faced by the United states. Hence national security involved policy initiatives in many places and across a variety of fields.

The Cold War quickly codified and enlarged the themes of the new understanding. The dangers form the Soviet Union, understood more in economic and political terms until the early 1950s and the 68 National Security Council (NSC68) foreign policy review, were coupled slightly later to the related concern over internal subversion. The McCarthyism purges and witch hunts were often justified in terms of national security. Military and institutional reorganization in the late 1940s produced the CIA and NSC as the preeminent organizations in the formulation of US policy in many

[47] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," *American Historical Review* 89(2), 1984: 246-281.

fields. Military threats and the role of nuclear weapons were central to these concerns, but events as far afield as the oil fields of Iran or the jungles of Southeast Asia took an immediate and urgent place in the deliberations of the security analysts of the new bureaucracies and think tanks.

This preoccupation with a wide vista of threats and with politics on the world scale combined with the emergence of a "realist" approach to international relations in the academy, as I have indicated in the early part of this chapter. Realism epitomized by Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* emphasized the importance of power in enhancing security in the international anarchy of world politics. Power was seen as the ultimate arbiter of international relations; all other approaches were secondary. In the nuclear age, power was understood mainly in terms of war-fighting potential and military prowess. International relations, as a number of commentator have noted, is very much a US discipline.[48] Strategic studies have also spread through many of the states tied into the US-dominated alliance system. The ethnocentric limitations of the realist concerns have influenced the discussions of security in developing countries, as have the concentration on military strategy and the assumptions of an external threat and permanent insecurity.

In the United States, the use of the concept has often conflated a number of meanings of security with powerful ideological effects. The deliberate conflation of national security with international (mainly the West and capitalist states) security and with collective security operated to render US imperial interests justifiable: the normal

---

[48] Ekkehart Krippendorf, "The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16(2), 1987: 207-214; Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, 1977: 41-60.

and desirable state of affairs. Coupled to this was the conflict between the East and West, much of which was played out in the South, where the poor and underdeveloped countries were rendered as a security threat as soon as questions of unrestricted US access to their resources were raised. Security also justifies internal spying on those who are portrayed as "subverting" the state, undermining national security, often in the interests of external powers. Finally, security also justifies permanent military mobilization, which may cause economic costs and render many citizens vulnerable to a variety of threats.

This is not to suggest that these understandings of security were always hegemonic. Many states attempted to develop security policies based on neutrality, and many never accepted the nuclear standoff between the superpowers as the inevitable result of the phenomena of security dilemmas. Nonetheless, the Western policy debate and the discussions of security in international relations were heavily influenced by these realist assumptions and the primacy of state politics. In Europe in particular, the political discourse was skewed by the persistent theme of planning to fight an "imaginary war" with the other superpower.[49] This preoccupation with potential global nuclear war and the geopolitical rivalry has shaped much of the Western discipline of international relations and its related subdiscipline of strategic studies more explicitly concerned with the minutia of military planning and strategy.[50]

---

[49] Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
[50] Bradley S. Klein, "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defense Politics," *Review of International Studies* 14(2), 1988: 133-148.

## Chapter Three: US National Security Policy and its Realist Underpinnings

Chapter three will illustrate in what ideological basic and practical reasons US national security policies were formulated during the Cold War based on the explanation of security studies and US hegemonic security discourse examined in chapter two. In particular, the three characteristic features of US foreign policy during the Cold War, "militarism," "globalism," and "interventionism" will be identified. Since the first priority of US foreign policy in the Cold War era was given to national security concern because of the hegemonic competition between the two great powers, "national security" concerns centered on the key US foreign policy practice through the entire Cold War period. Therefore, I expect the three characteristic features should be most significantly recognized in US national security policies. In the media coverage, different from domestic news, reporters are likely to rely on their news sources in case of foreign affairs. This assumption leads us to anticipate that "militarism," "globalism," and "interventionism" should significantly identified in the *New York Times's* coverage on US national security. The more specific discussions on this matter will be shown in the following chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. In this chapter, I first examine the meaning of "national security" to Americans in practice of US foreign policy after WWII, then in what specific rationale and conditions those three characteristic features have been located within the Cold War US foreign policy frame. Secondly, for theoretical background of US foreign policy practice in national security concerns, I will show how the great thinkers of

realism (or neorealism) have effected on those practices in terms of national security interests.

## 1. The Beginning and Ending of The Cold War

There are several approaches to understanding the beginning and end of the Cold War. In terms of conventional Western memory the Cold War was a confrontation, which became global, between the Soviet and Western systems. In all sectors of relations--military, ideological, diplomatic, economic and propaganda--there was conflict, but open war was always avoided between the major protagonists. There were however several extremely dangerous crises, and a number of brutal wars took place between their proxies.

According to one view, the historical origins of the confrontation lay in the traditional suspicion between Western liberalism and Russian authoritarianism, which had led to the Russian empire never being fully welcomed into the Western great power club in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century a new round in the confrontation was sparked in 1917 by the Booshevik revolution and Wilsonian crusading. It reached its culmination following the breakdown of the anti-Axis allies between 1944 and 1947 and the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's leading military powers. In brutal and insinuating ways, this Cold War came to dominate the pattern and character of international relations across the globe. From such a perspective the recent Cold War describes only one stage in a historical adversarial relationship between the West and Russian power on the Eurasian landmass.

Another viewpoint--less historical and more ideological--focuses on the period between 1917 and 1991, from the Bolshevik revolution to the decision to wind up the Soviet state. This might be called the long Cold War. Here the emphasis is on the political clash between the rival ideologies, communism and capitalism. Typically, this characterisation puts the blame for the start of the confrontation on the Bolsheviks, and only sees its end with the collapse of the Soviet state. What might be called the short Cold War was marked by the consolidation of the Western and Soviet systems at the end of the Second World War. This period, 1947-53, was dominated by the leaderships of Harry Truman and Josef Stalin, and marked out post-war international relations in terms of a highly militarized US-Soviet global rivalry.

Yet another version prefers to see an original--the first--Cold War, between 1944 and 1962, and a second or new Cold War, between 1979 and 1987. The first Cold War began before the Axis powers had been defeated, as the maneuvering started for favorable post-war positions; it then escalated dangerously into a militarized confrontation which was not ameliorated until the Cuban missile crisis brought home to decisionmakers the narrowness of the divide between Cold War and catastrophe in the era of intercontinental delivery systems and nuclear weapons. Thereafter, a 'limited adversarial relationship' developed, characteristic of other great power rivalries in the past, until the convergence of the Reagan and Brezhnev leaderships, when both superpowers reverted to fundamentalist types, and descalating words and deeds again led to fears of war.

This period arguably ended with the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union and his determination to change the character of the Soviet-US rivalry. The Cold War was publicly brought to a close by the former protagonists in 1990. By this definition the ending of the Cold war was not synonymous with the ending of the Soviet state. Probably the widest usage of the term "Cold War" refers to the systemic struggle which always managed to fall just short of hot war, between the Soviet Union and its allies and the United States and its allies, that developed alongside the defeat of Hitler in 1944-5, passed through various stages of intense confrontation and detente, and ended with the decision to wind up the Soviet state in 1991.

## 2. The Meaning of National Security in US Foreign Policy

### *Invoking National Security*

Definitively to articulate what "national security" means in the United States is hardly possible. The phrase "national security" has continued to be used to explain and justify many of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the United States since the end of the World War II. To put the idea in a most simple way, first of all, US national security is global in its scope.

On the perspective of its origin, what might be called 'the age of national security' was inaugurated in 1947. On March 12 of that year Harry Truman asked the United States Congress to approve $400 million in foreign aid for Greece and Turkey. He justified his request by claiming that "totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine *the foundations of international peace and hence*

*the security of the United States.*" Thus, "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." [1] Truman went on to explain the importance of the Greek Civil War for "*the foreign policy and national security*" of the United States in terms of an early version of the soon to be ubiquitous "contagion theory."

The presidency of Ronald Reagan, awash in the rhetoric of national security, supplies myriad more recent examples. According to Reagan, the American troops in Lebanon killed by the suicide bombing in October of 1983 were stationed there because "the Middle East is, , , , *vital to our national security.*"[2] The logic implicit in this claim is quite typical. Lebanon itself was important because war in Lebanon threatened the stability of the Middle East, which threatened the possibility of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, which in turn might jeopardize oil resources necessary to our allies in Western Europe and Japan, which would then threaten the economic and military strength of the free world, including the United States. According to this logic, US national security interests and hence its commitments are again conceived of as virtually global in scope. Two days after 230 marines were killed in Lebanon, on October 25, 1983, the US invaded the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. Although the ostensible reason for the invasion was the rescue of American medical students in danger from the

---

[1] Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, 1947, Volume IX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, for the World Peace Foundation, 1949), pp. 646-648, emphasis added.

[2] "Address to the nation on events in Lebanon and Granada," October 27, 1983, *Public Papers of the President, Ronald Reagan*, 1983, Book II (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 1519, emphasis added.

coup in Grenada. Grenada was at that time also being described as a "Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion of export terror and undermine democracy." In defense both of the presence of US troops in Beirut and of the US invasion of Grenada, Reagan argued that

> "There was a time when our national security was based on a standing army here within our borders and shore batteries of artillery along our coast, and of course a navy to keep the sea lances open for the shipping of things necessary to our well beings. The world has changed. *Today our national security can be threatened in far away places. It's up to all of us to be aware of the strategic importance of such places and to be able to identify them.*"[3]

Again, a prominent national security concern for the Reagan administration was the threat, the "menace to the peace and security of our Latin neighbors--and ultimately to ourselves," ostensibly posed by the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua.[4] "The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America," Reagan warned in 1983; "If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our homeland would be put in jeopardy."[5] In response, the United States cut economic ties with Nicaragua, mined Nicaraguan waters, and provided military aid to the Contra insurgency attempting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government--a government that the United States continued formally to recognize. Indeed, as it is shown in the following chapters of this dissertation,

---

[3] *Ibid*, p. 1521, emphasis added.
[4] Reagan, "Transcript of the President's speech," March 16, 1986, *New York Times*, March 17, 1986, p. 12.
[5] President Reagan's address on Central America to joint session of Congress," April 27, 1983, *New York Times*, April 28, 1983, p. 12.

the "Iran-Contra" incident was the very issue which was most frequently covered by the *New York Times* among the period of 1980 and 1997 using the phrase of "national security." In this case again, US national security was closely interconnected with US credibility abroad and was used to justify military action, economic sanctions, and covert intervention.

In addition to the pervasiveness of the language of national security in explanations and justifications of the global, interventionist, and militarized foreign policy of the United States, this rhetoric has also played an important role in its post-war domestic politics. For example, perhaps most notoriously, 'national security' was invoked in the attempt to cover up the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins and to stifle the subsequent Congressional investigation of them. The "national security defense" was "the standard defense of the actions of White House employees in burglarizing the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.[6] In 1973 Nixon told the Associated Press Managing Editors' Association that

> "I told Mr. [Assistant Attorney-General] Peterson that the job that he had, . , was to investigate the Watergate matter, that *national security matters were not matters that should be investigated because* there were some very highly sensitive maters involved, not only in Ellsberg but also another matter so sensitive that even Senator Ervin and Senator Baker have decided that they should not delve further into it."[7]

---

[6] Frank Mankiewiez, *US vs. Richard M. Nixon: The Final Crisis* (NY: Quadrangle, 1975), p. 150.
[7] Quoted in Mankeiwiez, emphasis added.

Of course, even the edited White House transcripts revealed quite clearly that the "national security scenario" was a blatant fabrication devised by Nixon, H. R. Haldeman, and John Dean to prevent testimony about the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins and to prevent the FBI from tracing the money involved through the Committee to Reelect the President back to the White House.[8]

In similar fashion, national security was again ritualistically invoked both to justify the actions of the participants in what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal, the secret sale of arms to Iran and the illegal funding of the Contras, and to hamper later Congressional investigations. The rhetoric of national security has thus significantly affected not only the foreign policy of the United States, but its domestic politics as well.

As these examples indicate, the rhetoric of national security has done yeoman service explaining, selling, justifying, excusing, and perhaps whitewashing US foreign and domestic policies throughout the post-war era. Then, what exactly does "national security" mean?

### *The Meaning of National Security in the United States*

In order to understand both the authority vested in this national security talisman and the ability of the U.S. national interest in national security to underpin global interventionism and militarism, it is necessary to understand what was actually meant by "national security." However, despite the importance of this conception in anchoring an enormous institutional apparatus, motivating and justifying costly foreign policy actions, and

---

[8] Douglas Muzzio, *Watergate Games: Strategies, Choices, Outcomes* (NY: New York University Press, 1983), p. 10.

legitimating domestic repression, there has been persistent failure explicitly to examine the concept of national security. Instead, both polemical statements invoking national security and more sober discussions of national security and national security policy are consistently vague about the actual content of the U. S. national interest in national security.

In this respect, Inis Claude's remarks on the term 'balance of power' are singularly appropriate to the term 'national security' as well.[9] "It is frequently assumed," said Claude,

> "that the meaning of the concept is self-evident, or clearly established and generally understood. Thus, the term is used as common coin, often without any attempt at definition or explanation. Indeed, "national security" might be regarded as a cliche in the literature of international relations--a standard expression, a phrase which literally rolls off the tongue or pen. . . . Unfortunately for the scholar who wants to understand and evaluate, the meaning of "national security" is not so definitively established as those who glibly use the phrase seem to imply."[10]

The term national security is used as "common coin" although it is not elaborately or explicitly defined. As Richard Barnet has pointed out, "in no statue is there a definition of national security."[11] The National Security Act of 1947 provides a good example. Although its title explicitly proclaims that this legislation was enacted in the pursuit of

---

[9] Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations* (NY: Random House, 1962).
[10] *Ibid*, p. 12.
[11] This is Richard Barnet's description from his "Rethinking national security," *New Yorker*, March 2, 1988, p. 107.

national security, the Act itself does not define the term. Instead, like a cliche rolling glibly off the tongue, it repeatedly invokes a common-sense understanding of national security. It is claimed, the purpose of the Act is "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security."[12]

In one sense, the absence of an explicit analysis and conceptualization of national security is not surprising. Policy makers and bureaucrats seldom engage in meta-level discussions about either the fundamental assumptions or the basic objectives informing their practices. Instead, they are primarily engaged in "problem-solving" activities based upon "problem-solving theories." These take the world as they find it, "with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make those relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble."[13] The common sense understanding of national security, the implicit theory of national security on which national security policy is based, is therefore seldom if ever examined since a detailed theoretical understanding of it is not considered particularly necessary to practical decision making. Thus, consistent with a focus on "problem-solving," one finds sustained and detailed analyses of national security policy, which focus not on clarifying the meaning or the assumptions of the common-

---

[12] Refer to the *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. 9 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, for the World Peace Foundation, 1948), Pp. 266-290.

[13] Robert Cox, "Social forces, states, and world orders: Beyond international relations theory," in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1986), p. 208.

sense conception and implicit theory of national security, but on alternative policies for achieving the self-evident good of national security within the parameters set by the common-sense understanding.

A problem-solving orientation also characterizes many academic analyses of national security and, in fact, the entire discipline, or sub-discipline, of national security studies. This sub-discipline is primarily a policy science, concerning itself with "the presence of forces as an instrument of policy."[14] It focuses on questions of how to make, select, and implement policies on such typical "national security" issues as arms races and arms control, nuclear strategy and nuclear proliferation, anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency, and military intervention and military aid.[15]

These studies are not generally accompanied by any explicit discussion or examination of the basic US national interest in national security which this 'planning' and "policy" is supposed to achieve. Instead, national security, the goal of this planning and policy, is simply assumed to deal primarily with force--military power--and its accoutrements, and particularly with military strategy, nuclear strategy, and the potential or actual use of military force. As these examples suggest, it is generally assumed that planning refers to military planning and that "threats" to US national security are military threats. This is, of course, consistent with the militarized character of US foreign policy. Within the sub-discipline of national security studies, then, the term national security is

---

[14] B. Trout and James E. Harf, eds., *National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982), p. 2.

[15] Similar lists of topics can be found in Bock and Berkowitz (*op. cit.*) and in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A report on a conference on the state of the field," *International Security* 12(4), 1988, p. 25.

used as "common coin," with little attempt at sustained theoretical or conceptual analysis. As with all policy science or problem-solving theory, efforts are instead consistently directed towards practical, policy-related issues and problems.[16] As one analyst put it, when it comes to the concept of national security, "theory has been generally eschewed in favor of analysis of specific problems and case studies."[17]

Occasionally, of course, the concept of national security and, in particular, the US national interest in national security, are defined somewhat more self-consciously and explicitly. The most conventional definition is some version of the following: national security is "the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats."[18] Similar definitions include Walter Lippmann's understanding of security as a situation in which a nation "does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war",[19] and Arnold Wolfers' claim that security "points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired. . . . security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accord with common usage of the term."[20] A slightly more elaborate definition is provided by George Kennan, who argued that the "fundamental objectives of our foreign policy" are two fold:

---

[16] This policy orientation is not only due to the institutional and individual links between the national security state and the academic and semi-academic sub-discipline of national security studies noted above. It is also due, in part, to the "house epistemology"--the "orientation toward the character of political knowledge that is most often purchased by scientific political researchers as a knowledge-justifying framework"--upon which that sub-discipline is premised. See Michael Shapiro, *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices* (New Heaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981).
[17] Peter Mangola, *National Security and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.3.
[18] Bock and Berkowitz, "The emerging field of national security" (op. cit.), p. 134.
[19] Walter Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), p. 51.
[20] Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150.

first, "to protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continual ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers," and second, "to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which this national can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development of other nations and derive maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities."[21]

US national security thus refers to "the need to create an international environment conducive to the survival and prospering of the nation's domestic institutions."[22] According to Gaddis, this definition "was as close as Kennan ever came to identifying the nation's irreducible interest in world affairs" because Kennan, in good problem-solving fashion, assumed that "the more difficult task was to specify precisely what was required to enhance the security of the national and the congeniality of the international environment."[23] Determining policies is thus portrayed as more difficult and, by implication, more important than specifying the goals which the policy is being designed to achieve. Gaddis considers this definition to be "bland and unexceptional" and claims that "few . . . would have questioned his Kennan's formulation."[24] Definitions of

---

[21] Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 27.

[22] Gaddis (*ibid*). In an earlier article Gaddis, using virtually the identical words, claims that "the chief objective of US foreign policy has been to maintain an external environment conducive to the survival and prosperity of the nation's domestic institutions," He calls this definition of US objectives "a truism" which is "no less valid for that" ("Was the Truman Doctrine a real turning point?" (*op. cit.*), p. 386).

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.* As Gaddis claims, it is undoubtedly true that few would have questioned Kennan's formulation. However, that Gaddis himself finds this formulation to be "bland and unexceptional" is somewhat startling because of the obvious failure, by an authority on US national security policy, to recognize the political commitments entailed in this definition of US national security. These commitments include, among others, the global scope of US interests and the belief that the United States should have control over any event, no matter how far from its borders, if it affects the welfare of American citizens. Thus, sovereignty notwithstanding, events internal to another country are legitimate targets of US policy if they affect the US

national security, when offered, are typically couched in quite general terms and tend merely to reproduce and affirm "common sense." They do not specify when particular states are to be understood as threatening, when particular situations require US intervention, or what sort of policy response is mandated.

As I have explained so far, based on its virtually magical legitimizing effects, the authority of 'national security' means that issues labeled as 'national security' concerns can often override other concerns. It thus legitimizes the trade-off in favor of military security whenever conflicts arise between military and other potential security issues. Many of the resources needed for Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" programs, for instance, were devoured by the war in Vietnam, while the "kinder, gentle America" promise by George Bush seems to have vanished into the sands of the Persian Gulf.

Here I do not mean to suggest that the term have no meanings. Policy makers could not make foreign and national security policy if they did not have some understanding of national security that everybody shared, and the policy or problem-solving field of national security studies could not proceed without an understanding of its subject matter. The common-sense understanding is provided by the rhetoric of national security--that is, it is already provided in the rhetorical invocation of national security in particular concrete historical instance. The rhetoric of national security defines for the United States what its national interests, in the service of which its global interventionism and militarized foreign policies are pursued, actually are.

---

or its citizens. They include as well the commitment by the US to establish and maintain a 'world order' congenial to it. Among other nefarious consequences, this seemingly "bland and unexceptional" definition implicitly sanctions interventionism, the coercive interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Based on this tradition of conceptual basis about "national security" within the United States, it is not striking how quickly the American sense of security, confirmed by the wartime victories and the development of the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb, developed into a sense of insecurity. The postwar quarrels with the Soviet Union, intensified by a communist ideology that was, in its aspirations (or presentations), global in sweep--as was, in its own way, the American counter-ideology of democratic capitalism--gave way to a pervasive sense of insecurity.

***Characteristic Features of US Post-War Foreign Policy***

It is necessary to illuminate the characteristic features of US foreign policy during the Cold War. Because one of the main purposes of this study is to show how these features during the Cold War has changed after the Cold War. As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, I argue that during the Cold War three characteristic features of US foreign policy were marked--militarism, globalism, and interventionism. Because of the Cold War frame US foreign policy has mostly concerned on global competition with the Soviet Union, and this global competition gave US foreign policy priority to national security concerns. If we expect that the media should have unavoidably relied on government's official statement for their foreign policy news source, those three characteristic features should have occupied the media coverage on US national security. My hypotheses were designed to test if this tendency continues in the post-Cold War period. Then, before the hypotheses are analyzed, it is necessary to understand where the characteristic features of US foreign policy, "militarism," "globalism," and "interventionism," came from.

US foreign policy concerns, first and foremost, has been characterized by its globalism, by global commitments and a global presence. Ambrose asserts, "The United States of the Cold War period was concerned with all political problems in the world."[25] During the Cold War Americans began to believe that what happened anywhere in the world was important to the United States national interests. The US became concerned about the political and economic affairs of other states--in particular about their susceptibility to economic or political instability, to revolution, to Communist insurgency, or to direct Soviet aggression. It therefore committed itself to the rebuilding of Western Europe and Japan, to the provision of ever-expanding free trade arrangements, to virtually global anti-communism, and to the global, or al least the extended, deterrence of nuclear war.

This global character of US commitments and its global presence was scarcely passive. Rather, it often took the form of *intervention* into the affairs of other nations. Indeed, "intervention has been the dominant motif of American postwar security interest."[26] By intervention I mean, quite loosely, any activity undertaken by the United States which "interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state."[27] Much of US policy towards other states in the post-war era was characterized by some element of compulsion of coercion with respect to their domestic affairs. The interventionist disposition of post-war US foreign policy regarding US national security appeared under

---

[25] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p. xiv.
[26] Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana: The Cold War Empire and the Politics of Counter-Revolution* (NY: Viking Press, 1970).
[27] R. J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 13.

a variety of guises, including economic assistance, covert operations, and direct military intervention.

Economic assistance programs, for example, were used as an important tool to realize this interventionist disposition, as in the aid to Greece and Turkey announced in the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the European Recovery Program or "Marshall Plan" authorized through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. Military interventions in the form of the threat or the actual use of force are legion, while covert intervention into the domestic affairs of other states ahs been a persistent theme of US foreign policy as well. For example, the US has involved in the overthrow of the elected governments of Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1971. Among others, Iran-Contra was the most dramatic case as a military assistance to overthrow the Nicaragua social government.

American globalism and interventionism, moreover, typically took a very militarized form. Highly visible among the foreign policy tools characteristically employed by the US was the use of military force overt or covert, the threat of military force, and the provision of military aid. As many commentators have pointed out, military thinking after dominated discussion of the means to achieve US foreign policy goals. George Kennan has argued, "Extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives has become the mark of this postwar age."[28] This "propensity toward military thinking" has been "shared by virtually all postwar presidents and those whom they have depended."[29]

---

[28] George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 172.
[29] Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Patterns and Process* (NY: St. Martin Press, 1987), p. 389.

The motif of post-war foreign policy, the guiding thread that wove its globalism, interventionism, and militarism into an apparently solid and durable fabric, was the overwhelming focus on the US national interest in conceptions of national security. In addition, understanding the way in which the US national interest in national security has been constructed and understood should also help to explain why, despite the earthquake in international politics, the reconfigured landscape which has resulted from it, and the opportunities for change and for reconstruction which have been created, US foreign policy seem to be largely continuing along the well-worn paths of global military intervention, recently in the Persian Gulf. Then, what do these characteristic features of US national security come from? On what concerns, those features are composed as US national interest of US national security?

### 3. US National Interests

In approaching to define initiations of US national interest, I am using the term "political realism" to designate a tradition in the analysis of international politics associated with the work of E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Robert Gilpin. Political realism is a useful place to begin for two reasons. First, political realism broadly defined remains the predominant mode of explanation in the American study of international relations and international politics. It has thus become a touchstone against which other approaches are measured and evaluated. Second, political realism's preoccupation with the power and security of states makes it potentially useful in explaining the content of the post-war US national interest in national security. Third, the concept 'national interest'

plays a central role in realist theorizing about international politics. In this part, I focus on the role played in that model by the 'national interest' and, at the same time, the strengths and weaknesses of its conception of the national interests as a tool to explain the characteristic features of post-war and post Cold War US national security policy. Here, I explain the US national interest of national security by the way how most prominent American political realists argue and explain.

Despite its endless critics, political realism provides a parsimonious and elegant model of international politics. This model begins with the assumption that international politics differs from domestic politics primarily in this anarchic character. The absence of a supra-state authority places states in the international system in a situation of inevitable and perpetual competition and struggle often called a security dilemma. "Political Realism", according to John Herz, "characterizes that type of political thought which in one form or another, , , recognizes and takes into consideration the implications for political life of those security and power factors which are inherent in human society."[30] Because of the ubiquitous security dilemma faced by all states, every state must pursue its national interest "defined in terms of power", where this power is political, military, and economic in content.[31] Power supplies the means necessary to survive and to

---

[30] John Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 18.

[31] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Knopf, 1973), p. 5; his "Another great debate": The National Interest of the United States," *American Political Science Review* 46(4), 1952, p. 964; and his *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). In the latter he again claims that "international politics is an unending struggle for power in which the interests of individual nations must necessarily be defined in terms of power" (p. 13). Despite his insistence on the primacy of power considerations, Morgenthau did not have a simple-minded notion of the distinction between the national interest "defined in terms of power" and the moral goals that individuals or states might want to pursue. In his *In Defense of the National Interest*, for example, he argued that "the choice is not between moral principles and the

continue to compete in a situation in which all states are potential enemies in the anarchic world.[32]

In fact, of course, not all states are actual threats at all times. Instead, statesmen and analysts "focus on states that could constitute effective threats, alone or in coalition with one another, given the power at their disposal."[33] Threats to states are determined on the basis of relative power of states in the international system. The national interest "defined in terms of power" is thus determined by the objective situation and the needs of states, and depends upon the distribution of power among them. It is this distribution of power which provides the central explanatory factor in political realism. One of the important aspects of this tradition is the belief that decision makers should realistically assess the distribution of power; they should overcome their "aversion to seeing problems of international politics as they are" because this will allow them realistically to assess their national interests in light of the distribution of power in the international system.[34] The basic model of international politics is one in which the distribution of power in the anarchic international system and a states' relative position in that system determine the

---

national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality" (p. 33). Later in the same work he also argued that "the antithesis between moral principles and the national interest is not only intellectually mistaken but also morally pernicious. A foreign policy derived from the national interest is in fact morally superior to a foreign policy inspired by moral principles" (pp. 38-39). Morgenthau also made this argument I "The mainsprings of American foreign policy: The national interest vs. moral abstractions," *American Political Science Review*, 44(4), 1950, p. 854.

[32] Although Morgenthau defines the national interest explicitly "in terms of power," even in his own arguments power is actually an instrumental goal that is itself the means of achieving the more fundamental objective of protecting the "physical, political, and cultural identity" of the state ("Another great debate" (op, cit.), p. 973).

[33] Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1986). P. 8.

[34] Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (op. cit.), p. 7.

national interest of the state. Each state then acts on that national interest in order to maintain or enhance its power and its position in the system.

According to this argument, the distribution of power basically determines the actions of states through the intermediary of the national "interest defined in terms of power." For Morgenthau, for example, the status quo power "aims at the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists" at a particular time. This does not mean, however, that a status quo power is against all change. Rather, it opposes change which will upset the prevailing power distribution. What Morgenthau calls an 'imperialist' power, on the other hand, is a state intent on upsetting the status quo, on altering the existing distribution of power. For example, the "very status of subordination" of a defeated state "may easily engender in the vanquished a desire to turn the scales on the victor, to overthrow the status quo created by his victory, and to change places with him in the hierarchy of power."[35] On Morgenthau's argument, then, the position of the state within the distribution of power in the system determines that state's national interest and thus its foreign policy decision and actions. Kenneth Waltz makes a similar argument. For Waltz the structure of the international system is the "distribution of capabilities" in the system, or once again the distribution of power, and specifically, the number of great powers.[36] Despite his superficially more elaborate notion of structure, however, the "organizing principle" of that structure is simply anarchy--which results merely in 'self-help' as the mode of state behavior, not in any specific policies. The international characteristics of

---

[35] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 58.
[36] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 92.

states are irrelevant since "the units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated."[37] The distribution of capabilities or of power therefore again defines the system. In a rigidly deductive fashion, changes in the structure, for Waltz, will "change expectations about how the units (states) of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce."[38]

Whether explicitly or implicitly, the notion of national interest plays an important role in these realist explanations. For Morgenthau it was explicitly "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics."[39] It connects the distribution of power in the system with the foreign policies and actions of states. Since states exist in anarchy, and since they are therefore mired in the perennial competition of the "security dilemma," states must necessarily pursue a particular national interest which is concerned crucially with their survival. The content of the national interest which is thus determined deductively from the nature and structure of the international system, and in particular from its anarchic, self-help character. The national interest is primarily concerned with the integrity of the nation's territory, its political institutions, and its culture. For Robert Gilpin as well the 'national interest' encompasses basically the same interests typically proposed by other political realists. Despite his claims to an economic "indifference-curve" rather than a political realist approach to the national interest, he in fact lists three components of the national interest, or what he calls "state objectives", which are quite typical realist interests: the

---

[37] *Ibid*, pp. 88-97.
[38] I*bid.*
[39] Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (op. cit.), p. 5.

conquest of territory, increasing the state's influence over the behavior of other states, and controlling, or at least exercising influence over, the world economy (again, state power).[40]

Despite the elegance of the political realist explanation of international politics, it suffers from a set of oft-rehearsed limitation. They are the very limitation in comprehending the US national security discussions with the end of the Cold War. I am most concerned here with problems concerning its notion of national interest pursued by the US in the post war and post-Cold War eras. As used by political realists, the concept national interest has two important characteristics--it is determined deductively and it is normative.

First, the deductive determination of national interests in this tradition leads to a conception of those interests which is 'too broad, too general, too vague, too all-inclusive" to answer the question posed in this project. This is so, as Tucker has noted, because political realism "deals with the perennial conditions that attend the conduct of statecraft, not with the specific conditions that confront the statesman. Realism is addressed to the general limitations on statecraft, nor to specific limitations on policy."[41] As a result, it cannot tell us, for example, whether the use of nuclear weapons should be threatened in a specific situation.

Secondly, the political realist notion of national interest sometimes conflates a normative and an empirical understanding of the concept of national interest. This is

---

[40] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 18-24.

[41] Robert Tucker, "Political Realism and foreign policy," *World Politics* 13(3), 1961, p. 463.

particularly obvious in Morgenthau's analyses. Morgenthau was concerned with the question "what is the national interest? How can we define it and give it a content which will make it a guide for action."[42] He answered this question in a way which combined empirical and normative elements. Morgenthau used the term, on the one hand, to refer to the state's 'interest defined in terms of power' which reflected the objective power and security situation and requirements of the state. But he also used the term as a normative concept that was to prescribe the national interest of the US and thus to prescribe sound US foreign policy. Within the realist tradition, then, the term 'national interest' came also to refer to 'good' foreign policy, to foreign policy which actually succeeds in promoting national power and national security. It rejects as contrary to the national interest any policy which does not meet the criteria of power, prudence, and success. That is, polices which are successful in enhancing or preserving power are considered to have been in the national interest, while those that were unsuccessful are not. Because of the normative use to which the term "national interest" is sometimes put, this conception of the national interest does not allow it to encompass whatever goals the state in fact does pursue or has pursued. It allows only 'good,' successful policies oriented toward power to be "national interest."

### 4. US National Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period

During the post-War years containment of the Soviet Union dominated the foreign policy of the United States. The principle derives from President Truman's declaration in 1947

---

[42] "Another Great Debate," (op. cit.), p. 971.

that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[43] It is too simple- and simplistic-to suggest that nothing else animated the nation's approach toward world affairs, but to principle was more important in explaining American foreign policy conduct for half a century. Containing communism and the threat of Soviet expansionism whenever and wherever they might appear were the overriding objectives. Thus globalism, anticommunism, and containment were inextricably intertwined as defining elements of America's post-World War II grand strategy.[44] This is why the most primary concern of US foreign policy after World War has been focused on "*security*." Indeed, the Cold War period produced many experts, or 'security intellectuals,'[45] in various fields involved in consulting and research for military agencies, the air force RAND corporation being only the most famous of the new institutions.[46]

In the US public realm these experts often dominate, or attempt to dominate, public debate using their supposedly superior expert, and often classified, knowledge to specify the 'issues' in ways that maintain the foreign policy themes of containment and nuclear deterrence of the 'Soviet threat.' Their discourses interlink to portray the world as a place of dangerous military competition in which nuclear weapons are essential to the protection of U.S. national security.

---

[43] Harry Truman, "Special message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan," December 19, 1947, *Public Papers of Presidents*, Harry S. Truman, 1947, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (1963), p. 515.

[44] For specific discussion on this view, see, John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987).

[45] Luckham precisely pointed out the role of 'security intellectuals' in the Cold War foreign policy projections: R. Luckham, "Armament Culture," *Alternatives* 10(1), 1985: 1-44.

[46] For the discussions on the origin and military oriented functions of RAND, see, F. Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

The post Cold war era has brought several conceptual reconfigurations to policy makers. The first and most visible result of changes in the U.S. foreign policy was that policy-makers became increasingly reluctant to engage in activities that might run counter to popular opinion; and in a situation where the U.S. public appeared to have little stomach for foreign adventures, this made Bush and Clinton act all the more cautiously. The second result is that economics had become its new god, it increasingly looked as if individual decisions about America's role in the world were just as likely to be determined by how much they cost as by whether or not they were wise. As Bergsten has pointed out, "with the end of the Cold War the primacy of Economics reappraise the precepts that will define world affairs, and clearly link those precepts to American interests, which have shifted sharply in the direction of economics,"[47] Economic concerns seems to be the very invaluable proposition now.

The most interesting reconceptualization of US foreign policy regarding this paper in the post-Cold War era is whether the United States should look at outside or inside. Cold War thinking continues to dominate American foreign policy but to the detriment of a realization of U.S. interests. As Tonelson has urged that foreign policy planning cease to be "an exercise in creating wish lists and instead focus on questions that can actually provide useful guidance for foreign policy makers."[48] Such an approach might lead to a fundamental reevaluation of U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union, the implications of economic interdependence, and the missionary vision that propelled

---

[47] Fred Bergsten, "The primacy of Economics," *Foreign Policy* 87, Summer 1992, p. 5.
[48] Alan Tonelson, "Clinton's World: The Realities of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," in Charles Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *The Future of American Foreign Policy* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 46.

American globalism in the Cold War era. In the end—and for reasons contrary to the Clinton administration's thrust—one might urge that the United States focus its attention at home, not abroad.

To the contrary, the opposite voice in the discussion of US foreign policy is that the West's victory over communism will lay to rest America's obsession with the spearhead of the so-called communist challenge, the Soviet Union. Many observers, adhering to the view that the Cold War was rooted primarily in ideological incompatibilities, assume that the repudiation of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe simultaneously removed the sources of East-West animosity and American policy makers' obsession with its long-time ideological foe. Communism may be dead, but the logic of realpolitik continues. Based on this assumption, the death of communism spells neither the birth of a new order nor the end of conflict. The former Soviet Union remains formidable, new centers of power are emerging, and new conflicts are coming to the fore in the post-Cold War world. Thus the United States cannot return to the isolationism. Instead, it must continue to bear the burden and exercise the responsibility of power, for it remains "entangled forever."

Proving this position, even after the Cold War's onset, American preeminence, not containment of the Soviet Union, was the driving force behind US grand strategy.[49] This was made clear in 1950, in the important National Security Council paper, NSC-68, which laid the intellectual groundwork for a policy of "militarized" and "globalized" containment. NSC-68 stated that: (1) the purpose of American power was "to foster a

[49] Discussions on US grand strategy will be explored in chapter. 6 of this dissertation.

world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish" and (2) the strategy of preponderance was "a policy which the United States would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet Union."[50] In this sense, the role of Soviet Union in American grand strategy thus was somewhat curious. On the one hand, the Soviet threat was really quite incidental to US strategy because America's international ambitions existed independently of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was crucial to the attainment of US strategic objectives because, both at home and abroad, the Cold War legitimized the extension of American power. Absent the Cold War, US policymakers might have lacked an argument to justify America's pursuit of global preponderance.

The apparent end of the Cold War, the abrupt and unexpected conclusion of the post-war era, and the erosion of the bipolar distribution of power in the international system are having, and will continue to have, far-reaching consequences. These rapid and extraordinary changes in the international system have created a window of opportunity for other changes as well. Specifically, under these altered circumstances it has become possible, appropriate, and perhaps necessary to reconsider the foundations of US foreign policy. After all, in the post-war era this foreign policy was build upon, among other things, the bedrock of divided Europe, a bipolar international system, and the Cold War. The credibility of the "Soviet Threat" and the threat from an "international Communist movement", both of which played so central a role in the post-war and Cold War eras, has faded.

---

[50] NSC-68, in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 401.

As I argue in this chapter foreign policy has typically been explained, justified, and legitimated in terms of US national interests--and specifically in terms of US 'national security'--such a reorientation in its foreign policy, should it take place, will require a reconsideration of US national interests--and specifically the nature of its national interest in 'national security'. Furthermore, as I will argue in this part, in the post-war and Cold War eras US national interests, 'national security' concerns, and hence US foreign policy entailed wideranging commitments abroad as well as persistently interventionist and militarist foreign policies. The demise of the Cold War and the end of the post-war era thus make possible a less militarized and less interventionist US foreign policy. Relating to this work, this explains a change of in US national security discourse. However, the basic ideological characteristic features are not changed, globalism, militarism, and interventionism.

The end of the Cold War has put new national security issues beside the long-standing fear of a nuclear war between the two superpowers and their preparations for large-scale conventional wars: ethnic conflicts leading to civil war that expose civilian populations to large-scale state violence; an increasing relevance of economic competitiveness and, relatedly, of the "spin-on" of civilian high technology for possible military use; increasing numbers of migrants and refugees testing the political capacities of states; threats of environmental degradation affecting national well-being; and perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics, including human rights and religion. Yes, these all make senses.

## Chapter Four: Less Talk about "National Security"

This chapter is dedicated to test how much coverage the *New York Times* gives to the national security stories. After the end of the Cold War, I expect that the *New York Times* coverage about US national security should have decreased, and there should be a change in the *New York Times's* reliance on government officials' statements for news sources. Numerous commentators have noted that the US media have long covered foreign affairs from the perspective of the official US national security interests.[1] The Cold War of course offered the premier model for such coverage, providing basic, enduring, organizing principles for selecting and reporting international events. I hypothesize that those organizing principles should be now obsolete. Based on this logic, I expect that, without ideological guidance of the Cold War perspective, the *New York Times*'s articles should have covered less on US national security in the post-Cold War period. With regard to this subject, I also anticipate that after the end of the Cold War the media should less have relied upon governmental officials for their news sources on "national security" coverage.

### 1. Less Talk about Security

The most conspicuous finding in the *New York Times* coverage of US national security is that the number of articles explicitly mentioning "national security" has profoundly

[1] See Patrick O'Heffernan, *Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Insider Perspective on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process* (Norwood, NJ: Abex, 1991); Herbert J. Altschull, *Agents of Power*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1995).

decreased since the end of the Cold War. The number of news stories containing the phrase "national security" during the Cold War greatly outnumbers than that of the post-Cold War period (see Figure 4-1).




Figure 4-1

Americans talk much less about their national security after the end of the Cold War. During the post-Cold War period (1990 - 1997) the total number of stories mentioning "national security" portrayed both on the *New York Times's* front page and editorial page is 270, whereas that of the Cold War (1980-1989) period was 726.[2] The average number of the stories per year between 1981 to 1989 is 70, while the number of the stories per

[2] There may be a disagreement on the beginning of the post-Cold War period. It depends on whether the fall of the Berlin Wall should be counted as the end of the Cold War or whether the collapse of the Soviet Union should be counted as the end of the Cold War. In this articles the beginning of the post-Cold War starts with the fall of the Berlin Wall. If necessary, the period from 1990 to 1991 will be separately considered as a Cold War transition term.

year between 1990 to 1997 is approximately 35.[3] Thus, the result tells us that by the end of the Cold War the *New York Times'* articles mentioning "national security" has dropped by 50 percent since 1990. Of course, this doesn't necessary mean that the discussion about "national security" in the United States as a whole has been decreased. But insofar as the *New York Times*--which is commonly read by elites and policy makers--reflects other media, and insofar as explicit mentions of "national security" corresponds to total discussions of the subject, it follows that "national security" now receives much less attention in public discourse than it once did.

This trend is partly attributable to the fact that Americans are now less interested in news development outside of the US.[4] According to many reporters, the reason for such disinterest is that since the end of the Cold War there have been fewer news developments that pose a threat to American national security. News reporters are finding that better news translates into less compelling stories. Furthermore, the everyday information in national security news is more prosaic. It consists of political and economic events that raise policy issues and force governments and people to choose. Except for the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-91, the coverage of such "national security" concerning news in the *New York Times* has steadily declined even since the late seventies, when the Cold War lost its sense of imminent danger and its role of the Cold War news frame.[5]

---

[3] Since my data base--Nexis/Lexis--includes the full texts of the articles only after June 1980. Therefore, I doubled the number of articles of the year.

[4] This interpretation comes from my theory on the characteristic features of US national security policies since WWII which are 'globalism,' 'interventionism,' and 'militarism.'

[5] As I have explained in chapter 1, with the beginning of 1980s so called the "second Cold War" sharpened the US-Soviet conflict. However, once the media coverage on 'national security' had decreased in 1990, it

Scholars in media studies argue that media coverage on international news in general has significantly decreased as well. For instance, explaining the declining trend of the media coverage on foreign news, Hoge has said, "the shrinkage was neatly symbolized this summer during Hong Kong's transition from British to Chinese rule. The three major networks sent their anchors . . . But NBC, under contract to cover the Wimbledon tennis tournament, cut for only three minutes in Hong Kong."[6]

The *New York Times* maintains a serious commitment to foreign news coverage, but space for such news was down significantly after 1991, according to Gwertzman.[7] In late 1994, Gwertzman said that the reduced "news role" for foreign news "is a problem for me." On an average day at the *New York Times*, when there is no "cataclysmic" news event, foreign news is assigned 15 columns of space at 800 words per column, for a total of roughly 12,000 words. Obviously, many of the current stories in these days are shorter than those of the Cold War era.

The Cold War perspective, which once organized virtually all foreign affairs coverage into an ideological picture supportive of American world hegemony. Without the ideological guidance of the Cold War perspective, the decreased coverage on US national security by the *New York Times* since 1990, markedly, means a vacuum of values. Hose states, "With the old gauges broken, the press is struggling to understand the new international order of risks and opportunities."[8]

---

was not restored to the previous level, for more discussion on this issue, see James F. Hoge, "Foreign news: Who gives a damn," *Columbia Journalism Review* 36(4), November/December 1997: 48-53.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 48.

[7] Quoted in Jon Vanden Heuvel, "Looking at a World in Motion" in Freedom From Media Studies Center, *The Media and Foreign Policy*, 20.

[8] James Hoge, "The End of Predictability," *Media Studies Journal* 7(4), Fall 1993, p. 1.

Regarding this post-Cold War trend in the media coverage, this work also identified a very interesting outcome. The analysis of the *New York Times* articles from 1980 to 1997 discovered that the majority of the front page stories explicitly mentioning "national security" came from "Foreign Desk." Among the articles 151 stories out of 238 (about 63 %) were from "Foreign Desk" during the Cold War period, whereas 53 stories out of 92 (about 57%) stories were from "Foreign Desk" in the post-Cold War period. These numbers tells us that the portion of stories from "Foreign Desk" mentioning "national security" has dropped after the end of the Cold War from 63 % to 57 %. It is an interesting finding that fewer stories mentioning "national security" are being written by "Foreign Desk" in the post-Cold War era, even though the drop is not that large. This may indicate that US national security concerns have been more characterized within the domestic affairs by the end of the Cold War, since news articles of external affairs of US have been less portrayed in terms of the US national security since 1990.

Americans read less news of their "national security," in terms of number of stories, than they did during the Cold War. It is a very interesting finding in regards to my dissertation. If this result is due to the general decrease of the coverage of international stories in the US media since the end of the Cold War, this correlation may substantially explain that US national security interests were significantly internationally defined during the Cold War era. Two of my hypotheses are to test these questions: during the Cold War the characteristic features of US national security policy portrayed by the media should had been "globalism" and "interventionism." Since they were the characteristics of US foreign policy through the whole Cold War period, I hypothesize

that the media should have covered the mainstream governmental statement in the case of foreign policy and these features should have changed after the end of the Cold War. These issues are discussed in chapter 6 and 7.

**2. Less Interpretative Coverage?**

It is also meaningful to compare the *New York Times* US national security articles portrayed on the front page with those on the editorial page. During the period under comparison, the decrease of the number of articles shown on the front page is slightly smaller than the decrease of number of articles shown on the editorial page (see Figure 4-2). The number of entire articles shown on the editorial page from 1980 to 1997 was 646, and that of the front page during the same period was 330. The number of articles shown on the editorial page has dropped from 488 for the Cold War period to 158 for the post-Cold War period, whereas the number of articles shown on the front page has dropped from 238 for the Cold War period to 92 for the post-Cold War period. This outcomes tells us that the total articles shown on the editorial page has dropped by about 68 % since 1990, whereas the total articles shown on the front page has dropped by about 61 % after the end of the Cold War.

Both during the Cold War period and during the post-Cold War period more stories about US national security were portrayed on the editorial page than the front page. The difference between the two periods is that, 488 stories out of 726 entire stories were portrayed on the editorial page (68%) in the Cold War era, while 158 stories out of 250 entire stories have been portrayed on the editorial page (63%) in the post-Cold War

era. This tendency suggests that the news articles about US national security during the Cold War were more interpretive than articles during the post-Cold War period.[9]




Figure 4-2

According to Patterson, "interpretive style empowers writers by giving them more control over the news message."[10] News stories are normally composed of "facts" and "interpretation." The interpretive style has become the dominant style of reporting in the United States.[11] The "facts" are often based on, for instance, what politician had said or done, "interpretation" greatly influenced the tone of their coverage. Thus, interpretation

[9] On "interpretive journalism," see Thomas E. Patterson, "The News Media: An Effective Political Actor," *Political Communication* 14(4), Oct/Dec 1997: 445-55.
[10] *Ibid*, p. 451.
[11] For this subject, see Thomas Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York: Vintage, 1994).

provides the theme, and the facts illuminate it. The theme is primary; the facts are illustrative. Usually in editorial page interpretation more prevails than any other page in today's newspaper. Whereas descriptive reporting is driven by the "facts," the interpretive form is driven by the theme around which the story is built. As a result, the above outcome tells us that more editorial pages were given to provide the Cold War theme (or frame) in case of "national security" news stories during the Cold War period.

The content of the articles also suggests that the *New York Times*'s "national security" coverage during the Cold War was event-driven, whereas in post-Cold War it was agenda-driven. During the Cold War those reports included defense budget numbers, Soviet weapons specifications, MIRVs and ABMs, and superpower arms control. Their coverage was brought out in new ways nearly every day, from summit meetings to proxy wars in Afghanistan or El Salvador. But, in the post-Cold War era the *New York Times* coverage on US national security includes many suggestions, ambitions, intentions, or resolutions concerning international economic stability, environmental preservation, drugs, and terrorism.

### 3. Who Speaks about Security?

In terms of sources, there has been no serious change in the *New York Times* articles including the phrase US "national security." The most frequent sources include reporter, columnist, government officials, president, professors, military or intelligence members (see Table 4-1). Again, these people speak for national security more than any other party both during and after the Cold War without any serious change. The analysis shows that

the reporters are the most frequent source. This is because, if no clear attribution was found in the text, all articles were attributed to reporters. This result has confirmed that with regard to "national security" stories the media mostly rely on official statements or governmental officials for their news source.

| | Frequency (1980-1989) | Percent (%) | Frequency (1990-1997) | Percent (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **White House** | 43 | 7.3 | 14 | 7.2 |
| **Defense Dept.** | 59 | 10 | 12 | 6.2 |
| **State Dept.** | 23 | 4 | 9 | 4.3 |
| **Intelligence** | 19 | 3.2 | 6 | 3.1 |
| **Government Unspecified** | 29 | 6.6 | 13 | 6.7 |
| **Former G. Official** | 19 | 3.2 | 6 | 3.1 |
| **Prof./Think Tank** | 76 | 12.8 | 25 | 12.9 |
| **Interest Group** | 10 | 1.7 | 14 | 7.2 |

Table 4-1, "Frequency of Citation by Source"

The analysis also makes us realize that in national security reporting the role of "civil" sources is clearly limited. Indeed, if I looked more carefully at the nongovernment source, the sphere of statist dominance becomes even more significant. The largest part of nongovernment news sources consists of professors or individuals associated with research groups defined as nongovernmental institutions. But it is hard to say that they

are entirely independent from government. Because in many cases their universities are often sponsored by Defense Department or State Department, and those individuals sometimes are heavily engaged in contracts with government agencies.[12] In other words, many of them are often still a part of the larger community of "national security," official circle.

With regard to news sources, one interesting finding was the increase of sources from "interest groups." In the post-Cold War period (1990-1997) among the articles including the phrase "national security" 7.4 % included the sources from "interest groups," whereas only 1.7 % included the sources from "interest groups" during the Cold War period (1980-1989). They include interest groups of "environment," "international crime," "disease," "ethnic group," "nuclear technology," "human rights," or "academic freedom," etc.

During the Cold War, the government's foreign policy agenda appears to have driven the media's decisions about what was news more than it does today. Bernard Gwertzman, the foreign policy editor of the *Times*, told his staff in a December 1992 memo:

> "When one looks back, it is remarkable but not astonishing how much of newspaper coverage since World War II was devoted to foreign affairs, and how much hinged on the Cold War and East-West rivalries. This competition consciously and subconsciously dominated government policies, affecting newspaper coverage as well."[13]

---

[12] See R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 22(3), September 1989: 563-578.
[13] Bernard Gwertzman, "Memo to the Times Foreign Staff," *Media Studies Journal* 7(3), 1993: 33-34.

This is not to say that from 1945 to 1991, the American news media reported solely what US government officials wanted them to, only that they reported a great deal about the issues that US foreign policy officials saw as important. The Cold War framing necessarily made the media coverage rely on governmental officials for their news sources. This is because the characteristics of media coverage about US national security policy during the Cold War were 'militarism,' 'globalism,' and 'interventionism.' Government officials were able to easily access to the information with regard to a variety of issues of US national security concern. To accomplish foreign policy for the sake of US national security interest, reporters also had a certain degree of difficulty in gathering information to report news stories.[14]

The president as a key news source needs to be examined. In times of crisis today, the occupant of the Oval Office still has tremendous tools to rally the nation around himself. But in the mid-1990s, the institution of the presidency seems to be less powerful when compared with Congress or with its own past.

> "This week Congress is to consider legislation that would undermine this and every President's ability to safeguard *America's security* and to command our armed forces . . . but if adopted it would endanger *national security* . . . In its present form, the bill unwisely and unconstitutionally deprives the President of the flexibility he needs to make the right choices for our *nation's security*."[15]

---

[14] I do not go further on this subject. Of course, I fully understand that the debate on who sets up agendas in the media is one of the important research topics in media studies. But, this is not research on media. Rather media coverage here provides data for security study.

[15] Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, and William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, The *New York Times*, February 13, 1995, p. A19, italics added.

President Bush and his successor, Bill Clinton, the first true post-Cold War president, faced a much more complex and demanding challenge in communicating their foreign and national security policies. They could no longer point to a common enemy to rally an unruly Congress or an uncertain public opinion.

Unsettled by the responsibility of covering the world without an overarching structure, unprepared for the new frame of political, religious, and ethnic strife released in this news era, the *New York Times* may willingly cede news values to policymakers as they did during the Cold War. In this perspective, the *New York Times* coverage of national security news more than ever will be dictated by the actions and initiatives of US foreign policy. Using Hallin's words, it is "an extended period of public confusion and uncertainty about world politics, and a passive, sometimes grudging consent to the decisions of the foreign policy establishment."[16]

[16] Hallin, "Hegemony: The American news media from Vietnam to El Salvador: A study of ideological change and its limits," p. 23.

## Chapter Five: Military and Non-military Topics in National Security Discourse

This chapter is dedicated to test the third hypothesis; with the Cold War over, the subjects of the *New York Times's* coverage about US national security should have changed. In this chapter I will examine if there are any new trends in the *New York Times's* coverage of US national security interest. Many other subjects may have replaced the military issues since the end of the Cold War. The test of this hypothesis tells us that at least in terms of the number of articles military issues still significantly occupy the national security coverage. However, the content analysis of the articles proves that the *New York Times's* stories about US national security have been meaningfully replaced by non-military subjects such as economy or environment since 1989. Therefore, this chapter discusses how much the priority given to 'militarism' of the *New York Times's* coverage on US national security has decreased since the end of the Cold War.

### 1. Still Talking about the Military?

The disappearance of the old bipolar agenda fundamentally altered the way in which the *New York Times* reported on foreign affairs and national security interests. The end of the Cold War significantly freed the US news media from the agenda of the White House and the State Department, allowing reporters, editors, and producers to pursue stories more unambiguously based on what the audience was thought to be interesting.

#### *Findings*

Given the deep cultural roots of the Cold War frame, the first question concerns how far the priority given to military issues changed on the *New York Times's* coverage about US national security before and after the end of the Cold War. During the last 18 years the *New York Times* covered an average of 38 articles every year about 'Military' related issues on the front page and in the editorial section.[1]

Most interestingly, at least in terms of the number of articles, the analysis disproves the expectation that *non-military* subjects such as "economy," "environment," "drug," etc. have not yet entered the mainstream of media coverage as an important part of national security discourse yet (see Figure 5-1). During the Cold War period (1980 to 1989),[2] among the articles containing the phrase "national security" about 70 % were about military subjects. This has not changed much in the post-Cold War period (see Table 5-1). As seen in the table 5-1, of the *New York Times* articles mentioning "national security" about 64 % were about military subjects in the post-Cold War period (1992-1997). During the Cold War transition period (1991-1992), 76 % of the articles about "national security" related to the military topics. Of course, "economic" subjects have grown notably in media coverage (see the next part of this chapter), but it is still hard to say that the post-Cold War security discourse can be labeled as "geoeconomic"[3] security

---

[1] Military related issues include armament, arms control, nuclear military, overseas military exercise, intelligence, information leaking, spying, military-technology, budgets regarding defense purpose, and any threat to US territorial integrity; see the appendix for the detail.

[2] Again, as done in chapter 4, I have temporary divided the period into three categories: Cold war period (1980~1989); Cold war transition period (1990, 1991); post-Cold war period (1992~1997). Since the fall of Berlin Wall was in 1989 and the breakdown of the Soviet Union was in 1991, in security studies it is understandable to argue that the period from the fall of Berlin Wall to the breakdown of the Soviet Union is a Cold War transition.

[3] For the introduction of "geoeconomics", see Simon Dalby, "Crossing disciplinary boundaries: political geography and international relations after the Cold War," in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, eds.,

discourse. One of the most frequently discussed topics after the end of the Cold War is the shifting of statecraft from "geopolitics" to "geoeconomics." However, at least in terms of number of articles, this idea is not substantially salient in the media coverage yet. Social or environmental issues have not become very salient in articles explicitly mentioning "national security" also.[4]




Figure 5-1

*Globalization: Theory and Practice* (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 29-42; Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission?* (London: Pinter, 1995).

[4] Economic issues include trade, finance, budget deficit, employment, technology, natural resources, international economy, global economic stability, industrial competitiveness, oil, etc.: Social issues include drug, immigration, education, civil right, social welfare, racial conflict, disease, religion, human right, academic freedom, international and domestic crime, etc.: Environmental issues include energy, population, nuclear technology, nuclear materials, etc.

**The New York Times's US National Security Coverage about the Military**

| Yr | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| To | 74 | 67 | 72 | 75 | 57 | 74 | 94 | 61 | 73 | 79 | 39 | 28 | 40 | 35 | 29 | 39 | 39 | 21 |
| M | 52 | 47 | 67 | 49 | 31 | 62 | 60 | 34 | 48 | 62 | 28 | 23 | 26 | 21 | 16 | 17 | 33 | 15 |
| % | 70 | 70 | 93 | 65 | 54 | 84 | 64 | 56 | 66 | 78 | 72 | 82 | 65 | 60 | 55 | 43 | 85 | 71 |

Table 5-1:
(1st row, year; 2nd row, the total number of articles containing the phrase "national security"; 3rd row, the number of articles about the military; 4th row, % of the military stories)

From the above table and previous figure, we can see that the occurrence of articles about military issues has decreased almost in proportion to the decrease of all articles containing the phrase "national security." I will carefully analyze how the *New York Times's* articles covered military stories from 1980 to 1997 in terms of their contents. This analysis will tell us whether, in terms of specific military subjects, there was no significant change in national security referents during and after the Cold War.

***Analysis***

*Cold War Military Security*

The Cold War security frame--influenced by Realism--argued that the statecentric, bipolar nature of the Cold War was the best guarantee of preserving international stability. It argued that the Cold War order was maintained by the division of the world into two poles and the rough balance of military strength between them. This bipolarity

formerly played as the key Cold War frame in the US military national security discourse on the *New York Times's* coverage through the whole Cold War period. The following *NYT* article is a good example.

> "To what extent does East-West commerce threaten Western *security*, and should these economic relations be used for political purpose? These questions will continue to divide the United States from its allies until we can resolve the difference between our conflicting interpretation of *security*. The Export Administration Act empowers that President to restrict exports for reasons of *national security* and foreign policy . . . European argue that economic health and export-led employment have been an essential part of their postwar *security*. By *security*, they mean the survival of a democratic way of life and the stability of the social order, both of which require healthy exporting industries. By contrast, Americans have tended to define *national security* in overwhelmingly military terms. Many tend to treat exports simply as a favor to other countries, and few care that the United States has acquired a reputation as an increasingly unreliable supplier . . . Europeans agree with Americans on the need to restrict exports that have a direct application to Soviet military power--items that could be diverted to waging war. But the Reagan Administration has broadened the definition of *security* controls to include goods and technologies that contribute indirectly to the conduct of war--namely, exports that generally strengthen the Soviet industrial base or earn significant hard currency."[5]

[5] Ellen L. Frost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Economic Affairs 1977-81, The *New York Times*, July 25, 1983, p. A13, italics added.

While military oriented approach continued throughout the Cold War, it became marginalized as a result of the narrowing focus of strategic mindsets from domestic and non-military sources of threat, to nuclear weapons and the increased chance of global nuclear war as a result of the loss of the US nuclear monopoly. Military security flourished in this period because nuclear deterrence was theoretical rather than practical. The major questions raised in this area were concerned with arms control and limited war, and as a result, the Cold War security agenda was conceptualized through the concept of deterrence and the strategic balance between the US and Soviet Union. The rivalry's complexity between the two ideologically based blocs was simplified to questions of alliance management and nuclear stability. It was commonly assumed that state behavior was based on a policy of power or security maximization through a strategy of influencing rivals acting certain ways by means of threat manipulations and force projection.

> "If the Administration plans to undercut its policy of "not undercutting" the strategic arms agreements with the Soviet Union, it can expect to undercut *our national security* as well. . . . The informal arrangement of abiding by--or, to use the Administration's phrase, "not undercutting"--SALT agreements strengthen our security by maintaining valuable limits on Soviet forces while we seek a new strategic arms agreement."[6]

Within this context, it is meaningful to examine the *New York Times*'s national security coverage about "arms building" and "arms control," which are parts of key military

---

[6] Dale Bumpers, Senator (D), The *New York Times*, May 30, 1984, p. A23, italics added.

security discourse in the realist-centric strategic thinking during the Cold War (see Figure 5-2). The outcome shows that there have been no articles mentioning "national security" on the subject of "arms control" since 1992 and no articles mentioning "national security" on the subject of "arms building" since 1989 either on the front page or the editorial page of the *New York Times*.




Figure 5-2

Figure 5-2 identifies that during the Cold War period (1980-1989) about 7 % of the articles mentioning "national security" on the perspective of the military discussed "arms building" subjects. "Arms building" was mentioned occasionally after 1989, but only in the perspective of military budget cuts, the federal budget deficit, global military

technology transfer, domestic military-industry complex, etc. "Arms control" subjects had been discussed quite often during the Cold War. Among the articles mentioning "national security" on the perspective of the military approximately 10 % were about "arms control."

It is also interesting to see how much the Soviet Union's new thinking under Gorbachev was delivered in the *New York Times* in terms of US national security. A few articles mentioned Gorbachev's leadership and its impact on US national security. During the entire Cold War period his leadership was negatively articulated on the perspective of US national security, or Gorbachev's characteristic feature was separately dealt with from the whole conception of "Sovietology." The following article may be the only one among the "national security" articles shown on the front page or the editorial page which articulates Gorbachev in a friendly voice. But, the whole nuance of the whole article is still drown in the Cold War frame. As a reminder, the following article was printed in 1989, the Cold War transition period.

> "Unfortunately, several myths distort public debate on *national security*. America doesn't have a military strategy, and all of *our national security* problem stem from that fact . . . The positive changes in the Soviet Union are due in part to our military power and our constancy of purpose, which undergird our strategy . . . Thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet threat, particularly in Europe, has disappeared. He has cut back his military and generally made the world safer . . . Even after Mr. Gorbachev's unilateral cut, NATO will face a severe force imbalance . . . Although we welcome change in the Soviet Union, we cannot rely on promises or perceived intentions." [7]

---

[7] Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, The *New York Times*, June 18, 1989, p. 25, italics added.

*Post-Cold War Military Security*

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States recognized new threats and redefined the roles for military forces in light of epochal alternations of security concern. The following two articles were written at the beginning of the post-Cold War period.

> "Right now we have the greatest opportunity in two generations to shed the burdens of militarism and return to the older American tradition. The crumbling of the Warsaw Pact and the changes in the Soviet Union dramatically lessen the threat that was the premise of our militarization . . . that the time has come to rethink *American national secuity* . . . For the militarization of the Cold War years has done terrible damage to the real sources of *American security*, our constitutional system of governmental and our economic strength"[8]

> "Competition between the Army vs. the Marines is unnecessary because each performs unique but complementary roles in our *national security* strategy . . . The Army's design for the future is based on *our nation's enduring security* requirement in light of the changing international environment. For the foreseeable future, the United States will no doubt have a smaller Army, but one that has a highly versatile, superbly trained and ready mix of heavy, light and special operations units manned by the highest quality . . ."[9]

The analysis identified two strongly interrelated propositions from the *New York Times's* coverage about military issues for US national security in the post-Cold War period. First, for the sake of US national security interests, as in a broader conception, the *New*

---

[8] Anthony Lewis, The *New York Times*, July 13, 1990, p. A27, italics added.
[9] Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, The *New York Times*, January 1, 1990, p. 24, italics added.

*York Times* articles in the post-Cold War period are mostly concerned about the stable international security, the so called "global security."[10] Second, the articles also frequently deal with the United States' engagement into many foreign countries' or regions' conflicts, into the so called "small wars."

On US national security in terms of military aspects, it is necessary to understand that, not even in the post-Cold War era but also since the end of World War II, the United States has decided that it is in its national interest to maintain a large standing peacetime military in order to secure international stability. Following World War II, the United States emerged as an essential counterweight to Soviet power and ambitions, and reasonably focused its energies on creating a security policy anchored in massive conventional forces and nuclear weaponry.

> " Through most of its history this has been an unmilitarized country . . . In the time of the Cold War the unmilitarized tradition has been abandoned. For four decades the United States has had millions of men under arms. Much of our resources and our scientific intellect has gone to build expensive new weapons. The country has been transformed into a *national security* state."[11]

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have brought a close to a

---

[10] One of the first realists to warn of the potential instability of the post-Cold War security environment was John Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer argued that the post-Cold War insecurity is inevitable because of the characteristic nature of international system under the United States' unipolarity. He explains that rampant nuclear proliferation, unbridled nationalism and other destablizing forces, heretofore restrained by superpower management, would be unleashed and render the post-Cold War world chaotic and anarchical rather than systematic and predictable.; see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15(1), Summer 1990: 5-56.

[11] Anthony Lewis, The *New York Times*, July 13, 1990, p. A27, italics added.

remarkable chapter in the history of American military security policy. Of the chapter being written now the new military threat can be inferred from our current domestic circumstances and the emerging configuration of the post-Communist world. Several questions center on the new military security discourse: will the United States continue to possess military forces of global reach and unrivaled effectiveness, capable of overawing any possible opponent?; Will the United States maintain the political will to use these forces overseas in support of its interests, in spite of the absence of a serious adversary?

With regard to "global security" among the two post-Cold War propositions of the military aspects of US national security interests portrayed in the *New York Times*, the appropriate size and shape of a peacetime military force is a subject of acrimonious debate in the newspaper. The debate is so contested because the outcome determines how much this nation will spend on defense as well as the roles and missions of each of the four armed services. With the Cold War over, the continual increase of the public's interest about economic issues makes enigma more difficult.

> "Warning of crippling consequences to *national security*, the Clinton Administration has begun a quiet but forceful campaign to persuade Congress to protect the nation's $29 billion intelligence budget from deep immediate cuts."[12]

After the Cold War, "two major regional contingencies" centers on the debate of US national security interests in terms of military exercise for "global security."[13] Briefly

---

[12] By Douglas Jehl, cited from James Woolsey, Director of CIA, The *New York Times*, March 14, 1993, p. 1, italics added.

[13] In fact, 'two major regional contingencies' is a long-standing puzzle to the United States' security interest. For example, in the 1950s, President Eisenhower, fearful of bankrupting American society and of the power of the military-industrial complex, limited the military to a fixed percentage of GDP and adopted a

introducing, there are two groups regarding the 'two major regional contingencies.' The first group supports the position that the US has no choice but to retain the two-regional-war strategy. To do any less would not only jeopardize its vital national security interests, but would undermine our status as a world leader and a global superpower. The second group holds that planning for two simultaneous major regional contingencies is like buying meteor insurance, a needless luxury. Proponents of this view, point out that when the US was bogged down in North Korea or the Persian Gulf, no other nation took advantage of that fact by starting a conflict somewhere else in the world.

The second characteristic position in the *New York Times's* coverage on the US national security interest after the end of the Cold War closely associates the first one, the "global security." It is about the United States' involvement into regional conflicts in most cases of the Third World.

> "In his first term as President, Bill Clinton . . . has confronted *national security* problems that would have bedeviled a battle-hardened cold warrior . . . And President had left behind political land mines in places like Bosnia, Haiti, Iraq, North Korea and Somalia."[14]

Apart from their relative scale, the key characteristic of small wars is the greater role that political considerations tend to assume as compared with larger conflicts. Small wars are many cases linked in some fashion to civil or revolutionary warfare, that is, to internal

---

policy of relying on nuclear weapons to make up for any perceived shortfalls in the size of the conventional forces. The Kennedy administration felt the military should be able to fight simultaneously two major conventional wars, one in Europe and one in Asia, as well as handle a minor contingency in the Third World. This necessitated a large increase in force size or structure and in the level of defense spending even before the war in Vietnam.

[14] Tim Weiner, cited from President, The *New York Times*, October 28, 1996, p. A1, italics added.

struggles over political power. At the same time, small wars often give rise to domestic or international complications that far transcend in importance the concrete stakes involved. There is one more aspect to consider in the post-Cold War era. Presently, the question of whether small wars can be handled through mechanisms of collective security or not has become prominent. Whether or to what extent the United States will be able to manage its small-war involvements in collaboration with the UN or NATO is one of the critical questions on its current security agenda.

> "The measure is deeply flawed. It is called the National Security Revitalization Act, but if adopted if would endanger *national security* . . . If we deduct the cost of our voluntary actions against our UN dues, it would cancel our entire peacekeeping payment. Other nations--Japan and our NATO allies--would surely follow, and US peacekeeping would end. Under current circumstance, it would end US peacekeeping overnight."[15]

Obviously, the fall of communism has complicated the global security picture towards the perspective of the United States engagement to small wars. The sudden disappearance of Moscow's rule of influence has, in ways not wholly foreseen by anyone, let loose demons of ethnonational rivalry and ambition that seem certain to pose serious threats to international order for some time to come. It may also serve to tempt certain states to pursue regional hegemony in the manner of Saddam Hussein, whose bid for domination of the Persian Gulf in 1990 almost certainly reflected the diminished weight of the Soviet Union on the area's politics.

---

[15] Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, and William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, The *New York Times*, February 13, 1995, p. A19, italics added.

The Somalia venture has become a touchstone for the concept of military humanitarian intervention and an enhanced US role in the post-Cold War world. In spite of impressive initial successes in pacifying much of southern Somalia and delivering food to those in need of it, the intervention proved to be a fiasco at the political level. The principal outcome of the Somalia intervention from the US point of view was to make the American people still more allergic to assisting nation building in the Third World as well as increasing skepticism of the reliability of the United Nations as a partner in such endeavors.

> "When someone proposes any action to save starving women and children, it is hard to counsel caution without appearing cruel. But the proposal to dispatch up to 30,000 American troops to Somalia must be considered as dispassionately as possible. The Bush Administration should explore whether we might be able to buy peace and humanitarian relief before sending in military forces. The use of combat troops is premised on humanitarian objectives, as against protecting our *national security*, the traditional justification for deploying forces."[16]

### *Logic of Military Security*

The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty--the claim of exclusive right to self-government over a specified territory and its population. Because force is particularly effective as a way of acquiring and controlling territory, the fundamentally territorial nature of the state underpins the traditional primacy of its concern with the use of force,

---

[16] Raymond Bonner, American foreign policy analyst, The *New York Times*, December 2, 1992, italics added.

"military security." Throughout history, the right to govern has been established by the capability to assert and defend the claim against armed challengers internally and externally. Both the during and after the Cold War, the agenda of military security is thus focused largely around states. Therefore, military security matters arise primarily out of the internal and external processes by which human communities establish and maintain machineries of government. It is noteworthy that the most extreme modern form of the state, the European or Westphalian state, has consolidated itself by a progressive disarming of the citizenry and a movement toward an ideal in which the state is the only legitimate wielder of force in society and has effectively commanded far greater instruments of force, both domestically and externally, than those illegitimate armed elements that remain.[17]

Due to this tradition the most distinctive elements of securitization has been its focus on military strategy. To this end the focus on traditional security has been the military means that actors in the international system employ to gain their political objectives or ends. This logical background implies that the general trend of military security discourse itself might not significantly change in the post-Cold War era.

## 2. Economic Security

[17] Even in the West, only during the nineteenth century did this development become effective enough to allow the separation of police from military functions, and in many new states this distinction still has shallow roots. This contrasts with situation within feudal states and most forms of classical empires, where both the capability and the right to use force normally existed at more than one level of society. Among the developed states, the United States has conspicuously deviated from the Westphalian ideal, constitutionally retaining the right of its citizens to bear arms and of its component states to retain their own militias as a defense against the hegemony of the federal government.

Even though the *New York Times's* coverage on economic subjects in terms of US "national security" is small in terms of the number of articles, but close analysis of the coverage shows that economic security has become an extremely an important concept to US national security concerns.

***Analysis***

As indicated in chapter one, the main purpose of this research is to analyze news coverage containing the phrase "national security," by which US national security discourses can be examined. Thus, the small number of news articles regarding economic issues in terms of national security does not completely persuade us that economic security has not yet become a mainstream US national security discourse. Rather, as the following arguments show that, even with the small amount of the coverage, economic subjects have become the critical United States national security agenda in terms of the content in news stories since the end of the Cold War.

> "The administration has portrayed the plan as an economic boost for a potential lucrative industry and as an essential initiative for *U.S. national security*."[18]

Figure 5-3 shows that the number of *New York Times's* articles per year about "national security" in terms of economic aspects from 1980 to 1997 has been pretty consistent. Among the articles mentioning "national security" on the front and editorial pages, about 15 % of the entire stories had discussed economic subjects (108 articles out of 726

[18] Jeffrey S. Milstein, former State Department policy planner, The *New York Times*, December 7 1993, p. 22, italics added.

articles) during the Cold War period (1980-1989). In the post-Cold War period (1990-1997) about 16 % dealt with economic issues (43 articles out of 270 articles). This finding tells that, even though the economic issues are not prevailing as much as the military issues, they have been portrayed in the media with a substantial amount of coverage.




Figure 5-3

During the last 18 years the *New York Times's* articles about US national security have constantly included stories advocating economic importance for the sake of national security interests.[19] An examination of those articles also leads us to conclude that articles of economic subjects in the Cold War frame would not forget the nature of bipolar

[19] Refer to the appendix to see their variety kinds of specific subjects.

rivalry.

> "he (President-elect) tells his transition team, "*national security*" . . . where, precisely lies the greatest *threat to security*?. . . there is simply no way to defend *American security* from Soviet without putting the economy ahead of every other claim . . . Without economic revival, inflation will hobble new weapons programs and dissipate military pay increases."[20]

Noticeably enough, the *New York Times's* articles containing the phrase "national security" in terms of economic subjects have become to focus only on economic interests after the end of the Cold War. Some of them only mention domestic economic growth and US industrial competitiveness, and others are more geared for a global free economic environment.

> "The Administration has portrayed the plan as an economic boost for a potentially lucrative industry and as an essential initiative for US *national security*. . . the Administration was transformed . . . into an obsession with American economic competitiveness and generating jobs."[21]

> "for real such *national security* challenges . . . Mr. Clinton pointed . . . , giving priority to his plans for rebuilding US economic strength, repudiating protectionism . . . Prospects for a Uruguay Round global trade agreement hinge for now on the success of President Bush's threat of retaliatory duties against European white wine. But the North American Free Trade

---

[20] By editorial board, cited from President, The *New York Times*, November 16, 1980, p. A20, italics added.

[21] Gary Chapman, coordinator of the 21st Century Project, a public-interest program on science and technology policy, The *New York Times*, May 31, 1994, italics added.

Agreement can be ratified in Mr. Clinton's first month."[22]

In fact, "economic interdependence" has played a central role in US grand strategy since 1945. In making this statement, I am not advocating a crude "revisionist" claim that American grand strategy is driven by the desire to capture overseas markets or sources of raw materials, or that US strategy is shaped by the needs of a capitalist ruling elite.[23] American strategy is far more sophisticated than that. It rests on a set of assumptions about the relationship between a liberal international economic order--that is, economic openness based on multilateral free trade--and security. Specifically, US policymakers believe that economic interdependence leads to peace, and hence to increased security for the United States.

According to the logic that unfolded in the *New York Times*, there are two ways in which economic interdependence supposedly causes peace. First, there is commercial liberalism's traditional assumption that by increasing prosperity, an open international trading system decreases the risk of war because states will not want to have their trade and prosperity interrupted by war. The intellectual lineage of this notion traces back to the idea of Adam Smith or John Bright.

> "Americans recognize how the Administration has mismanaged the economy . . . jeopardizes *our national security* and economic interests . . . In the long term, the U.S. must promote commercial ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States--an effort that will produce jobs and rising living standards in all nations. . . Every day

---

[22] Editorial board, The *New York Times*, November 10, 1992, italics added.
[23] On "revisionist" view of US grand strategy, i.e., see Gabriel Kolko, *Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

> of delay (to support Russia) endangers democratization and market development as well as costing American jobs and profits that will otherwise end up in Japan or Europe."[24]

Second, US policymakers believe a key "lesson " of the 1930s is that economic nationalism (autarky, rival trade blocs) led to totalitarianism and militarism in Germany and Japan: thus it was an important cause of geopolitical instability. They also believe that the Second World War's origins were rooted in economic causes (in, for example, competition for territorial control of markets and raw materials). Thus, an open international trading system eliminates the need to capture resources and markets by providing nondiscriminatory access to all states.

> "the most threats to *American national security* . . . the task force concluded that Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil-producer, remains politically stable and is unlikely to become another Iran"[25]

The news articles insisting on the necessity of "economic interdependence" have its clear logic to articulate it. When security concerns are paramount, the key question no longer is whether everyone is gaining something but rather who is gaining the most.[26] Since economic power is the cornerstone of military strength, when security is an issue, states

---

[24] Richard A. Gephardt (D), House majority leader, The *New York Times*, February 12, 1992, italics added.
[25] By Jeff Gerth, source from Official of CIA, The *New York Times*, December 1, 1996, italics added.
[26] This is one of the most important assumptions of "Realist" thinking in 'International Relations' in terms of 'absolute gains' vs. 'relative gains.' During the Cold War the perspective of 'relative gains' was prevailing in foreign policy or security policy of specific countries supported by realistic obsession. For more careful explanation on "relative gains," see Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," *American Political Science Review* 85, 1991: 1303-20.

want their economies to be more vigorous and to grow faster than those of their rivals. Also, when war is regarded as a real possibility, states deliberately attempt to reduce their dependence on imported products and raw materials in order to minimize their vulnerability to economic coercion by others. This also impairs economic interdependence. Therefore, economic interdependence is both the condition of peace and prosperity and outcome of them.

The bottom line here is this: When security in the international system is plentiful, trade flourishes and, so long as they are getting richer themselves, states are untroubled by the fact that others are also getting wealthier. When security in the international system is scarce, however, trade diminishes; states seek to maximize their power over their rivals, and hence attempt to ensure they become richer than their rivals.

### *Arguments on Geoeconomics*

Regarding "economic security" in the United States, the most frequently discussed arguments after the end of the Cold War are about "geoeconomics." The concern with economic security is obvious in the Clinton administration's rhetoric and in the language of numerous writers in American policy journals in the 1990s. More specifically, these writers are concerned in part with ensuring an international political regime that provides domestic prosperity.[27] For instance, concern about Japanese economic control over aspects of the US economy has led to autarkic and protectionist arguments, a form of

[27] Two classic statements of these themes at the end of the Cold War are Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefininf Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68(2), 1989: 162-77; T. C. Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69(3), 1990: 1-18.

"geoeconomic" discourse that runs counter to the traditional rationales of free trade but that uses nationalist and security language to posit Japan as a threat.[28] At the same time, the discourse on economic security is also explicitly concerned with the growing lack of control of the US government over key technological innovations that have important military utility.[29]

Thus, there is a dilemma between international trade as an essential prerequisite for global, and hence American, prosperity (a crucial political value, in the language of realism, that the state should supposedly pursue) and the erosion that such trade has on national technological capabilities, which are crucial to the production of contemporary state-of-the-art military hardware. The contradictions are also clear where intelligence agencies become involved in matters of industrial espionage and counterespionage in the name of national competitiveness, or in the loosely related concern of maintaining a national defense industrial base. Given the increasingly global operation of corporations, where substantial proportions of international trade are in fact transactions between different parts of the same global corporation, the applicability of national boundaries as economic and security demarcations are increasingly suspicious.

In some other forms these arguments have parallels in the contemporary extension of the traditional Cold War geopolitical arguments about the vulnerabilities of the raw-material supply route and the necessity of protecting trading partners to ensure supplies in

---

[28] Gearoid O'Tuathail, "Japan as Threat: Geo-Economic Discourse on the USA-Japan Relationship in US Civil Society, 1987-91," in Colin Williams, ed., *The Political Geography of the New World Order* (London: Belhaven, 1993), pp. 181-209.

[29] Beverly Crawford, "The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence," *Millennium* 23(1), 1994: 25-55.

times of crisis. Further, American formulations that emphasize the importance of specifically strategic minerals are sometimes vulnerable to the simple charge of circular reasoning. Military aircrafts use substantial quantities of relatively rare metals whose known sources are in remote and politically unstable regions. In order to ensure access to these materials, it is then argued, requires the production of military equipment capable of guaranteeing continued access to these raw materials needed to produce the military equipment. In the face of increasing globalization, these geoeconomic arguments that reassert access to resources in the South also challenge the arguments for international trade that suggest that global interdependence is necessary to ensure prosperity. The dilemmas here are also fairly clear, albeit not exactly new. One set of security priorities points to autarky, the other clearly to international interdependence.

### *Logic of Economic Security*

Then, what kind of securitizing process is needed in the case of economic security? The whole idea of economic security is exceedingly controversial and politicized. The analysis of the *New York Times's* coverage on US national security in terms of economic security shows that there are two characteristic features in economic securitization: securitization for global society and securitization with less explicitly defined rationale.

The idea of economic security is locked squarely in the unresolved and highly political debates about international political economy concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market. The main contending positions reflect different views about whether states and

societies or markets should have priority and whether state or private economic actors have security claims of their own that must be weighed against the verdict of the market.

The relative US decline was an inevitable result of the exaggerated position of the global dominance it held in 1944. This position was challenged some newly decolonized countries that were finding effective paths to modernization. By the 1970s, some policy makers in the United States were already beginning to feel threatened by dependence on imported oil, trade deficits, and pressure on the dollar. The inclination to securitize this process arose in part from sheer US unfamiliarity with the pains of economic interdependence but mostly from concerns about hegemonic decline and the effect of a weaker United States on global order.

Alongside US decline was the growing integration and liberalization of the global economy, first in trade and, beginning in the 1970s, also in finance. This condition had two effects. First, it meant that national economies became progressively more exposed to competition from other producers in a global market and to ever more powerful transnational corporations and financial markets. The effects of the global economy in promoting unemployment and deindustrialization came to be seen as a threat to both welfare and sovereignty by those who were not doing well within it. Some also saw the global economy as a threat to the state itself or at least to the traditional conception of what the state was supposed to do. Second, this condition meant that all national economies that had become adapted to an open global trading and financial system were dependent upon its continued stability and smooth functioning of both domestic and

global society. All of these economies were therefore threatened by the possibility of systemic crises that might disrupt the worldwide flow of goods and capital.

Economic security is rich in referent objects, ranging from individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself. These objects often overlay. The most significant difference in terms of referent objects between during and after the Cold War lies on the new finding that with the end of the Cold War a state no longer plays as the most important referent object. Instead the global market as a whole has become the key economic security referent.

Concern about the global economy might be securitized in its own terms, but it might also be securitized in terms of a national economy or of groups of individuals within a national economy. There is one interesting finding. With regard to this issue, the most immediate peculiarity of economic security is that under liberal logic its most distinctive unit, the firm, has a relatively weak claim to status as a security referent object. This is due to the contradiction between the inherently instrumental, ephemeral nature of the firm and the logic of existential threats that underlies security. In the liberal perspective, firms are fundamentally organizations of convenience. They may grow very large and may last a long time, but even the oldest and largest are subjected to the market, and when they cease to be efficient or to produce desired goods and services, they are dissolved and replaced by new firms.

***Afterthoughts***

One interesting counter-argument regarding global "economic interdependence" is that international economic interdependence does not cause peace. In fact, it has very serious adverse security consequences that its proponents either do not understand or will not acknowledge. Economic relations (whether domestic or international) never take place in a vacuum; on the contrary, they occur within a politically defined framework. International economic interdependence requires certain conditions in order to flourish, including a maximum degree of political order and stability. The country who provides this order or stability is normally labeled as a "hegemon." Therefore, in a sense, the United States' advocates for "global security" identify a desire to provide institutional conditions and legal standards designed by the country. This is not a new scheme. This standpoint will be discussed again in chapter six.[30]

Also, international economic interdependence generally occurs when states feel secure, when they do not have to worry about others transforming their economic gains from trade into military advantages. Conversely, when states are concerned about their security, they are less likely to engage in free trade. When security is the issue, states are always measuring themselves in comparison with their actual or potential rivals. When states feel secure, they focus on the overall gains to global wealth that flow from trade. Under peaceful international conditions, the distribution of this increased wealth is not a matter of high politics: as long as all states are getting wealthier, trade is looked upon as a

[30] Concerning of 'global security' is the most conspicuous feature in the realm of security in the United States. However, agendas of 'global security' are the very interests of 'hegemonic state' which has historically existed. This explanation will be shown at chapter 7 of this dissertation.

good thing. When security is an issue, however, states become intensely concerned about how the gains from trade are being distributed. This is what the United States is planning to achieve for its continuous hegemonic power.

As the whole Cold War period illustrates, the hegemonic power (the United States since WWII) did its best to provide the stable, secure conditions that interdependence requires. A concrete illustration of this is the American role in facilitating Western Europe's economic integration after the Second World War. Even though West Germany's economic recovery was crucial to jump-starting Western Europe's war-shattered economy, the West Europeans were leery because they feared that Germany's economic revival would lead to its geopolitical resurgence. The United States "solved" this problem by taking on the task of protecting the West Europeans from themselves (in addition to protecting them from the Soviets), thus permitting them to put aside their political rivalries and work together to get back on their feet economically.

We might need to think about this experience since we have already entered onto a new security realm in which an economic security agenda sounds equivalent to a globally bounded liberal economic regime.

### 3. Environmental Security

*Environmental security* has become one of the most common issues in discussions both in the policy-makers and in the public. It needs special attention. Even though the amount of the *New York Times*'s coverage is small, environmental issues have become one of the

most important concerns in security discourse not only in the Untied States, but also in most of the countries. As the following analysis indicates, even though environmental concern has mainly captured our daily discussion, environmental topics have not become mainstream security discourse in the media yet.

***Analysis***

The analysis shows that the *New York Times* articles up to 1997 do not fully support the theoretical predictions. The number of "national security" articles mentioning environmental security is very small. From 1980 to 1997, only 30 articles have made either the front page or editorial page. It is about 3 % of the total articles. However, it does appear that with the Cold War over the coverage on environmental security has increased by a small amount (see Figure 5-4).

In the post-Cold War period (1990-1997) among the articles mentioning "national security" on the *New York Times*'s front page or editorial page, approximately 7 % were about environmental security, whereas during the Cold War (1980-1989) about 1.5 % were about environmental security. The figure 5-4 indicates that, even though the number of the articles on the front page or editorial page of the *New York Times* covering environmental security is very small, environmental security has been constantly mentioned since the end of the Cold War.




Figure 5-4

One of the most striking features of the discussion about environmental security is the existence of two different agendas: a science agenda and a political agenda. Although they overlap and shape each other in part, the scientific agenda is typically embedded in the sciences and nongovernmental activity. It is constructed outside the core of politics, mainly by scientists and research institutions, and offers a list of environmental problems that already or potentially hamper the evolution of present civilizations. Even though the *New York Times*'s articles are not fully comply with this features, the two features are found to a certain degree.

> "We must consider such connections if we are to redefine "*national security*," global climate change and other threats require it. Mr. Lake made reference to the "new threats" of

> environmental degradation and population growth; but in discussing only "old threats" in his speech (that is military), you miss the point. Failure to broaden our concept of *national security* lies at the root of isolationism and the heart of today's debate . . . the United States can no longer discuss *security* without paying attention to the environmental and economic impacts of climate change, such as flooding and losses to the insurance industry."[31]

The political agenda is essentially governmental and intergovernmental. It consists of the public decisionmaking process and public policies that address how to deal with environmental concerns. As such, the political agenda reflects the overall degree of politicization and securitization.

> "Calling environmental destruction 'a growing *national security threat*,' Senate Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today proposed shifting substantial Defense Department and intelligence resources to address ecological problems . . . "the end of the Cold War has greatly reduced the risk of superpower confrontation," Mr. Nunn said, but he added that pressures on the environment could increase the danger of ethnic or regional conflicts."[32]

Generally, the two agendas overlap in the media and in public debates. Ultimately, the scientific agenda underpins securitizing moves, whereas the political agenda is about three areas: (1) state and public awareness of issues on the scientific agenda (how much

---

[31] Seth Dunn, Coordinator of US Climate Action Network, The *New York Times*, May 3, 1995, p. A22, italics added.
[32] By Philip Shabecoff, source from Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senator Armed Services Committee, The *New York Times*, June 29, 1990, p. A1, italics added.

of the scientific agenda is recognized by policymakers, their electorates, and their intermediaries--the press); (2) the acceptance of political responsibility for dealing with these issues; and (3) the political management questions that arise: problems of international cooperation and institutionalization--in particular regime formation, the effectiveness of unilateral national initiatives, distribution of costs and benefits, free-rider dilemmas, problems of enforcement, and so forth.

### *Characteristics of Ecological Security Concern*

Since the *New York Times's* coverage of "environmental security" is not enough to examine further research, the general theoretical review follows is given next part. Even though environmental subjects have not become a mainstream security discourse yet, recently both the policy-makers and the public remarkably discuss environmental topic in terms of security discourse. Early advocates of linking problems of environmental degradation to traditional security discourses were hopeful that the rhetorical ploy would result in an increased priority given to matters of environment in the policy-making circles of the US and other Western states.[33] Contrary to this preposition, some writers

---

[33] Some analysts describe environmental security as "ultimate security," see Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security--The Environmental Basis of Political Stability* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); others as a pollution of security proper, see Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium* 19(3), 1990: 441-473; most others oscillate somewhere in between. Some scholars filter environmental security through a political and military lens, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes and Acute Conflict," *International Security* 16(2), 1991: 76-116; others perceive it as a social welfare issue. In the study of international relations, moreover, the environment seems to be a welcome garden for case studies in regime theory, see Peter Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc Levy, eds., *Institutions for the Earth-Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).

explicitly argued that environmental degradation would trigger conflict.[34]

Most of all, ecological threats are much more diffuse than clearly identified military threats, or even more focused economic threats that can be linked to questions of debt, financial structures, or the fluctuations of international commodity prices. The ecological disruption of the planet threatens numerous facets of existence. Indeed, the all-pervasiveness of ecological threats makes ecological security perhaps even more difficult to formulate than other forms of security.[35] Greenhouse effects and changing to formulate patterns, rising sea levels and ozone depletion--not to mention the rapid global depletion of species diversity--threaten all states and individuals with only partially predictable hazards. In addition, the more localized dangers of soil erosion, acid precipitation, pollution, and toxic contamination mean that most facets of human existence are meeting human-generated hazards, whose vector is broadly "environmental."

Environmental security is a problematic that clearly reveals the difficulties of security thinking if the complex contexts of environmental politics and security policy are critically examined. The conflation of the themes exposes a number of dilemmas that call into question either one or the other term's political efficacy.[36]

---

[34] For a view of the earlier literature, see Simon Dalby, "The Politics of Environmental Security," in Jyrki Kakonen, ed., *Green Security of Militarized Environment?* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994), 25-53. The conventional case for considering environmental factors as a security threat is made in Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: *The Environmental Basis of Political Stability* (New York: Norton, 1993).

[35] See Neville Brown, "Climate, Ecology and International Security," *Survival* 31(6), 1989: 519-532; Udi Helman, "Environmental and the National Interest: An Analytical Survey of the Literature," *The Washington Quarterly* 13(4), 1990: 193-296; A. J. Fairclough, "Global Environmental and Natural Resource Problems--Their Economic, Political and Security Implications," *The Washington Quarterly* 14(1), 1991: 81-98.

[36] For an earlier articulation of these points, see Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17(1), 1992: 95-134.

Three dilemmas are fairly clear. First, the haste with which at least some parts of the US military were willing to adopt environmental themes in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War gives pause for thought. The military record on environmental protection in many societies is much less than reassuring. The environmental legacy of Cold War nuclear test ranges, weapons-making facilities, and abandoned toxic waste at military facilities in many states is one aspect of the issue.[37] Beyond this is the parallel concern that institutions concerned with secrecy and centralized control, not to mention frequently being exempt from environmental regulation under some variation of doctrines of sovereign immunity, are simply not appropriate social organizations for dealing with environmental issues.[38]

Second, conventional formulations of security that support maintaining the North's political status quo implies maintaining consumer life styles, which in turn requires protection of Northern access to resources around the world. On this large scale the environmental security discourse once again raises the simple but fundamental question of what exactly is being rendered secure. Whatever political arguments may have been made at the time, the United States was in a war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 at least in part to ensure the maintenance of oil supplies to the industrialized world. The economic patterns of industrial production in developed parts of the world depend to a large extent on oil. It is precisely this dependence that is the major contribution to the

---

[37] See Seth Shulman, *The Threat at Home: Confronting the Toxic Legacy of the US Military* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege* (New York: Basic, 1992).

[38] Daniel Deudney, "The Mirage of Ecowar: The Weak Relationship among Global Environmental Change, National Security and Interstate Violence," in I. H. Rowlands and M. Greene, eds., *Global Environmental Change and International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 169-91.

changing composition of the global atmosphere, with all the possible consequences that flow from this change in terms of climate change and environmental disruption. If environmental security is, at least in part, about protecting societies from disruptions caused by anthropogenic climate change, then maintaining the American (and the rest of the developed world's) way of life based on the huge use of fossil fuels is obviously not contributing to environmental security in the sense of protecting environments.

Third, the dilemmas of linking environment and security also refer to enlarging the operation of the formal commercial sector in the South. Security based on modernization and the promotion of economic growth often leads to environmental destruction. Forests are stripped and clear-cut in the search for profits for development, while water supplies are contaminated and indigenous peoples deprived of subsistence. Modernization is secured at the cost of disrupted ecologies and the denial of subsistence. This is seen in the recent political turmoil in Southern Mexico. Early in 1994 the Chiapas revolt was at least in part about control over land. The link between the turmoil and the North American Free Trade Agreement was made by a number of human-rights watchers. Commercial interests hoping to expand external markets were, so their reports say, enclosing and clearing land that traditionally was used by indigenous and peasant peoples for their subsistence. This is a frequently heard theme in conflicts over resources and land in the underdeveloped world. The desperation of the dispossessed had, it seemed, led to political unrest and widespread insecurity. But the reimposition of political order by the military reinforced the disruption of these people's lives, perpetuating violence and encouraging migration to the cities of Latin and North America. The politics

of modernization often involve these conflicts; the political order protected by national security policies in many underdeveloped states is related to the destruction of ecosystems, especially of tropical rain forests. Once again, securing modernity seems to be antithetical to environmental protection.

On this point it is also worth remembering that the premise of the notion of sustainable development is precisely that the conventional notions of development are not sustainable. In terms of the debate in academic literature on these matters as they relate to security, the dilemma can perhaps be most clearly seen in Barry Buzan's discussions of the possibility of a mature anarchy's provision for international security on a global scale.[39] His theory in part suggests that security is premised on much of the world's becoming advanced industrialized democracies. If this is impossible due to ecological limitations (rather than resource shortages, as earlier arguments suggested), then the prognosis for a global future of peace and security, if security is understood as requiring conventional industrial development, is not good. Ecological limitations suggest that the industrial democratic assumptions present a dubious premise on which to construct the edifice of security order.

These dilemmas lead to the argument that either security or environment has to be rethought to allow for an easy conflation of the terms. Security understood as the perpetuation of the modern order seems antithetical to the preservation of the environment. Preserving the environment in turn seems antithetical to the preservation of the modern political economy, which is according to conventional thinking, the referent

[39] Buzan, *People, States and Fear*. Other suggestions for extending contemporary Western economic patterns are also vulnerable to this critic.

that should be secured. The dilemma of environmental security is this simple, but none of the suggested reformulations are easy.

## 4. Conclusion: From National Security to Global Security

Several other subjects such as human rights, terrorism or immigration have been mentioned in the *New York Times* between 1980 to 1997. However, the coverage is too scanty to make any argument based on those subjects yet. For example, human rights in the United States has been mentioned only 4 times in the articles containing the phrase "US national security" on the front or editorial page during the period, and human rights of foreign countries also has been mentioned 4 times among all the analyzed articles. The *New York Times* has covered "terrorism" 9 times in terms of "US national security" on the front or editorial pages from 1980 to 1997, it also has covered "drug" 14 times in the articles mentioning "US national security." This coverage did not show any significant differences between during the Cold War period (1980-1989) and during the post-Cold War period (1990-1997).

To analyze the *New York Times's* coverage on US national security in terms of a subject leads us to conclude that the most significant change in the coverage between during and after the Cold War is a shifting concern from national security discourse to global security discourse. Indeed, following the winding down of the Cold War frame after 1989, the new global security predicament has been the object of extensive scrutiny.

"Our real *national security* can no longer be separated from global security, which depends in

part on the ability of all countries to secure global interdependence."[40]

This new trend toward global security makes more sense as we consider that the Cold War frame playing as the most important means to interpret and deliver news stories. Security under the so-called globalization age is about global social movements committed to world order values such as non-violence, economic justice, environmental sustainability, good governance and human rights. This new tendency leads us to carefully think about the role of state. Obviously, the role of the state these days is widely challenged, as the limitations of state-centric politics, environmental policy and economics are all too evident. As explained in chapter two, the characteristic features of the Cold War security, with extreme emphasis on state and military, are waning to a certain degree in the post-Cold War era. Of course, it is not proclaimed that the role of sovereign state has become less important since 1989. Rather, in a sense, we have to begin where we are, and the governments of sovereign states will pragmatically remain important actors in world politics and will continue to serve key functions in the regulation of violence, the development of law, the direction of social policies and the management of external relations. Statecraft will therefore continue to be of significance.

As indicated in chapter two and three, the term strategic thinking has been closely associated with an American approach to the study of military aspects during the Cold War frame. The analysis of the *New York Times's* coverage mentioning "national security" clearly identified that the military subjects were the most important topics both

[40] Elaine Allen, President of Physicians for Social Responsibility, The *New York Times*, July 27, 1994, p. A20, italics added.

in term of amount and in term of content between 1980 to 1997 in accordance with the characteristic feature of US national security policy, "militarism." This has also been described as national security studies due to the fact that it was generally American studying US security.[41] One of the distinctive elements of strategic studies has been its focus on military strategy. To this end the focus of traditional strategic studies has been the military means that the international system employs to gain their political objectives or ends.

The Cold War frame focusing strategic military aspects has been closely linked to realism, which treats states as the principal actors in the international system. It is difficult for strategic approaches to address domestic sources of insecurity. In the post-Cold War era the objective of security is shifting away from the state to the individual or substate group, again this so-called "global security." This implies a focus on even how individuals can threaten the state (or ruling regime) or how the state can threaten the security of individuals, mainly in the name of regime preservation or national security.

Based on the outcomes of this chapter, we can expect that in the coming years the United States will face three kinds of threats to its security interests broadly understood: direct threats to the United States itself and to its citizens and assets abroad; threats to the security and well-being of its allies and friends; and threats to world order. Terrorism, the international drug trade, illegal immigration, and nuclear blackmail or limited nuclear attack compose the first category. In the second category, there is conventional warfare,

---

[41] The key American Cold War Strategists include Bernard Brodie, Ablert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger, William Kauffman, Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling. See J. Garnett, "Strategic Studies and its Assumptions," in J. Bayliss, K. Booth, J. Garnett and P. Williams, *Contemporary Strategy: Vol. I Theories and Concepts* (London, 1987).

internal wars, and coups directed against states to which the United States has security obligations or that are otherwise important to American interest. World-order threats are more difficult to define but as generally discussed, involve threats to the stability of a region in which the United States has important interests. Their relationship to US security is indirect and relatively long-term. At the limit, the presence or absence of democratic government in a region or in the world may generally be understood as a world-order interest of the United States.

## Chapter Six: Reference of Foreign Countries in National Security Discourse

This chapter discusses the fourth hypothesis: Since the end of the Cold War, the *New York Times'* coverage of US national security should have changed in its reference to foreign countries as US national security concerns. During the Cold War period the Soviet Union should had been considered the most critical state for US national security concern in the media coverage. However, I hypothesize that by the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union has been no longer portrayed as a US security threat in the *New York Times* articles containing the phrase "national security." This hypothesis includes three substantial minor hypotheses that accompany the hypothesis of the disappearance of 'Sovietology.' First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, replacing the former Soviet Union, no longer has been portrayed as a US national security concern in the *New York Times'* coverage in terms of US national security. Second, since the collapse of the Soviet Union the *New York Times* should have scarcely mentioned other regions or foreign countries in the articles mentioning US "national security." Thirdly, as policy makers and the public normally mention, China and Japan must have become the main US national security concerns in the *New York Times'* coverage after the end of the Cold War. This chapter discusses all these hypotheses.

### 1. Disappearance of 'Sovietology'

During the Cold War period (1980-1989) the Soviet Union has been dominantly mentioned in The *New York Times* US national security articles. 374 articles, referring to

other countries for US national security concern, were shown on the front and editorial pages in the *New York Times* between 1980 to 1991, and 68 articles between 1992 to 1997.[1] Among the articles about 63 % (203 articles out of 374) referred to the Soviet Union while *New York Times* were reporting US national security interests referring to other countries from 1980 to 1992, whereas only 16 % during 1992 to 1997 (see figure 6-1).




Figure 6-1

During the entire Cold War period, "Sovietology" prevailed in the media detailing US foreign and national security policy, and providing a cultural prism to explain complex

[1] To test the hypothesis of this chapter, I differently divided the period under from the way how I did in the previous chapters. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union happened in 1991, instead of 1980-1989 and 1990-1997, I divided the entire years into 1980-1991 and 1992-1997.

political and military events in countries as diverse as in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. "Sovietology," is the realist literature in international relations, nuclear strategy, and geopolitics to ideologically construct the Soviet Union as a dangerous "Other."[2] During the Cold War, US policy-makers drew on "sovietology" and crystalized it out as a discourse of this period. In the media this frame depicted international events as a rivalry between two major superpowers and ranged other countries into "friends" and "enemies" of these superpowers. Warfare in Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, or Afghanistan could be interpreted as internal power struggles provoked by religious, ethnic, or regional civil wars in order to topple unstable regimes. Alternatively, these conflicts could be seen in terms of hegemonic rivalry against Soviet Union for global ascendancy, thereby involving vital US' national interests.

In the post-Cold War period, Russia (or the former Soviet Union) has hardly been mentioned in the *New York Times* in regards to US national security concerns.

> "For the most part, our national decision makers have failed to recognize the extent of the reduced threat to our *national security* following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact."[3]

As you can see in the figure 6-1, the number of *New York Times* articles referring to other regions in terms of US national security have significantly decreased since 1990. It has decreased almost by 75 % after the end of the Cold War. If we consider the significant

---

[2] For the more specific discussion, see Simon Dalby, "Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union As Other," *Alternatives* 13, 1988: 415-442; Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990).
[3] Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director, N.A.A.C.P., The *New York Times*, May 5, 1992, p. A30, italics added.

decrease of the number of articles containing the phrase 'national security' since 1989, the decrease of articles referring to other regions for US national security concern is not a surprise. One interesting outcome regarding the disappearance of 'sovietology' is that, even though the change of the subjects examined in chapter 5 became conspicuous since 1989--after the breakdown of Berlin Wall, the decrease of the news articles referring the Soviet Union (or Russia since 1992) for US national security concerns became salient in the *New York Times'* coverage after 1990. From this finding, we can argue that the US national security concern portrayed in the media more relied on the country itself rather than the prospecting collapse of communism. The outcome also indicates that particularly in the year of 1982, 1983 and 1986 the Soviet Union centered on the *New York Times* articles mentioning "national security" in terms of area.

Therefore, my hypothesis is acceptable because Russia or the former Soviet Union has been hardly mentioned in the *New York Times* articles in the perspective of the US national security since the end of the Cold War. Especially in 1993, neither Russia nor the former Soviet Union was shown in the *New York Times* coverage of either on the front page or editorial page.

Instead of 'Sovietology' of the Cold War period, a wide variety of regions have been listed on the coverage in the post-Cold War period, even though the number of stories referring to other countries in terms of the US national security has decreased significantly. Those countries include: China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Rwanda, Haiti, South Africa, Japan, Mexico, Bosnia, Serbia, Guatemala, Croatia, Cuba, Somalia, and even France. If we do not include the Soviet Union or Russia, the occurrences of

countries on the perspective of U.S. national security is pretty stable throughout the entire compared years. Not surprisingly, East European countries have never been mentioned as a US national security concern since 1992, while they were frequently mentioned in the discussion during the Cold War.[4]

## 2. Why is There Still Concern about Other Regions?

The second hypothesis about US national security concern by referring to other countries is about the replacement of 'sovietology.' Contrary to my expectation, even though the Cold War is over, the *New York Times'* articles about US national security still contain references to other countries with the matter of security concern. Many regions and countries have been mentioned, and those places may include certain countries who used to be supported by the United States during the Cold War era. As the most typical example, Iraq has been often listed in the *New York Times'* articles as the United States' main threat after the end of the Cold War. But the United States had supported Iraq during the 8 year Iran-Iraq War in which the Soviet Union was pro-Iranian government. Between 1980 to 1989, Iraq was negatively mentioned only twice in terms of the US national security concern.

Interestingly enough, in 1995 the *New York Times* mentioned France as a US national security concern because of the economic spying.

---

[4] However, East European countries have been reported in the context of NATO expansion. The only exception to this end is the articles about Yugoslavia. However, on the case of Yugoslavia is different in that the area have been mentioned as US security concern not by for the sake of the country closely related to US national security interest, but by for the sake of European security as a whole.

"At a time when American *national security* is increasingly defined by economic interest, it is reassuring to see the lumbering intelligence apparatus in Washington turning away from the obsolete work of monitoring Russian military forces . . . it is not appropriate to bribe French officials for economic information."[5]

### *The Rise of Great Powers and Economic Interdependence*

Why does the *New York Times* still cover a variety of foreign countries to refer US national security concern? The analysis of the *New York Times* articles including the phrase "national security" after the end of the Cold War identifies two propositions. First, the United States mostly concerns itself with the rise of the new great power because it is a main threat to the America's entwined interests in global stability and interdependence. Second, the United States also believes that the "spillover" of instability from strategically peripheral areas to regions of core strategic interest should be a threat to American interest. The following two articles stand for those two propositions.

"For the first time since Pearl Harbor, a new administration takes power with no global strategic threat hanging over it. Economic issues like European protectionism, North American free trade and competitiveness with Asia have moved to the center of foreign policy debate. Mr. Clinton would be wise to be seize this opportunity to change the *national security* agenda."[6]

"the White House make decisions about *national security*. . . Mr. Clinton said on

---

[5] By editorial desk, The *New York Times*, February 23, 1995, p. A22, italics added.
[6] By editorial desk, The *New York Times*, November 10, 1992, p. A22, italics added.

> Tuesday. . . we must lead in two ways. First, by meeting the immediate challenges to our interests from rogue regimes, from sudden explosions of ethnic, racial and religious and tribal hatreds form short-term crises, and second, by making long-term investments in security, prosperity, peace and freedom that can prevent these problems from arising in the first place."[7]

Logically, the emergence of new great powers would have two deleterious consequences for the United States. First, new great powers could become aspiring hegemons themselves and, if successful, would seriously threaten US national security. Second, the emergence of new great powers historically has been a destabilizing geopolitical phenomenon.[8]

For instance, it seems that most of the US foreign policy community accepts that little can be done to prevent China's emergence as a new great power because it lies outside the U.S. sphere of influence whether it is true or not in reality. The United States may have to acquiesce in China's rise to great power status. However, within Washington's sphere of influence, the United States' strategy of preponderance clearly aims to prevent the great power emergence of Germany and Japan by embedding them firmly in US-dominated security and economic framework. US policymakers fear that a "renationalized" Japan or Germany could trigger an adverse geopolitical chain reaction.

Although the Cold War is over, American policymakers still consider America's pacification role in Europe and East Asia as vital, due to the US military presence in

---

[7] Tim Weiner, The *New York Times*, October 28, 1996, p. A1, italics added.

[8] For instance, we think of how the emergence of the United States, Germany, and Japan as great powers in the late nineteenth century contributed to the international turmoil that culminated in the First World War.

those regions. They fear that if the United States were to withdraw from Europe and East Asia and leave Germany and Japan to tend to their own security, regional security competitions would ensure. At best, the result would be an increase in political tension that would make international cooperation more difficult. At worst, renationalization could undermine regional stability and perhaps lead to war. Either way, the US strategic interests furthered by economic interdependence would be imperiled.

In addition to the emergence of new great powers, turmoil in the peripheries could also jeopardize America's interest in international stability.

> "Competition between the services is unnecessary because each performs unique but complementary roles in our *national security* strategy. . . to support to United States friends and allies, peacekeeping, security assistance, the war on drugs and support to civil authorities such as disaster relief through all over the world."[9]

Turbulence in the periphery could prompt America's allies to act independently to maintain order in the peripheries, again raising the specter of renationalization, and/or ripple back into the core and undercut prosperity by disrupting the economic links that bind the United States to Europe and East Asia.

Therefore, American security guarantees that Europe and East Asia are the means by which the strategy of preponderance maintains a benign international political order conductive to interdependence. Through these security guarantees, the United States retains the primary responsibility for defending German, Japanese, or Chinese security

---

[9] Carl E. Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, The *New York Times*, January 1, 1990, p. 24, italics added.

interests both in the core and in the periphery. The United States thereby negates those countries' incentives to renationalize their foreign and security policies and to become great powers. In order to implement the strategy of preponderance successfully, the United States, according to a 1992 Pentagon planing document,

> "must account sufficiently for the national security interests of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order." [10]

Indeed, there is a public consensus in the United States that the country must continue to dominate the international system and thus 'discourage' the advanced "industrial nations from challenging our leadership or . . . even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."[11] To accomplish this, America must do nothing less than "retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing . . . those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations."[12]

At the same time, the United States must provide what one of the Planning Guidance's authors termed 'adult supervision.' It must not only dominate regions composed of wealthy and technologically sophisticated states but also take care of such nuisances as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and North Korea's dictator Kim Jung Il, in order to protect the interests of virtually all potential great powers so they need not

---

[10] The *New York Times*, March 8, 1992
[11] Benjamin Schwarz, "Why America thinks it has to run the world," *The Atlantic Monthly* 277(6), June 1996, p. 96.
[12] *Ibid*, p. 96.

acquire the capability to protect themselves--in other words, so those powers need not act like great powers.

> "the administration has concocted a highly misleading litany of *national security* threat . . . but our adversaries--other than China and the former Soviet republics, which have long ability to strike the United States--are Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria."[13]

Therefore, for example, Washington must protect Germany's and Japan's access to Persian Gulf oil. If these countries were to protect their own interests in the Gulf, they would develop military forces capable of global 'power projection.' Obviously, the United States must spend more on its 'national security' than the rest of world's countries combined. This post-Cold War strategy reflects what the historian Melvyn Leffler defined as an imperative of America's Cold War national-security policy: that neither an integrated Europe nor a united Germany nor an independent Japan must be permitted to emerge as a third force. This is the very logic of the United States' strategy which has made the continuity of the *New York Times'* articles containing "national security" referring to other countries in terms of the US national security interest.

### 3. Is China or Japan Replacing the Soviet Union?

***The Unipolar Moment***

---

13 Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., Executive director of the Arms Control Association, The *New York Times*, June 18, 1994, p. 21, italics added.

The last hypothesis of this chapter is testing the assertion that China and Japan have become the most critical countries in US national security discourse after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, one of the common wisdoms in the United States is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the country needs to pay attention to China and Japan for their potential hegemonic growing. Contrary to this expectation, the number of articles mentioning China or Japan in the *New York Times* national security articles was surprisingly small between 1980 to 1997. Through the entire period Japan has been mentioned 14 times in the articles containing the phrase "national security" on the front or editorial pages in the *New York Times*, and 11 times in case of China.




Figure 6-2

However, the *New York Times'* coverage on China and Japan and on a variety of regions with the perspective of US national security interest cannot be understood without a more comprehensive standpoint.

Both academia and policymakers believe that America's globe-girdling security will continue even the end of the Cold War, because they conceive the role of the country has not changed since WWII. They will justify the Pax Americana by invoking 'the imperative of continued U.S. world leadership,' the need to shape a favorable international environment, to have reassurance of allies, and the ongoing need for stability and continuing engagement. Even during the Cold War, "Soviet threat" might not have been mentioned.

The most important question with regard to this hypothesis is if the unipolar moment of the United States will lead to the emergence of new great powers, then unipolarity of the international system eventually transforms to multipolariry.[14] This means that, according to the realist balance of power theory, states seek to balance power, and thus the preponderance of power in the hands of single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers and possibly coalitions of powers, determined to balance the dominant state. Layne writes, ". . . in unipolar systems, states do indeed balance against the hegemon's unchecked power."[15] The question is not whether new powers will rise and balance but when, and to Layne the answer is similarly clear--"fairly quickly."

Contrary to this position, others advocate that balancing behavior of prospective

---

[14] The more comprehensive discussion on US unipolarity is dealt in chapter 6.
[15] Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17(4), Spring 1993, p. 13.

new great powers against the dominant hegemonic power is most usefully understood as a response to a threat.[16] The logic of this theory suggests that whether or not states balance, a dominant state will depend at least in part on the foreign policy behavior of the dominant state. In the current United States' unipolar context, the rapid rise of new powers to balance the United States is not a foregone conclusion. US behavior can affect the calculations of other major states and may help convince them that it is unnecessary to engage in balancing behavior. By this logic, a rapid transition from unipolarity to "great power rivalry in a multipolar setting" is not inevitable.

Now I return to the issue of China and Japan. If many Americans had been asked ten years ago why US troops were deployed in East Asia and Europe, they would have answered, to keep the Soviet out. They may have wondered, however, why the United States persisted in its strategy long after Japan, South Korea, and Western Europe had become capable of defending themselves. Now that the USSR itself has disappeared, why does Washington continue to insist that US 'leadership' in the East Asia and Europe is still indispensable?

### *China*

In the United States it seems plain that everyone understands China as a potential threat to the US. However, figure 6-2 tells us that in terms of the number of articles the *New York Times* covers on China is not as popular as the public normally perceives to the Chinese threat. In fact, the occurrence of China as US national security concern on the

[16] Among the scholars in this position, Walt's argument is most prevailing. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

front page or on the editorial page is extremely rare (2.5 % of the entire articles) in the *New York Times*. Therefore, my analysis is focused on the specific content of the coverage. Of course, it is possible that the US national security articles referring to China may be portrayed in the *New York Times* other than on the front page or on the editorial page. This consideration is not included within the scope of my research.

Most of all, the avoidance of an unnecessary confrontation with China is a prevailing nuance of the *New York Times*' coverage. And, there is no significant difference in terms of frequency in the *New York Times* coverage of China as a US national security concern throughout the whole period of analysis, from 1980 to 1997. It was 1985 when China was mentioned as a US national security concern for the first time either on the front page or on the editorial page.[17] Regarding the purpose of this research, an article on October 16, 1989 was meaningful to the US national security conception.

> "Mr. Kissinger bitterly denounced the US House and Senate for voting to impose economic sanctions on China after the massacre in Tiananmen Square. China remains too important for America's *national security* to risk the relationship on the emotions of the moment."[18]

Despite ongoing controversies, most policy makers in Washington seem to believe that China is not an inherently expansionist; instead, it just worries about its powerful neighbors, Japan and Russia, and seeks a strategic relationship with the United States that will enable it to balance these two powers. On this score the debate between the pro-

---

[17] See the *New York Times*, December 2, 1985, p.A15.
[18] Anthony Lewis, cited from Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State under Nixon Administration, The *New York Times*, August 20, 1989, p. 23, italics added.

containment and the pro-engagement schools of thought regarding China currently favors the latter group. The pro-containment advocates have captured most of the headlines, but the pro-engagement advocates have created the stronger case.[19] The following article typically shows a somewhat generous attitude to China.

> "In the final version, perhaps after the M.F.N. China decision, a line from a pragmatist was brought up from below a substitute . . . our national security strategy reflects both America's interests and values."[20]

Recent discussions of Sino-American relations have focused on the development of a US policy for managing a rising power and potential rival. But, the temperature is pretty mild. The debate over containment versus engagement is at the center of this discussion. Advocates of Containment foresee the rise of a belligerent power, a process that will inevitably destabilize Asia and challenge vital US interests. Arguing that a powerful China will be intent on achieving a long list of unrealized territorial and political ambitions, they insist that the US must respond to China's rise by strengthening this alliances on the Chinese periphery and increasing US military deployments in Asia.

Advocates of engagement agree that China is growing stronger but argue that Chinese intentions remain fluid and that premature adoption of belligerent policies risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy--treat China as an enemy and it will be one. They

---

[19] The two most frequently cited papers regarding these two different approaches to China are Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs* 76, March/April 1997, Pp. 18-32; Robert S. Ross, "China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power," *Foreign Affairs* 76, March/April 1997, Pp. 34-44.

[20] William Safire, The *New York Times*, August 25, 1994, p. A21, italics added.

assert that expanded economic relations and official dialogues about security issues, human rights, and the global commons will maximize the prospect that China will use its power in a manner conducive to U.S. interests.

The difference between these two policy packages is significant, but I believe that they share a concern for China's increasing ability to destabilize the regional balance of power and threaten vital American interests. In both cases, this concern is based on incorrect assumptions about Chinese strategic capabilities. The reason that there is no a "China threat" is not because China is a benign status quo power, but rather because it is too weak to challenge the balance of power in Asia yet and will remain weak well into the first half of the 21st century.

One thing that of which we have to be prudent is that engagement must mean more than simply offering China the opportunity to follow the rules.

> "The Clinton Administration's penchant for putting trade above our *national security* has convinced China that even the greatest outrages will go unpunished . . . if we really want to engage the Chinese, we have to show that we are willing to punish them when they break the rules."[21]

It requires acknowledging Chinese interests and negotiating solutions that accommodate both American and Chinese objectives. In bilateral relations, this will entail compromise approaches over the future of Taiwan. It will require mutual accommodation to prevent nuclear proliferation the Korean peninsula and accommodation of Chinese interest in

---

[21] Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, The *New York Times*, April 24, 1997, p. A29, italics added.

Sino-Pakistani security ties. Washington must acknowledge the economic sources of trade imbalances and the Chinese government's limited ability to enforce its domestic laws and international commitments.

***Japan***

As my hypothesis on China as a US national security concern has been proved incorrect, Japan also has been rarely mentioned on the front page or editorial page of the *New York Times* between 1980 to 1997 (see figure 6-2). Among the articles containing the phrase "national security" only 3 % mentioned Japan as US national security concern. Again, my analysis is dedicated to the content of the coverage, rather the occurrence.

Most of the articles about Japan have focused on economic subjects in the *New York Times'* coverage. Therefore, my interpretation of the articles about Japan also approaches to that direction. One of the fundamental aims of America's Cold War strategy was to create and maintain "a global liberal economic regime"-- a capitalistic world order.

> "making the poor richer is the best way to create new exports and wealth for Americans. . . Promoting economic growth through freer trade is the surest and cheapest means to pump up Economies . . . This package of proposals profoundly redefines US *national security* . . . "[22]

After WWII, American statesmen believed that the United States, standing alone and strong in a world of weary nations, had a remarkable opportunity, as Acheson said, to ". .

---

[22] Leslie H. Gelb, The *New York Times*, August 2, 1992, italics added.

. grab hold of history and make it conform." American statesmen seized that opportunity by creating a complex strategy to reify Adam Smith's dream. Washington envisioned a world economy in which trade and capital would flow across national boundaries in response to the laws of comparative advantage and supply and demand--an economy in which production and finance would be integrated on a global scale. The constricted national markets that were emerging in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in Europe and East Asia would be combined, eliminating the inefficiencies of statistic self-sufficiency. Large-scale regional economies would in turn be integrated into an interdependent world economy. US policymakers knew that building this multinational capitalist community required the United States to provide Western Europe and Japan with enormous amounts of economic aid, so that those areas would not retreat into closed economies.[23] They also knew that an open world economy demanded an even more ambitious American project: transforming international relations.

By providing for Japan's security and by enmeshing its foreign and military policies in a US-controlled alliance, Americans have contained their erstwhile enemy, preventing their "partner" from embarking upon independent--and possibly dangerous--political and military policies. By restraining its powerful ally, Washington has, to use a euphemism favored in policymaking circles, "reassured" Japan's neighbors and stabilized relations among the states of East Asia. The United States played the decisive role in promoting Tokyo's integration with its former colonies in Japan-centered regional trade

[23] After the end of the Second World War the United States' project to construct a global liberal economic regimes was consolidated schemes such as the Marshall Plan, for Europe, and the Dodge Plan, its equivalent for Japan.

networks that have been the foundation of East Asia's economic miracle. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, overcame their fear and resentment of Japan and opened doors to Japanese investment and trade.

With the Cold War over, the stability of the Pacific Basin and a strong US - Japanese relationship will be more important to the United States than ever before. The US economy needs the vast markets of the Pacific Rim; it benefits enormously from Japanese investment capital and technology and the impetus toward greater productivity provided by Japanese competition. The *New York Times'* articles explicitly mentioning "national security" in its reference to Japan as US national security concern completely contain these ideas. This trend is applicable to the articles both of the Cold War period and of the post-Cold War period.

> ". . . Congress is expected to shift the focus of the emotional debate to economic issues of *national security* . . . the American companies have begun to recognize that their relationships with Toshiba and other foreign high-technology companies are so complex and intertwined that there is virtually no way to avoid serious economic damage."[24]

> ". . *Amreica's national security* would suffer if the troubled industry were allowed to collapse . . . as they built factories in this country and in other Asian countries over the last decade and opened their markets a bit to some foreign companies, an interdependency developed. In many ways, the relationship benefits this country."[25]

---

[24] By Susan F. Rasky, cited from Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade, The *New York Times*, September 14, 1987, p. A1, italics added.
[25] By Stephen Engelberg, cited from Grant Bennett, Businessman, The *New York Times*, November 2, 1993, p. A1, italics added.

All these benefits would be lost, according to Coll, if the "traditional rivalries among Asian powers. . . unravel into unrestrained military competition, conflict and aggression."[26] In the same vein the author of the Clinton Administration's security strategy for East Asia, Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense, asserted in 1995 that the U.S. military protectorate is "the basis for stability and prosperity in the region"; if the United States were to forsake its leadership role in East Asia, "the stable expectations of entrepreneurs and investors would be subverted."[27]

To the United States, the best change in East Asia is no change at all because any alteration in the status quo could start falling the dominoes. And if there is to be change, Washington--not Tokyo or Beijing--must manage it. To permit the opposite would send a dangerous signal about America's diminishing ability to regulate, calibrate, and manipulate international politics in East Asia. Of course, Washington appreciates that change is inevitable, and its frustration comes from being unable to manage an increasingly unmanageable world.

The hope and fear with which policymakers view economic change in East Asia illustrates the contradictory convictions that animate US policy. Washington both heralds the economic dynamism of the Pacific Rim, hoping it will bring democracy and peace and worldwide economic growth, and dreads the Asian miracle. It knows that just as economic change engenders a shift in political and military power, so a particular

---

[26] Alberto Coll, "Power, Principles, and Prospects for a Cooperative International Order," *Washington Quarterly* 16(1), Winter 1993: 5-14.

[27] So called "Nye Report" is the most frequently cited and discussed article regarding Asian security. In the article, Nye asserted that See Joseph Nye, "The Case of Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* 74(4), August 1995: 90-102.

economic order is jeopardized as the foundation upon which it rests--US hegemony--weakens. In the oxymoronic vocabulary of US diplomacy, strong partners are economically welcome and indeed necessary, but U.S. leadership is indispensable.

## 4. Conclusion: US Global Preponderance

It is the very fact of the Soviet Union's collapse that has knocked off the Cold War frame in the *New York Times'* coverage in the articles mentioning US "national security". In this chapter it has been tested by the hypothesis that the *New York Times* stories referring to other regions or countries in terms of US national security concern should have changed since the end of the Cold War. In a word, this test identified the tenuous continuity of US national security consideration in which the United States has never given up its global interest in terms of her national security concern. As I have shown in chapter three, 'globalism' is one of the characteristic features of US foreign policy after the end of the Second World War. This feature has been completely reflected in the media coverage during the Cold War and even after the Cold War. For concluding remarks, I will explore two characteristics of US national security tradition: global political stability and economic interdependence.

The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as preferable to Soviet domination. The United States could only enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era due to the effects of bipolarity itself. Simply put, without the Cold War, America will not be

able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. But, obviously this is just one aspect of the Cold War configuration. The strategic mindset of US policy makers in which Americans are mostly obsessed by US preponderance perceives every part of the world as possible US national security concerns. Of course, there is a significant counter-argument to the United States' preponderance thinking.

> " . . . the foreign policy Establishment still subscribes to a strategy aimed at preserving America's status as the world's sole superpower. Such thinking will ultimately endanger our *national security*."[28]

However, during and after the Cold War, geographically, the strategy of preponderance clearly identifies Europe, East Asia, Latin America, and the Persian Gulf as regions wherever the United States has vital security interests. To recapitulate, Europe and East Asia are important because they are the regions from which new great powers could emerge and where future great power wars could occur; central to the functions of an interdependent international economic system; and vital to US prosperity. The Persian Gulf is important because of oil. Geographically, these regions constitute America's vital interests; however, its security interests are not confined to these regions. The United States must also be concerned with the "peripheries' - regions that are geographically removed from the core - because turmoil there could affect the core. Indeed, since 1989

---

[28] Christopher Layne, Professor of University of California at Los Angeles, The *New York Times*, March 18, 1993, p. A23, italics added.

many periphery countries such as Haiti, Rwanda, and Sudan have been mentioned in the *New York Times* coverage explicitly containing the phrase US "national security."

It is closely related to the US grand strategy that was designed after the end of the Cold War. Since the end of the Second World War, US strategy ostensibly was shaped by the need to contain the Soviet Union.[29] The Cold War's imperatives imbued US foreign policy with a clarity of purpose. With the Cold War's end, it was possible to rethink the first principles of US foreign policy and to reconceptualize America's world role from scratch.

With the disappearance of its superpower rival, the United States, could have reconsidered the various international obligations it had assumed during the Cold War. After all, the Soviet threat had been the impetus for the US commitment to NATO and for the American military presence in East Asia. Similarly, American interventions in the Third World had been animated by the geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union. Having prevailed in the Cold War, the United States could have withdrawn from its costly external commitments and focused its energies on addressing a too long neglected agenda of domestic economic and social issues. However, this did not happen.

Thus, American global interests today present a seeming puzzle: the Soviet Union's collapse transformed the international system dramatically, but there has been no

---

[29] Indeed, the debate about US grand strategy has been vehemently after the collapse of the Soviet Union. See, for instance, Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22(1), Summer 1997: 86-124; Christopher Layne, "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-first Century," *World Policy Journal* 15(2), Summer 1998: 8-28; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21(4), Spring 1997: 49-88; Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21(3), Winter 1996/7: 5-53.

corresponding change in the basis of US foreign policy during and after the Cold War. In terms of ambitions, interests, practice, and alliances, the United States today is following the same strategy that it pursued from 1945 until 1991, so-called the strategy of preponderance.[30]

[30] Originally this term is from Melvyn Lefflers' description of postwar grand strategy as a strategy of preponderance to reflect what I demonstrate to be the underlying continuity between America's postwar and post-Cold War strategies. See Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). At the same time, the concepts of preponderance is much likely similar to the "primacy" policy which is explained in ch. 6 of this dissertation.

## Chapter Seven: Isolationism vs. Interventionism in National Security Discourse

It is proclaimed that US interventionist feature of foreign policy during the Cold War, explained in chapter three, has waned with the end of the Cold War. This chapter is dedicated to test this proclamation. I hypothesize that the content of the *New York Times'* articles containing the phrase "national security" should had been more internationally oriented during the Cold War period and that of the post-Cold War period should be more domestically oriented. It was not easy to code the news articles in terms of domestic focus or international focus for the sake of US national security concern. I have set up a few standards to categorize the *New York Times'* articles to fit to the hypothesis: First, the articles were tested on the basis of any area outside of the United States was mentioned in consideration of US national security; second, the articles were tested on the basis of US domestic interest having any priority over international interest when those two interests were contested; third, the articles were tested on the basis of the analyzed *New York Times* articles were supporting any US positive leadership for global or international interest. This test boils down our attention to the long-standing debate in the United States foreign policy community, 'isolationism' vs. 'interventionism.'[1] This chapter starts

[1] As noted at chapter three, finding an adequate and useful definition of the term 'intervention' is quite challenging. While I have adopted part of the definition of intervention provided by Rosenau and Vincent, I reject their further claim that for a foreign policy action to be labeled "intervention" it must be "convention-breaking", that it must be a form of behavior "which constitutes a sharp break with then-existing forms" of behavior, or norms of international politics (Rosenau, "Intervention as a scientific concept," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13(2), 1969, p. 161; Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, p. 13). In being labeled "convention-breaking", intervention is rendered an aberration of sorts, a violation of systemic norms. The issues, however, is much more complex. Great powers, for instance, have traditionally been permitted to intervene in their recognized "sphere of influence" or, more contentiously, where they have a 'legitimate' interest. In this sense, intervention, by certain states at least, is itself a norm or convention rather

with the general introduction about the theoretical propositions on this debate. Then, based on the analysis of the *New York Times'* articles, I will bring several important aspects and considerations regarding domestic priority vs. international priority on the US national security concern. In many senses, this chapter may be understood as dealing with a similar research agenda to chapter five. But, the issue of this chapter is specifically confined to the discussion on "interventionism" as a feature of US foreign policy, whereas chapter five has more focused on the disappearance of the "Sovietology" and the appearance of potential global powers through the *New York Times* coverage.

## 1. Visions for US Strategies Under the Current Debate

With the end of the Cold War four grand strategies, relatively discrete and coherent arguments about the US role in the world, now compete in our public discourse. They may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy.[2] "Grand strategy" is an important-sounding term however the concept is simple: it is the process by which a sate matches ends and means in the pursuit of security. In peacetime, grand strategy encompasses the following: defining the state's security interests; identifying the threats to those interests; and allocating military, diplomatic, and

---

than a "convention-breaking" behavior. For the United States in the post-war period, intervention ahs not been an exception. It has instead been a routine tool of US foreign policy practice.

[2] Often students in this discussion label their positions differently; 'interventionism' vs. 'non-interventionism' or 'internationalism' vs. 'non-internationalism.' E. Wittkoff made a clear explanation about Americans' belief system by proposing four categories; Accomodationists, Internationalists, Isolationists, Hardliners; see, Eugene Wittkoff, "On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence," *International Studies Quarterly* 30(4), 1986: 425-445.

economic resources to defend the state's interests. Thus the debate about US grand strategy touches on the following questions: What regions of the world are important to US security? Will new great powers rise and threaten American interests? What alliance commitments should the United States undertake? Does the United States have a stake in regional "stability", and in economic interdependence? What military forces does the United State need to defend its interests? What is the proper balance between America's external commitments and its domestic needs?

As shown in Chapter five, many places and regions have replaced the Soviet Union in US national security interest after the end of the Cold War. That means that the United States' byproducts of global interest and interventionist mindset have not changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before furthering the analysis of the third hypothesis, I am going to explain what these four strategies argue in terms of their premises, national interest, and foundational ideology.

### *Neo-Isolationism*

Neo-isolationism is the least ambitious, and probably the least popular grand strategy option among foreign policy professionals.[3] The new isolationists have embraced a constricted view of US national interests that renders internationalism not only

[3] The new isolationists seldom refer to themselves as isolationists. Indeed, they often vociferously deny isolationist tendencies. Earl Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," *Foreign Policy* 81, Winter 1990-91: 3-19, prefers "disengagement." Patrick J. Buchanan, too, in "American First-and Second, and Third," *National Interest* 37, Spring 1990: 77-82, uses "disengagement." Doug Bandow, "Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home," *Current History* 93(579), January 1994: 8-13, prefers "benign detachment." Eric A. Nordilnger, however, in the most sophisticated, and perhaps least conventional version of the isolationism, *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), embraces "isolationism."

unnecessary but counterproductive. National defense--the protection of "the security, liberty, and property of the American people"[4]--is the only vital US interest. Neo-isolationism is different from the traditional isolationist thinking in that its understanding of the current threat is low and if it grew, it would grow slowly. So the United States ought not to be on the scene everywhere, ready to act. Forty or fifty years ago, scholars typically used the term "isolationism" to describe those who opposed US entry into the League of Nations and favored high tariffs after the First World War. They usually painted those officials as Neanderthals and tagged them with the blame for the Great Depression and World War II.

The idea of new isolationism subscribes to a fundamentally realist view of international politics and thus focuses on power.[5] Its advocates ask: who has the power to threaten the sovereignty of the United States, its territorial integrity, or its safety? They answer that nobody has it. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a rough balance of power in Eurasia. If either Russia or China begins to build up its military power, there are plenty of wealthy and capable states at either end of Eurasia to contain them. Like traditional isolationism, this strategy observes that the oceans make such a threat improbable in any event. The United States controls about one quarter of the gross world product, twice as much as its nearest competitor, Japan, and while not totally self-sufficient, is better

---

[4] Bandow, "Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home," p. 10.

[5] The version of realism that underlies the new isolationism is minimal. Its strategic imperatives are even more limited than those of the minimal realism outlined by Christopher Layne, "Less is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia," *National Interest* 43, Spring 1996: 64-77. Layne distinguishes between maximal and minimal realism. He views a balance of power approach as minimal realism. Layne links primacy with maximal realism. For an earlier version of minimal realism and neo-isolationism, see Robert W. Tucker, *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

placed than most to "go at it alone." US neighbors to the north and south are militarily weak and destined to stay that way for quite some time. The United States is inherently a very secure country.[6] Indeed, the United States can be said to be strategically immune.

*Critique*: Neo-isolationism serves US interests only if they are narrowly constructed. First, though the neo-isolationists have a strong case in their argument that the United States is currently quite secure, disengagement is unlikely to make the United States more secure, and would probably make it less secure. The disappearance of the United States from the world stage would likely precipitate a good deal of competition abroad for security. Without a US presence, aspiring regional hegemons would see more opportunities. States formerly defended by the United States would have to look toward their own military power; local arms competitions are to be expected. For instance, proliferation of nuclear weapons would intensify if the US nuclear guarantee was withdrawn. Some states would seek weapons of mass destruction because they would simply be unable to compete conventionally with their neighbors. This new flurry of competitive behavior would probably energize many hypothesized immediate causes of war, including preemptive motives, preventive motives, economic motives, and the propensity for miscalculation.

***Selective Engagement***

---

[6] Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17(4), Spring 1993, p. 48, makes this point. He uses it to support an argument.

Selective engagement endeavors to ensure peace among power states that have substantial industrial and military potential--the great powers. By virtue of the great military capabilities that would be brought into play, great power conflicts are much more dangerous to the United States than conflicts elsewhere.[7] Thus Russia, the wealthier states of the European Union, China, and Japan matter most to the US The purpose of US engagement should be to directly affect the propensity of these powers to go to war with each other. These wars have the greatest chance of producing large-scale resort to weapons of mass destruction, a global experiment that the United States ought to prevent. These are the areas of the world where the world wars have originated, wars that have managed to reach out and draw in the United States in spite of its strong inclination to isolate themselves from it.

Like new isolationism, selective engagement emerges from the realist tradition of international politics and its focus on large concentrations of power.[8] Like cooperative security, it is also interested in peace. Though some of its proponents agree with the neo-isolationist premise that US geography and nuclear deterrence make the United States secure enough that a Eurasian hegemon would not pose much of a security problem for the United States, selective engagement holds that any great power war in Eurasia is a

---

[7] Robert Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security* 15(4), Spring 1991: 5-53; and Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13(2), June 1990: 1-51, are the two most complete expositions of selective engagement. See also Ronald Steel, *Temptations of a Superpower* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

[8] Selective engagement is informed neither by the minimal realism that underlies the new isolationism nor the maximal realism that drives primacy; it is instead based on the traditional mainstream balance-of-power realism evident in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

danger to the United States.[9] On the basis of both the increased destructive power of modern weaponry and the demonstrated inability of the United States to stay our of large European and Asian wars in the first half of this century, selective engagement argues that the United States has an interest in great power peace.

Selective engagement shares the neo-isolationist expectation that states balance, and that nuclear weapons favor the defender of the status quo. However, selective engagers also recognize that balancing may be tardy, statesmen may miscalculate, and nuclear deterrence could fail. Given the interest in great power peace, the United States should engage itself abroad in order to ensure against these possibilities in the places where the consequences could be the most serious. This position advocates that balancing happens, but it happens earlier and more easily with a leader. Advocates of selective engagement do start with the premise that US resources are scarce: it is simply impossible to muster sufficient power and will in order to keep domestic and international peace worldwide, or to preserve the United States as the undisputed leader in a unipolar world.

*Critique*: Selective engagement has its own problems. First of all, compared to other strategies, there is relatively little idealism or commitment to the principle behind the strategy. It lacks the exuberant US nationalism of primacy, or the commitment to liberal principle of cooperative security. It focuses rather narrowly on interests defined in terms

[9] On this point see Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters," pp. 8-10; and Art, "Defensible Defense," pp. 45-50.

of power. Can such a strategy sustain the support of a liberal democracy long addicted to viewing international relations as a struggle between good and evil?

Secondly, selective engagement does not provide clear guidance on which ostensibly 'minor' issues have implications for great power relations and thus merit US involvement. It posits that most will not matter but admits that some will. Since trouble in peripheral areas is likely to be more common than trouble in core areas, the selective engagement strategy gives its least precise positive guidance on matters that will most commonly figure prominently in the media and hence in the public debate on US foreign policy. The responsible practice of selective engagement will thus require considerable case-by-case analysis and public debate.

Finally, the strategy expects the United States to ignore much of the trouble that is likely to occur in the world. America's prestige and reputation might suffer from such apparent lethargy, which could limit its ability to persuade others on more important issues. Great power rivalries are currently muted, and if successful, the strategy will quietly keep them that way. This would be an enormous contribution to the welfare of the entire world. However, it is an open question whether a regular tendency to avoid involvement in the issues that do arise will ultimately affect the ability of the United States to pursue its more important interest. Arguably, it was fear of such a result that provided one of the impulses for the ultimate US involvement in trying to end the war in Bosnia.

***Cooperative Security***

The most important distinguishing feature of cooperative security is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible.[10] Therefore, cooperative security begins with an expansive conception of US interests: the United States has a huge national interest in world peace. Cooperative security is the only one of the four strategic alternatives that is informed by liberalism rather than realism. Advocates propose to act collectively through international institutions as much as possible. They presume that democracies will find it easier to work together in cooperative security regimes than would states with less progressive domestic polities.

Cooperative security does not view the great powers as a generic security problem. Since most are democracies, or on the road to democracy, and democracies have historically tended not to fall into war with one another, little great power security competition is expected. The cooperative security enterprise represents an effort to overcome the shortcomings of traditional collective security. For both, aggression anywhere, and by anyone, cannot be allowed to stand. Both place a premium on international cooperation to deter and thwart aggression. It is to be "all for one and one for all." Cooperative security advocates do not rely on spontaneous power balancing because this is only likely when traditional vital interests are engaged. Instead, international institutions, particularly the United Nations, are to play a critical role in coordinating the deterrence and defeat of aggression. Regional institutions, particularly a

---

[10] Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of Internationalism Organization* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 247; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 183-184: "any aggressor anywhere' is in fact the national enemy of every country because in violating the peace and law of the community of nations it endangers, if indirectly, the peace and security of every nation."

transformed NATO, have an important role to play where international institutions are weak. Institutions respond to imminent threats, and deter all who would break the peace.

*Critique*: Cooperative security is vulnerable to a range of criticisms. Most importantly, individual states are still expected to be able to rise above narrow conceptions of national interest in order to respond to appeals for action on behalf of the collective good, and to engage in what will seem to them as armed altruism. In theory, some collective action problems associated with collective security may be ameliorated by cooperative security.[11] In particular, the combination of intensive arms control, military technological superiority, and US leadership is meant to substantially reduce the costs of cooperation for any given member of the cooperative security regime. Nevertheless, there will still be defectors and free riders. Major power aggression would still be a problem for cooperative security, as it was for collective security, some powers may perceive the intrinsic stakes as small and the aggressor as far away and difficult to fight. It seems unlikely, for example, that the NATO allies would ever fight the China over Taiwan, even if the United States wanted to do it. States concerned about the possible competitions of the future will still ask if any given opportunities for current cooperation will achieve a common good, or oppose a common bad, and will change their power position relative to all other potential challengers, including one another.

---

[11] On this matter, see Richard Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," *Survival* 34(1), Spring 1992, Pp. 40-43; and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19(3), Winter 1994/95: 5-49.

The task of building sufficient general multilateral credibility to deter a series of new and different potential aggressors seems very difficult. Regular US action to oppose the Soviet Union during the Cold War did not entirely dissuade that regimes from new challenges. Since this was an iterative bipolar game, credibility should have accumulated, but that does not seem to have happened. Although US credibility appears to have been quite high in Europe, where direct interests were great and deployed military power was strong, elsewhere Soviet behavior was often mischievous. Therefore, it is quite likely that a true cooperative security strategy would involve the UN, designated regional organizations, and effectively the United States, in a number of wars over many years if it is to have any hope of establishing the ability to deter the ambitious and reassure the fearful. This would, however, serve to further strain public support for a demanding strategy.

***Primacy***

Primacy, like selective engagement, is motivated by both power and peace. However, the particular configuration of power is key to this strategy option; it holds that only a preponderance of US power ensures power.[12] The pre-Cold War practice of aggregating power through coalitions and alliances, which underlies selective engagement, is viewed as insufficient. Peace is the result of an imbalance of power in which US capabilities are sufficient, operating on their won, to cow all potential challengers and to comfort all coalition partners. Consequently, selective engagement is not enough. Therefore, both

[12] This is the maximal realism of hegemonic stability theory. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

world order and national security require that the United States maintain the primacy that emerged from the Cold War. The collapse of bipolarity cannot be permitted the emergence of multipolarity; unipolarity is best.

Primacy is most concerned with the trajectories of present and possible future great powers. As with selective engagement, Russia, China, Japan, and the most significant members of the European Union, matter most. War among the great powers poses the greatest threat to US security for advocates of primacy as well as those of selective engagement. But primacy goes beyond the logic of selective engagement and its focus on managing relations among present and potential future great powers. Advocates of primacy view the rise of a peer competitor from the midst of the great powers to offer the greatest threat to international order and thus the greatest risk of war. The objective for primacy, therefore, is not merely to preserve peace among the great powers, but to preserve US supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing itself from any global challenger.

Advocates of primacy, like those of selective engagement, do recognize that US resources are limited, but they contend that the United States is a wealthy country that all too often acts as if it were poor.[13] The problem is not a lack of resources, but a lack of

[13] According to Muravchik, "We can afford whatever foreign policy we need or choose. We are the richest country in the world, the richest country the world has ever known. And we are richer today than we have ever been before. We command not fewer but more resources than ever." He calls for spending 5 percent of GDP on what he calls foreign policy; see Joshua Muravchik, *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996).

political will. Advocates of primacy are quite optimistic, however, that the US public can be induced to sacrifice for this project.[14]

*Critique*: Three major criticisms are most frequently mentioned. First, the diffusion of economic and technological capabilities--precipitated in part by the open international economic system that the United States supports, in part by the spread of literacy, and in part by the embrace of market economics--suggests that other countries will develop the foundations to compete in international politics. New great powers will rise in the future. Though there is no recognized rule of thumb that specifies the share of gross world product, a state must be in command in order to bid for hegemon. It seems peculiar to suggest that the situation today is not much different from the end of World War II, when an unbombed United States produced 40 percent of gross world product.

Secondly, contrary to the expectations of primacy advocates, it is likely that some states will balance against the United States. They will not wish to remain in a permanent position of military inferiority, just as the United States would struggle to reverse the position if it were imposed even by a benevolent state. Primacy underestimated the power of nationalism. Some states may not accept US leadership simply out of national pride. States coalesce against hegemons rather than rally around them. Primacy is therefore a virtual invitation to struggle.

Lastly, American insistence on hegemonic leadership can engender resistance that may undermine the long-term effectiveness of any multilateral mechanisms that the

---

[14] On this matter, see William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75(4), July/August 1996: 18-32; Muravchik, *ibid.*

United States may wish to exploit should challengers actually merge. If a rising power such as China cannot be accommodated, as Britain accommodated the rise of the United States, the collective defense mechanisms of selective engagement or the collective security component of cooperative security would ensure that the United States need not bear alone the burden of taking on those who would undermine international order and stability: primacy may make this remedy unavailable.

## 2. The *New York Times* Coverage on Isolationism vs. Interventionism

Among the *New York Times'* articles including the phrase "national security," most of them could be coded either as a domestic focus or as an interventionist focus with an exception of a few cases. With this hypothesis, I expected that before 1989 interventionist characteristic should had been prevailing on the front and on the editorial pages in the *New York Times'* coverage, and isolationist characteristic should have been prevailing since 1989. Contrary to my expectation, both in the Cold War and in post-Cold War periods the *New York Times* national security articles are more characterized to interventionism than to isolationism (see figure 7-1).

In the figure 7-1, both during and after the Cold War the numbers of articles delivering US interventionist feature for her national security concern have been consistently larger than the numbers of articles covering isolationist feature except 1988 and 1989. From 1980 to 1989 about 30 articles per year were characterized as "isolationism" in terms of U S national security concern, whereas 40 articles on average

delivered "interventionist" features in every year. Between 1990 to 1997, about 11 articles have been characterized as "isolationist" feature per year, and about 20 articles delivered "interventionist" positions in terms of US national security concern.




Figure 7-1

The analysis also tells us that the more *New York Times* articles are covering "interventionist" characteristics in the post-Cold War period. Among the articles containing the phrase "national security," 405 articles out of 698 articles were featured as delivering "interventionism" in terms of US national security concern during 1980 to 1989, while 157 articles out of 244 articles have been marked during 1990 to 1997. This indicates that by the end of the Cold War the articles about "interventionism" has

decreased by about 50 %, whereas the articles about "isolationism" has decreased by about 65 %.

### *The Contextual Structure of Interventionism*

To understand the outcomes, we need to exercise the genealogical approach on US national security. George Kennan's "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" has been called the most influential article of the twentieth century.[15] Never before or since has a single essay so symbolized a long-term geopolitical strategy--in this case, "containment," Kennan's prescription for countering the Soviet threat. Though Kennan himself later had second thoughts, the ideas he presented in that article served as the basis for US diplomatic, military, and economic policy for fifty years.

In the eight years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States has dispatched troops to foreign soil several times under the name of "*national security*"--during the Bush years to Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia; in the Clinton years to Haiti and Bosnia.

> " . . . claiming *national security* risks . . . the Pentagon could clear the air of some lingering concerns about the number of Panamanian civilians killed and the causes of injury and death to Americans during the invasion."[16]

> " . . . since World War II has inherited so varied and chaotic an agenda: turmoil in Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Russia and a score of former Soviet republics . . . Victory in the Cold

---

[15] George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 26, July 1947: 566-82.
[16] Charles B. Rangel, Democrat of New York, The *New York Times*, December 20, 1990, p. A31, italics added.

War has left American diplomacy without a clearly defined purpose in our *national security* interest."[17]

Amidst these interventionist leadership of the United States, each time the same questions have arisen: why should we be involved? What "vital national security interests," if any, justify risking the lives of American soldiers? Where, exactly, does our national interest lie?

While Bush administration tried to propagate principles of the "New World Order" in which the United States plays a leadership role in world affairs as it did during the Cold War, the Clinton administration has called for a strategy of "engagement and enlargement." Specifically speaking, its argument is engaging other country or regions to enlarge democracy and free market. [18] Reduced to essentials, the policy argued that the United States needed to be deeply involved in world politics. US troops would carry out missions ranging from fighting regional wars to peacekeeping to nation-building. The theory supporting engagement and enlargement is as follows: The United States, although the most powerful country, is not all-powerful, hence it needs assistance. The way to meet this need is to support international institutions, such as the United Nations and

---

[17] Editorial Desk, The *New York Times*, January 24, 1993, p. 16, italics added.

[18] Interestingly enough, those who prefer the United State's interventionist approach have never used the term "interventionism. Instead they call themselves as 'internationalism', while with the Cold War over it has been replaced by 'selective' or 'cooperative' 'engagement.' For an explanation on US foreign policy of 'engagement' and 'enlargement,' see President Bill Clinton, "Remarks on American security in a changing world," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 12, 1996, Vol. 32, No. 32, Pp. 1404-7; John Ikenberry, "Why export democracy?: The 'hidden grand strategy' of American foreign policy is reemerging into plain view after a long Cold War hibernation," *Wilson Quarterly* 23(2), Spring 1999: 56-60; Executive Office of the President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C., February 1996).

international treaties for economic integration and arms control. If it follows this plan of "engagement," the United States can "enlarge" the circle of democratic regimes and market economies. Then, peace and property will ensure. NATO is a good example to meet this ideology of American foreign policy on its national security.

> "NATO expansion would involve a crucial political and military realignment of Europe, the continent still most directly linked to the *national security* of the United States . . . The White House hopes *enlargement* . . . would commit American conventional and nuclear forces to the defense of newly independent European nations and require the costly modernization of their armed services. It would also move the alliance's boundaries considerably closer to Russia, a step sure to strengthen nationalists and Communists in an insecure country still traumatized by two German invasions this century."[19]

Indeed, America's current discourse over the supposed national mood of introspection, or the return of isolationism, is more noisy than instructive. The analysis of this research based on the *New York Times'* coverage suggests that American global commitments are being extended, rather than cut back. Indeed, 20,000 American troops helped keep an U.S.-brokered peace in Bosnia, a part of the world neither central to American interests nor familiar to American arms. American aircraft carriers cruise protectively off Taiwan, while a naval patrol remains in place in the Persian Gulf. American warplanes still enforce the no-fly zone over northern Iraq. A democratically elected presidency has been restored to Haiti, courtesy of the U.S. armed forces. The Pentagon's strategic review of the US role in Asia, generally known as the Nye Report, suggests maintaining the current

[19] Editorial Desk, The *New York Times*, December 12, 1996, p. A36, italics added.

American commitment to Asian security, along with the current level of U.S. forces in Asia (around 100,000 military personnel) for another 20 years.[20]

### *Understanding Isolationistic Mood*

However, at the same time within the post-Cold War era it has been clearly proven that the public discourse on isolationistic solutions for U.S. national interest is prevailing. The new distrust of interventionism has been twofold. The first matters with the shift from 'geopolitics' to 'geoeconomics.'[21] There has been animosity toward foreign aid, whose costs are invariably over-estimated by the American public, even though the money amounts to approximately $18 billion, just over 1 percent of the U.S. federal budget for 1998, or almost the exact sum American spend each year on video rentals.[22]

The second main thrust of anti-interventionism is rhetoric against the rising levels of immigration, mainly of the illegal kind; but even the legal use of immigration to reunite families by those with widely extended kinships has come under attack. In this case, we may be observing a shift toward anti-internationalism than a rejection of the long tradition of American altruism with respect to the outside world. The emphasis on economic domestic interests also plays as a key logic to this position. Americans understand that the extended logic of 'interventionism' inevitably associates with

---

[20] Joseph Nye, Jr. "The Case of Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* 74(4), July/August 1995: 90-102.
[21] For explanation on "geoeconomics", see chapter 5.
[22] According to Jess Helms, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he has never voted for a foreign aid bill and insists that the American people "are tired of pouring hard-earned money down those ratholes"; secondly cited from, Martin Walker, "The New American Hegemony," *World Policy Journal* 13(2), Summer 1996, p. 14.

'internationalism' which necessary asks for openness of the United States domestic market.

However, the analysis of the *New York Times'* coverage once again showed that American global leadership is unavoidable one, even though public's supporting for domestic interests is fully acceptable.

> "Economic issues like European protectionism, North American free trade and competitiveness with Asia have moved to the center of foreign policy debate. Mr. Clinton would be wise to seize this opportunity to change the *national security* agenda. . . . giving priority for rebuilding US economic strength, repudiating protectionism and urging the American influence be used to promote higher labor and environmental standards abroad."[23]

For nearly 50 years, the one constant in American public opinion has been that the United States should take an active part in world affairs. Back in 1947, as the Cold War was beginning, 68 percent of Americans agreed with this statement, while 25 percent said the United States should not play much of an international role. Last year, the numbers were almost identical, with 67 percent of those polled approving an active American international role and 28 percent disapproving.[24] These figures reveal a highly durable consensus. The proportion of those calling for an active role has never fallen below 65 percent (it reached this low point in 1986) nor risen higher than 73 percent (registered in

---

[23] Editorial Desk, The *New York Times*, November 10, 1992, p. 22, italic added.
[24] See Martin Walker, "The New Hegemony," p. 17.

1991). The proportion of respondents wanting to stay out of world affairs has never risen above 32 percent (in 1976 and 1986) nor dropped below 24 percent (in 1991).[25]

Of course there are negative arguments on this US active role. These days US active role in world affairs focuses mainly on economic interdependence or liberal international economic regime as introduced in chapter five. The global free trade system, the essential part of the Clinton Doctrine, will only prosper if its trade routes, its overseas investments, and the sanctity of its contracts are underwritten and defended. In the nineteenth century, Britain played this role. In the twentieth century, America took over, and it is now nagged by the constant and understandable fear that to be the last guarantor of a global trading system and the last free trader when others grow behind their tariff walls is to share, eventually, Britain's fate. America is being overstretched, paying to defend the stable environment that benefits others. In this context Schvarz's critic deserves to catch our attention. As Benjamin Schwarz has written, in a pretty paradox, "The worldwide economic system that the Untied States has protected and fostered has itself largely determined the country's relative economic decline. Economic power has diffused from the United States to new centers of growth. American hegemony, perforce, has been undermined."[26] The *New York Times* also covers this proposition.

> "Militarily, America has emerged unrivaled, yet much of our arsenal is destabilizing, unusable and irrelevant in new tasks of *national security* . . . Not least are the moral costs: abroad, a bitter legacy of our many interventions; at home, a democracy diminished by

---

[25] John Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1979 ,1983, 1987, 1991* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations).

[26] Secondly cited from Walker, *ibid.*, p. 18, Benjamin Shwarz, "America's Global Role," (paper presented at a conference, "Kennan, the Cold War, and the Future of American Policy," sponsored by the School of International Relations, University of Southern California, January 1995).

> *national security* demagogy and extra-constitutional acts, still governed by garrison-state conformity and myopia. America is neither the power nor the ideal that began the Cold War 45 years ago . . . In a properly enlightened Washington, new policy would rest on a new trinity of military, economic and political-scientific *national security* . . . "[27]

Events from President Clinton's 1992 election on a promise to "focus like a laser beam on the economy" to the 1994 midterm election, in which control of Congress switched hands with the help of numerous freshmen who were unsupportive of an activist foreign policy, have raised questions about whether the United States is returning to a pre-World War II isolationism. However, noticeably, public interest in foreign news and US relations with other countries dropped only slightly between 1990 and 1994.[28] These outcomes were released in the recently published *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy* in which the public still favorably prove US active role.[29] One major poll found that Americans support continued US involvement in world affairs, but the general public does not want the United States to be the "world's policeman." The public, like presidential candidate Bill Clinton in 1992, sees foreign policy essentially as an extension of domestic concerns; its top five foreign policy priorities were stopping international drug trafficking, strengthening the economy, stopping the flood of illegal aliens, protecting the global environment, and ousting Saddam Hussein as leader of Iraq.

---

[27] Roger Morris, former Staff of NSC under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, The *New York Times*, February 5, 1992, p. A23, italics added.
[28] John Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).
[29] Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

Therefore, we can conclude that the US public's emphasis on domestic interest have not engendered by sacrificing their international interests in terms of US national security concerns.

Many should have expected that the post-Cold War era should bring for the U.S. policy makers to give a larger priority onto domestic problems regarding national security concern. But as explained above, the result is quite the reverse. Despite a widespread conviction that, in a post-Cold War world, the American role would diminish, in the last decade the United States has: launched a massive counteroffensive against the world's fourth largest army in the Middle East; invaded, occupied, and supervised elections in a Latin American country; intervened with force to provide food to starving peoples in Africa; and conducted punitive bombing raids in the Balkans.[30]

### *American Exceptionalism: Exceptional Role for Global Security*

The analysis of the *New York Times* articles explicitly mentioning US "national security" crucially identified that the "interventionist" feature has been more commonly found in the post-Cold War period. It is argued that, according to the *New York Times'* coverage regarding US national security after the end of the Cold War, the referents of US national security have been much more globally oriented and interventionally characterized than those of the Cold War era.

---

[30] In fact, President Clinton frequently made a clear resolution on this proposition. For instance, he insisted that, "it requires the confident will of the American people to retain our convictions for freedom and peace and to remain the indispensable force in creating a better world at the dawn of a new century,"(President Bill Clinton's speech on Aug. 12, 1996 at George Washington Univ.).

As you can see in the figure 7-2, subjects about US global leadership could be hardly found in the *New York Times'* articles mentioning US "national security" during the Cold War period while they are substantially popular in the post-Cold War period. These subjects included "US role for global peace and cooperation," "US leadership through international organizations," "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," "international arms trade/transfer," "international crime," "US role to enlarge world free market," and "US assistance to democratize former communist countries." Among the articles which embraced "interventionism" in terms of US national security concern only 9 % explicitly referred to US active global leadership during the Cold War period (1980-1989), whereas in the post-Cold War period 41 % of the articles ascribed to US active global role for US national security interests. This is a sharp increase.




Figure 7-2

Then, how do we explain this trend which would seem to be in a sense indifferent to the end of the Cold War? In other words, the trend is an unusual coexistence in which the real discourse about interventionist features of US national security has not diluted, at the same time, whereas the most Americans assume that they have to be less involved in world affairs after collapse of the Cold War frame. I am going to introduce the American exceptionalism to explain this ambivalence in which most Americans believe that their country was born with a kind of holy and special commitment and responsibility.

There is an interesting self-perceptions that America is a special kind of nation, with a special role and special obligations, all stemming from a unique identity that other countries have to respect. We want to benefit from our engagement in world affairs and from our leadership, though at the same time we are reluctant to pay the costs in the way we once did. The following *New York Times* article was written under the title of "*National Security*, Redefined."

> "Absent a compelling military threat, foreign policy ideas will have to compete for public support on the basis of their consistency with American values, like democracy, human rights and environmental protection . . . that would free resources for *national security* . . ."[31]

The tendency of 'American exceptionalism' is not a new one at all, believing continued American hegemony is important because it is seen as the prerequisite for global stability. Instability is dangerous because it threatens the link that connects US security to the strategic interests furthered by economic interdependence. An enlarging market economy

---

[31] Editorial Desk, The *New York Times*, November 10, 1992, p. A22, italics added.

is an overriding US interest because it is viewed as both *a cause and a consequence* of peace and stability in the international system. Indeed, the role of interdependence in the strategy of US preponderance is circular: interdependence is a vital interest because it leads to peace and stability; however, peace and stability must exist in the international system before interdependence can take place.

The United States' exceptionalism also leads the country to the concerns about its credibility from other countries. As the strategic theorist Thomas C. Schelling has put it: "Few parts of the world are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves. . . . but defending them or running risks to protect them may preserve one's commitments to action in other parts of the world at later times."[32] If others perceive that the United States has acted irresolutely in a specific crisis, they will conclude that it will not honor its commitments in future crises. Hence, the United States has taken military action in peripheral areas - Bosnia, for example - in order to demonstrate to both allies and potential adversaries that it will uphold its security obligations in core areas, as happened repeatedly in the Cold War.

A crucial factor in weighing the credibility of a defender's commitments is the degree of its interest in the protected area. Had the Soviets seriously contemplated an attack on Western Europe during the Cold War (and there is no evidence that they did so), they almost certainly would have had to draw back from the brink. In a bipolar setting, Western Europe's security was a matter of supreme importance to the United States for both strategic and reputational reasons. However, at the same time, with the

---

[32] Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 124.

end of the Cold War the intrinsic value of many of the regions where the United States may wish to extend deterrence will be doubtful. Indeed, in the post-Cold War world, "few imaginable disputes will engage vital US interests."[33] It thus will be difficult to convince a potential attacker than US deterrence commitments are credible.

### 3. Isolationism Ever in the United States? / US' Never-ending Global Interests

As mentioned above, there is nothing new about the continuity of US interventionism, no change has been the hallmark of American grand strategy from 1945 to the present. At the beginning of this dissertation, I have shown that globalism, militarism, and interventionism were the three characteristic features of US national security policy during the Cold War period. As we have seen by the test of the fifth hypothesis--since 1989 the *New York Times'* coverage more focuses on isolationism--we have realized that our expectation was incorrect, and interventionism is still prevailing in US national security discourse, which is tested by the media coverage. For the next step I am going to show the historically rooted disposition of US interventionism.

Then, why is interventionism still salient in the *New York Times'* coverage on US national security concern, even though it seems that our daily discourse regarding US national security is much more concerned to domestic affairs? To answer this question, it is necessary to trace the origin of the debate on 'isolationism' and 'interventionism.' Upon the United States' case, why and how rising nation-state to translate her wealth into

---

[33] Robert Jervis, "What do we want to deter and How do we deter it" in *Turning Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy*, ed., L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael Mazar (Boulder: Westview, 1994), p. 130.

international power is the question.[34] According to Zakaria, after Civil War, U.S. seemed poised to burst forth as a major player in the world balancer of power. It was huge, agriculturally rich, rapidly industrializing, and had demonstrated terrifying military and naval power against the Confederacy. Instead, American demobilized their armed forces, turned inward, and did little to expand even into their own hemisphere until the 1890s. After considering the various historical explanations offered, Zakaria settles on two plausible hypotheses that can explain America's baffling conduct about international affairs: state-centered realism by which nations "try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power: and defensive realism by which nations "try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive an increase in threats."[35]

Zakaria then measured his theories against the many, mostly abortive, efforts by post-Civil War presidents to annex territories or exert influence abroad. Andrew Johnson was able to purchase Alaska in 1867 and to annex the unoccupied Midway Islands, but all efforts by other presidents to expand into the Pacific and Caribbean failed because of congressional opposition. During the twenty-four-year span, the Senate was the most powerful part of the federal government while the presidency was relatively weak. So although the United States surpassed Great Britain and Germany to become the world's

---

[34] One of the most interesting research regarding this subject is done by Fareed Zakaria. Fareed Zakaria raised the same question. He insists that the question be of singular importance, since a new power's rise can complicate and even endanger the equilibrium of the status quo international system; hence Zakaria sees "the problem of peaceful change as the central dilemma of international relations (p.3)." In his book he studies how the United States became a player in the international system between 1865 and 1908 in hopes of gaining insight on how US should adjust to the rise of new powers today: Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[35] *Ibid*, p. 42.

leading economic power by the 1880s, it refused easy opportunities to acquire mostly highly strategic territory.

Next, Zakaria looks at the 1890-1908 period, a boom time for US expansion. During this period the Americans seized Spain's Caribbean and Pacific possessions, part of Samoa, and the Panama Canal; intervened in several Great Power conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War; and gained access to Chinese markets. His answers to this period is that American foreign policy became much more active and aggressive due to a large increase in presidential power. A Supreme Court case in 1890 greatly expanded the defined powers of the president on foreign policy and other matters.[36] The federal bureaucracy grew rapidly in order to administer new agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, devoted to regulating problems caused by the industrial revolution. Military intellectuals, such as Army Colonel Emory Upton and Navy Admirals Stephen B. Luce and A. T. Mahan, reformed their service roles and doctrine and persuaded Congress to increase army and navy budgets in order to expand personnel and modernize weapons. Finally, Congress began to defer more to the president's wishes in foreign policy. In sum, his study indicates that America prior to the 1890s was not isolationist, as too many scholars have claimed--it was just a strong nation with a weak state.[37] In other words, isolationism has not been selected; rather interventionism was not

---

[36] *Ibid*, ch. 4.

[37] The growth of the federal state described by Zakaria paralleled national movements to centralized and consolidated economic, social, and cultural habits of life: See, for instance, Wilfred M. McClay, *The Masterless: Self and Society in Modern American Thought* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Alfred D. Chandler Jr., *Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Mira Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: A History of American Foreign Investment to 1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

ready to a certain degree of status. To be sure, well before the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union took shape, Washington was aiming for global preeminence. As the diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis observes, the United States "expected to lead the new world order" after 1945: "Few historians would deny, today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after World War II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and present antagonist."[38]

Given that America's underlying postwar grand strategic aims were essentially unconnected to the superpower rivalry, it is not surprising that even though the Soviet Union has disappeared, US interventionist disposition for its national security remains unchanged. As was the case after the Second World War, the present strategy of preponderance seeks to maximize US control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers, especially in Europe and East Asia. As was the case after the Second World War, the strategy reflects the belief that global stability and economic interdependence based on US leadership is a vital US national security interest.

Theoretically speaking, preponderance-hegemony is a realist strategy that aims to perpetuate America's post-Cold War geopolitical dominance. Advocates of preponderance believe that the United States should attempt to maximize its relative power (compared to other states) because international politics is highly competitive. The strategy of preponderance rests on the assumption that states gain security not through a balance of power, but by creating a power imbalance in their favor. In a harsh,

---

[38] John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," *Diplomatic History* 17, Winter 1993, Pp. 3-4.

competitive world, security rests on "hard" power (military power and its economic underpinnings) and it is best to be Number One. Of course, this doesn't necessary mean "soft power"—communication, culture, ideology, etc.--is less important. For the strategy's proponents, systemic stability (the absence of war, security competitions, and proliferation) is a function of US military power.

Although a few commentators have contended that US intervention in Bosnia was animated by humanitarian concerns, this was not the case. American policymakers, including President Clinton, made it clear that their overriding concerns were to ensure European stability by preventing the Balkan conflict from spreading and to reestablish NATO's credibility.

> "This week Congress is to consider legislation that would undermine this and every future President's ability to safeguard *America's security*. . . . it would endanger *national security*. . . the bill unilaterally and prematurely designates certain European states for NATO membership. NATO should and will expand. NATO expansion will strengthen stability in Europe for members and nonmembers alike. . . . that approach gives every new European democracy a strong incentive to consolidate reform."[39]

Indeed, some of the proponents of preponderance believe that US intervention in Bosnia alone is insufficient to prevent peripheral instability from spreading into Western Europe. To forestall a geopolitical snowball, they contend, NATO must be enlarged to incorporate the states located in East Central Europe. These expressed fears about the "spillover" of

---

[39] Warren Chirstopher, Secretary of State, William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, The *New York Times*, February 13, 1995, p. A19, italics added.

instability from Bosnia into Europe are often hazy when it comes to stating what the precise consequences of this spillover will be.

Simultaneously, some US policymakers and analysts have detailed their concerns: they fear that spreading instability could imperil economic interdependence. In 1992, William Odom, the former director of the National Security Agency, explicated the perceived significance of the link between US interests in interdependence and its concerns for European stability and NATO credibility: "Only a strong NATO with the US centrally involved can prevent Western Europe from drifting into national parochialism and eventual regression from its present level of economic and political cooperation. Failure to act effectively in Yugoslavia will not only affect US security interests but also US economic interests. Our economic interdependency with Western Europe creates large numbers of American jobs."[40]

Without any exaggeration, it is true that defending America's perceived interest in maintaining a security framework in which political stability and economic interdependence can flourish has become the primary post-Cold War rationale for expanding its security commitments toward all the corners of the world. The important logic to this assertion is that, to preserve a security framework favorable to interdependence, the United States does not, in fact, intervene everywhere; however, the logic underlying the strategy of preponderance can be used to justify US intervention anywhere.

---

[40] Secondly cited from Christopher Layne, "Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-first Century," *World Policy Journal* 15(2), Summer 1998, p18; originally from, William E. Odom, "Yugoslavia: Quagmire or Strategic Challenge,?" *Hudson Briefing Paper*, no. 146 (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, November 1992), p. 2.

## 4. Conclusion

During the past 18 years more than half of the entire articles explicitly mentioning "national security" in the *New York Times'* front and editorial pages are associated with at least one of the following subjects: foreign countries social stability, diplomatic relations, spying, information leaking, overseas military exercise, international environment, immigration, trade, overseas regional conflict, international oil supply, starvation in remote regions, foreign countries' civil wars, etc.

Regardless of the end of the Cold War, interventionism as a characteristic feature of US national security policy remains unchanged. And the media coverage about US national security significantly has incorporated the feature. Thus, my hypothesis that the *New York Times'* coverage on US national security has more focused on isolationism in world affairs since the end of the Cold War was proved incorrect. This outcome also has been supported by the explanation that the United States' continuity of interventionism has a more solid and historical ground.

Of course, there might be a pessimistic view on US global leadership. For instance, it is doubtful that the United States could deter a Russian invasion of the Baltics or the Ukraine, or, several decades hence, a Chinese assault on Taiwan because the Cold War ended. To engage in such actions, Moscow or Beijing would have to be highly motivated: conversely, the objects of possible attack are strategically unimportant to the United States, which would cause the challenger to discount US credibility. The spring

1996 crisis between China and Taiwan suggests the difficulties that US extended deterrence strategy will face in coming decades.[41] During the crisis, a Chinese official said that China could use force against Taiwan without fear of US intervention because American decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan."[42] Although this is an empty threat today, as China becomes more powerful militarily and economically in the coming decades, threats of this nature from Beijing will be more potent. This shows the difficulty of the U.S. foreign policy decision making process in which the unipolar hegemon after the collapse of the Soviet Union has to make those potential powers realize that US domestic interest does not necessary mean the conflict to US interventionist feature of her national security interest.

---

[41] China provoked the crisis by conducting intimidating military exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections.

[42] Quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure US Listens," the New York Times, January 24, 1996. I stress that this analysis is prospective. Today, China lacks the military capabilities to invade Taiwan successfully; however, the balance of forces probably will shift decisively in China's favor in the next decade or two, and the deterrent effect of any American commitment to Taiwan would be vitiated. Conventional deterrence no longer would be robust, and any US intervention would carry with it the risk of escalation to nuclear war.

## Chapter Eight: Conclusion

The main purpose of this dissertation was twofold. On the one hand, in "security" studies in general, I wanted to prove that the Cold War frame used to characterize the concept of security by state-centric and strategic (in most cases military) approach. On the other hand, I also wanted to prove that "militarism," "globalism," and "interventionism," the three characteristic features of the Cold War US foreign policy, are still prevailing in US security discourse portrayed in the media even after the end of the Cold War. Based on these purposes, this dissertation was dedicated to show how much these characteristics in general security studies, particularly in the United States national security discourse, have been freed from the Cold War frame. Being different from the traditional security research, I used the *New York Times* articles for my research data. In this conclusion chapter, I have three themes to explain based on the outcomes of the analysis; recapitulating the previous four chapters, how much has the end of the Cold War affect on US national security discourse through the media coverage; what are the key replacing arguments in US national security discourse after the end of the Cold War; and if the United States has replaced the Cold War armageddon national security discourse with the post-Cold War global security one, what is the real significance or hidden agenda of being "globally secure"?

### 1. US National Security Discourse and the *New York Times*

***The End of Security?***

If one removes the terms security from the political lexicon, what then? If an expert in International Relations had been asked, "if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind?" Maybe the answer is that there simply is not a hole. After all, the hole is in many ways a relatively recent creation. Despite the frequent invocation of the name of Thomas Hobbes as the architect of contemporary security notions, it was only in the middle of this century that security became the architectonic impulse of the American polity and, subsequently, of its allies. The emergence of security states elsewhere is often more recent. In the United States, the National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and related institutions were early Cold War creations. Their rationale came from a period of perceived danger to American interests which for the first time as a result of the US victory over the Axis power were truly global in scope. Coupling fears of Soviet ambitions formed the heart of a semi-permanent military mobilization in order to support the policies of containment militarism.[1]

If this context is no longer applicable, then the case that the national security state is not an appropriate mode for social organization in the future is in many ways compelling. If security is premised on violence, as security-dilemma and national-security literatures suggest, perhaps the necessity of rethinking global politics requires abandoning the term and the conceptual structures that go with it. Likewise, perhaps the discourse of national security studies, if not all international relations, and for that matter, more specifically geopolitical modes of reasoning, are also not practically functional as the discursive frameworks for any political arrangement that can hope to deal with some

[1] The classic account of the formation of the "national security state," is Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origin of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977).

of the more pressing global difficulties. The difficulty of extending security to deal with pressing political items is by now obvious. Perhaps the time for a new language to encompass the political agendas of the post-Cold War era has finally arrived.

### *The New York Times's Coverage on US National Security in the Post-Cold War Era*

> "For the most part, our national decision makers have failed to recognize the extent of the reduced threat to our *national security* following the collapse of Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. What is needed now is a revised definition of *national security* that factors in the well-being and skills levels of our human resources as well as the dangerous pathologies of drugs, AIDS, domestic violence . . . A new definition of *national security* must also take into account our industrial base, levels of productivity, rates of capital formation, rebuilding of infrastructure and the state of research and development for civilian purpose."[2]

I posed three fundamental questions in this research about an elite newspaper's coverage of US national security: Have articles about military issues decreased after the end of the Cold War?; Are there any other countries on the news coverage who replaced the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States after the end of the Cold War? Or ,with the Cold War over, does the United States no longer have any other states or regions as its threat portrayed in the media in terms of "national security"?; Within the post-Cold War period, are the news articles about US national security more concerned about domestic issues than international issues? Our analysis suggests that the end of the Cold War have

---

[2] Benjamin L. Hooks, Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, "For the 90's, National Security Begins at Home," The *New York Times*, May 5, 1992, p. A30, italics added.

significant consequences for how an elite American newspaper delivers stories about US national security. To recapitulate, the military issues are still dominantly portrayed as political discourse through the media in terms of "national security" concerns. Even if Russia no longer plays a security threat to the United States as the former Soviet Union did during the Cold War, many other regions or countries have been referred as new US security concerns in the post Cold War era. Disagreeing to the common understanding, a priority given to US interventionist policy over isolationist policy has not decreased even after end of the Cold War. The analysis of the *New York Times's* articles also identified that subjects of security have significantly changed in the coverage since the end of the Cold War, though the occurrences of these articles have not been significant yet.

With regard to the decrease of the number of news articles on US national security, I argue that the Cold War news frame have atrophied, creating a greater media capacity to consider and investigate previously problematic storylines regarding America's role in the world. There are two reasons. First, the post-Cold War environment lacks a clear conceptual consensus regarding US foreign policy. As James Schlesinger has remarked: "with the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the shrinkage and transmutation of the Soviet threat, the United States has lost the magnetic north for calibrating its foreign policy. Major decisions taken in recent years, seemingly firm in execution, rest upon an uncertain direction in underlying policy."[3]

Second, to the degree that a post-Cold War foreign policy doctrine has emerged, it has reported Cold War ideological alignments, particularly regarding the use of force.

---

[3] James Schlesinger, "Quest for a post-Cold War foreign policy," *Foreign Affairs* 72(1), Winter 1993, p. 17.

Stephen Stedman has referred to a reemerged variant of Wilsonian internationalist, calling them "new interventionism."[4] The "new interventionism" is found among human rights advocates, disaster relief specialists, and other varieties of humanitarians who are united in their adherence to a vision of global responsibility, coupled with a diminished regard for more traditional notions of national sovereignty. On the other hand, conservatives--at least some--have emerged as neo-isolationists who have shed their anticommunist-inspired internationalism and are now reluctant to endorse the use of the American military in all but the most prescribed circumstances. All of this, of course, is still inchoate and subject to further realignment.

And that is also the point: the relatively tight ideological consensus of the Cold War frame has given way to a divergent array of competing positions. "Normal" politics have been replaced by debates about the fundamental orientations of American foreign policy. If this is the case, what Bennett speculated would be true of news coverage of domestic issues such as abortion--that there would be a greater inclusiveness of dissident voices and ideas--may now also characterize at least some foreign affairs issues. In exploring this possibility, we use both quantitative and qualitative indicators that focus on thematic shifts in news frames concerning US involvement with other countries affairs.

It has been also clearly proven that the characteristic features of US foreign policy, "militarism," "globalism," and "interventionism," have been dominantly covered in the *New York Times* articles containing the phrase "national security" through the entire period from 1980 to 1997. One interesting aspect of this result is about the news

---

[4] Stephen John Stedman, "The new interventionists" *Foreign Affairs* 72(1), Winter 1993: 1-15. For the definition of the term refer to chapter 7 of this dissertation.

source of national security reports. As shown in chapter 4, this research has identified that the majority of the news sources on national security are coming from the mainstream government officials or related parties such as government sponsored research institutions or scholars both during and after the Cold War. As Bennett's theory of press indexing indicated, the *New York Times's* coverage on US national security closely reflected the range of opinion that exists within the government.[5] This tendency has not changed after the end of the Cold War. In this vein, Hallin's argument is precise: he suggests that "journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. Instead, the journalist's role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values."[6]

## 2. Ending the Cold War US Security Discourse

### *Losing the Cold War Frame*

As shown through this dissertation, it is clear that America's Cold War policy is best understood not only by its communism-containing words but also by its ally-containing deeds. Washington committed itself to building and maintaining an international economic and political order based on what officials at the time termed a US "preponderance of power." By banishing power politics and nationalist rivalries, American's Cold War alliances in East Asia and Europe in effect protected the states of those regions from themselves.

---

[5] W. Lance Bennett, "Toward a theory of press-state relations," *Journal of Communication* 40(2), 1990: 103-125.

[6] Daniel Hallin, *The Uncensored War: The media in Vietnam* (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), Pp. 116-118.

There is a very simple answer to my research puzzle: the Soviet Union was a much smaller central factor in shaping US policy than is commonly supposed. In fact, after the Second World War, American policymakers sought to create a US-led world order based on preeminent US political, military, and economic power, and on American values. That was - and remains - the essence of the strategy of preponderance.

With the Cold War over, in age of apparent globalization, national security is no longer such an easy justification for state action. Coupled with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, this has induced a crisis in the Western security discourse. The "keepers of threat" have been deprived of their principal "threat"; the world can no longer be described in terms of a bipolar geopolitical division with a 'third world' to be struggled over and the Soviet Union geographically contained. To some scholars, although the grand metaphor of the container is no longer so easily applied, its demise is not to be expected soon.[7] The structure of the NATO discourse now includes partnerships with Eastern European states, but it is often still focused on external threats and the differences between those within NATO and threats originating from "out of area" sources. The Clinton administration's foreign policy has maintained some of the key spatial tropes of containment, only now partly reversed in their direction. Instead of containing the Soviet Union, American foreign policy now "enlarges" the sphere of liberal democratic states. In the absence of the threatening communist "Other"--in another word, the Cold War frame--numerous new threats to national security have been

[7] Among them, Chilton' work is the most conspicuous one in that he explained the security discourse during the Cold War as a metaphor of the Western Container. See Paul Chilton, *Security Metaphor: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996).

proposed. Rogue states and nuclear outlaws have offered some alternatives, but neither constitute a threat like the magnitude of the Soviet one. Concerns with low-intensity conflict as part of the Cold War have given way to more generalized concerns with violent "internal" conflict and "failed states" that may suddenly transcend limits, especially if international conflict in some of the key larger states of the "South" leads to spillover effects and regional instabilities. The list of security issues goes on: transboundary criminal organizations, hostage incidents, non-state mediators, and computer connections suggest, at least to those whose state-centric conceptual frameworks for dealing with order no longer fit the new situations, that 'global chaos' is a technically accurate description of a system in which small perturbations can have dramatic consequences elsewhere in the global system that 'need' to be managed.

***Beyond the Realism?***

If we are really encountering new dimensions of insecurities, does realism have a future? Realism has occupied a paradoxical place in the study of international politics. It is commonly regarded as the dominant paradigm in the field, particularly in the subfield of security studies. The end of the Cold War gave new impetus to the perennial debate on realism. Insecurities after the Cold War were not predicted, but could have been expected. The realist basis of Cold War discourse restricted speculation to relationships between existing states, to comparisons between the past bipolar system and hypothetical multipolar systems, and to the implications for nuclear instability.[8]

[8] The best known example is Mearsheimer, "Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security* 15(1), 1990: 5-56.

The early postwar realist strategists examined four key themes. Theorists in this area looked at calculation of the trade-off between military security and other values such as economic welfare and individual freedom. Second, both military and non-military tools of statecraft would be important to national security. Third, the recognition of the security dilemma (that is, the actions that one state does to increase its security in turn decrease the security felt by others) led to cautious use of military power. Fourth, linkages between national security and domestic affairs such as the economy, civil liberties, and democratic processes were made.[9]

As mentioned in chapter 2 and 3, strategic studies about national security are based upon the realist interpretation of international relations. Realists argue that due to the anarchic nature of the international system states should be skeptical about the possibility of permanent peace, ideas of world government, and disarmament, as well as concepts such as collective or cooperative security. As a result strategic studies focus much more on military threats to states while security studies broaden the definition to include non-military threats not only to states but also to non-state actors and substate groups.

There is a common agreement among security analysts about the effect that the end of the Cold War has had on the field of security studies. First, the role of military power is increasingly questioned. While the old school of strategic studies accepted that questions of focus had to be seen in the wider context of the political and economic aspects of the international system, the revival of liberal notions of multilateral

[9] D. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *World Politics* 48(1), 1995, p. 122.

cooperation that accompanied the end of the Cold War delegitimized force as a tool of statecraft. For some this means that military threats have declined in relevance while for others military tools are seen as less useful. Second, there is a need to reexamine the way we think about security. For some this is a result of fundamental changes to the post-Cold War environment and for others it is failure of strategic studies to predict the end of the Cold War. Third, there is a need to broaden the term "security." Again, for some this means expanding the definition to include the effect of domestic issues on the national security agenda of states, while for others it means treating non-military threats to national well-being as security threats.

Despite these elements, realism will continue to be an important source of theories of international politics and security studies. Because, most of all, no other paradigm offers a richer set of theories and hypotheses about international politics. Realism offers a world view that can be used to generate deductive theories to explain the recurrent patterns of international politics from ancient times to the present. No contending paradigm has been able to match realism's ability to generate logically integrated theories that apply across space and time. Marxism had the potential to match the conceptual elegance and breadth of realism, but that ideology has fallen into disrepute and tends to focus on explaining economic, political, and social phenomena within states, not between them. Because there is no alternative paradigm, realism by default retains a central place among theories of international politics, security studies in particular.

## 3. Post-Cold War US Security Discourse

### *Globalization or "Global Security"*

Globalization has been most encapsulated in the final decade of the twentieth century. This research fully supports this argument. This research implicitly identified that the most importantly mentioned conception in the *New York Times* articles containing the phrase "national security" since the end of the Cold War is "*globalization.*" The changes of globalization are eye-catching at the material level but are profound below the surface, at the level of ontology and political philosophy. For students of International Relations, one outcome of the processes of globalization is that the familiar textbook notion of the sovereign state is called into question. State borders are increasingly open to external penetration on a minute-by-minute basis, to everything except neighboring armies, as the autonomy of governments declines over economic planning, social ideas and cultural choice. The sovereign state's power to control its own destiny is eroded by globalization. James Rosenau's term "post-international politics" becomes more pertinent everyday.[10] However, at the same time, this is certainly not to say that governments and states are henceforth unimportant. They are and will remain influential conduits in the distribution of social, political, and economic goods. They regulate the lives of their citizens in manifold ways, but they themselves are more than ever regulated by outside pressures.

### *Hidden Agenda of Global Security*

[10] See James Rosenau, *Turbulence of World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).

The advocates for "global security" are not new ones at all. To put it in a more common and friendly term, it is just another name of 'hegemon.' The history of modern international politics, which dates from about 1500, is strewn with the geopolitical wreckage of states that bid for hegemony: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, Victorian Britain, Germany under Hitler.[11] The historical lesson is pretty clear: states that bid for hegemony invariably fail.[12] The important question, of course, is why do they do so? The answer is no secret to those who study international politics: when one state becomes too powerful, it threatens other states' security, so called "security dilemma."

The United States' new security discourse of "global security" is just another name of "US hegemon." Given the poor track record of would-be hegemons, why do American international relations theorists and, more important, policymakers believe the United States can succeed where others have failed? There are three reasons. First, they argue that others do not balance against overwhelming power per se, rather they assert that states balance against those who act in a threatening manner, which the United

---

[11] For a more detail discussion of the issue in this section, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17(4), Spring 1993: 5-51; and idem, "American Grand Strategy After the Cold War: Primacy or Blue Water?" in *American Defense Annual*, 1994, ed., Charles F. Herman (New York: Lexington, 1994), Pp. 19-43.

[12] For instance, a crucial relationship exists between America's relative power and its strategic commitments. The historian Paul Kennedy and the political economist Robert Gilpin have explained how strategic overcommitment leads first to "imperial overstretch," and then to relative decline. Gilpin has outlined succinctly the causal logic supporting this conclusion. As he points out, the overhead costs of empire are high: "In order to maintain its dominant position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the international economy. These protection and related costs are not productive investments; they constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominant state" (Pp. 156-57). Ultimately, the decline in its relative power leaves a waning hegemon less well placed to fend off the challenges to its system-wide strategic interests. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

States, as a "benign" hegemon, does not.[13] Second, scholars and policymakers believe that because the United States takes into account other states' interests, far from balancing against the United States, others want to ally with it. Finally, it is claimed that America's "soft power" - the appeal of America's liberal democratic values and culture legitimates its exercise of hegemonic power. Based on these beliefs, global security as US post-Cold War security discourse mostly focuses on liberal economic interdependence by the United States global leadership.

Just as the market cannot function within a state unless the state creates a stable "security" environment in which economic exchange can occur (by protecting property rights and enforcing contracts), the same is true in international relations. Since there is no world government, it falls to the dominant state to create the conditions under which economic interdependence can take hold (by providing security, rules of the game, and a reserve currency, and by acting as the global economy's banker and lender of last resort). Without a dominant power to perform these tasks, economic interdependence does not happen. Indeed, free trade and interdependence have occurred in the modern international system only during the hegemonies of Victorian Britain and postwar America.

In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics *does not take place in a political vacuum*. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a

---

[13] This is what international relations theorists call "balance of threat" theory, on which see Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21(4), Spring 1997: 49-88.

redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would).

A truly global economy is probably impossible to achieve. In fact, as Robert Gilpin has said, "what today we call international economic interdependence runs so counter to the great bulk of human experience that only extraordinary changes and novel circumstances could have led to its innovation and triumph over other means of economic exchange." Historically, to secure international capitalism a dominant power must guarantee the security of other states, so that they need not pursue autarkic policies or form trading blocs to improve their relative positions. This suspension of international politics through hegemony has been the fundamental aim of US foreign policy since the 1940s. The real story of that policy is not the thwarting of and triumph over the Soviet threat but the effort to impose an ambitious economic vision on a recalcitrant world.

At the same time, it is necessary to remind that this trend does not grantee to overcome the state-centered selfishness in the national security interest. Rather, "globalized interests" may end up expanding militarization in security subjects which was not considered a security concern during the Cold War. For instance, while the *New York Times* coverage delivers more globalized feature in its articles about US national security, the state-centered interests have not disappeared.

Not surprisingly, the primary goal of post-war US foreign policy was "maintaining the security of the United States." But what did this mean? What was to be secured? "National security" has typically been defined as some variant of "the ability of

a nation to protect its internal value from external threats."[14] To the United States internal values have always expanded and enlarged their contents and scopes by external engagement. Within this context, as explained in chapter 7, the common view of American foreign policy on national security as endless vacillating between isolationism and interventionism is wrong: Americans in this century have never ceased expanding their sphere of interests across the globe. The American conception of interest, moreover, has always gone beyond narrow security concerns to include the promotion of a world order consistent with American economic, political, and ideological aspirations.

Therefore, the end of the Cold War did not bring any substantial changes to the United States at all. The country still resolutely proposes global interventionism, and always has needed "to shape a favorable international environment."[15] In particular, this proposition was desperately critical to Dean Acheson and the other designers of America's Cold War foreign policy, and there was only one solution: "We cannot have full employment and prosperity in the United States without foreign market."[16] As Acheson recognized, America's anxieties, together with its hopes, compelled the United States to create and maintain an open world economy. The essential character of capitalism is international. This is the very theme at which the Cold War frame began and ended. Indeed during the Cold War the United States made a good use of the Cold War

---

[14] P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, "The emerging field of national security," *World Politics* 19(1), 1966, p. 134.
[15] Benjamin Schwarz, "Why America thinks it has to run the world," *The Atlantic Monthly* 277(6), June 1996, p. 92.
[16] In his memoir, Acheson very clearly showed his resolution why the United States necessary needs foreign market: See Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (NY: Norton, 1969).

frame for its global view. My research of the *New York Times* articles verified that this tendency has solidly secured during the years under analysis. We have realized that fewer talks on "national security" time does not necessary mean the more secured American and Americans. The media still talk about national security concerns but with different subjects, different countries, and with different configurations of security referent now. As the United States was not less secure during the Cold War, the end of the Cold War has nothing to do with securing Americans and the United States' national security.

## Appendix: Coding

**Type of Stories**

01 Foreign Desk, 02 National Desk, 03 Financial & Business Desk, 04 Science Desk, 05 Metropolitan Desk, 06 Book Review Desk, 10 Unsigned Editorial, 11 Signed Editorial, 12 Regular Column, 13 Guest Column, 14 Letter to Editor

**Type of Source**

05 Security/ Intelligence Members, 06 Defense Dept Members, 07 Commerce Dept Members, 08 CIA Director, 09 State Dept Members, 10 President, 11 Vice President, 12 Secretary of State, 13 Secretary of Defense, 14 National Security Advisor, 15 Military Members, 16 Other Secretaries, 17 Other Cabinet Members or Governmental Officials in General, 18 Officers of International Organizations, 19 Retired Officials, 20 Congressmen, 21 Senator (Rep), 22 Senator (Demo), 23 Representative (Rep), 24 Representative (Demo), 25 Judiciary, 26 Supreme Court, 27 Party members, 31 Candidate for President (Rep), 32 Candidate for President (Demo), 33 Candidate for Senator (Rep), 34 Candidate for Senator (Demo), 35 Candidate for Representative (Rep), 36 Candidate for Representative (Demo), 37 Other Candidates, 41 Professor, 42 Think Tank Members, 43 Lawyer, 44 Members on Special Committee, 51 Reporter, 52 Columnist, 53 Editor, 54 Reader, 55 Editorial boarder, 56 Journalist/Author

61 Businessmen in Trade, 62 Bankers, 63 Businessmen in General

71 Interest Group for Environment, 72 Interest Group for Drugs, 73 Interest Group for Human Rights, 74 Interest Group for Economic Interest, 75 Interest Group for Disease, 76 Interest Group for Immigration, 77 Interest Group for Peace Movement, 78 Interest Group for Ethnic Issue, 79 Interest Group for Military/Intelligence, 80 Interest Group for Others, 81 Foreign Countries' Leaders (President & Prime Minister only), 82 Foreign Countries' Leaders except 81, 83 Foreign Officials of International Organizations (e.g. UN, EU etc.), 91 Clergymen, 92 Union Leaders

**Type of Subject**

01 Armament/ Arms Building, 02 Nuclear Military, 03 Conventional Military, 04 Chemical/ Biological Military, 05 Arms Control/ Reduction, 06 Foreign Countries' Stability/ Democracy, 07 Intelligence/ Information, 08 Foreign/ Diplomatic Affairs, 09 Overseas Military Exercise, 10 Nuclear Terrorism, 11 Other Terrorism, 12 US Strategic Interest on Other Countries, 13 Territorial Defense in General, 14 Military Technology, 15 Domestic Political Stability, 16 Communism/ Ideological Conflict, 17 Constitutional Liberty/ Civil Right, 18 Nuclear Deterrence, 19 Regional Hegemony/ Global Rivalry with the Soviet, or Soviet Expansion, 81 Détente with USSR, 82 Sovereignty/ Territorial Integrity to US, 83 Spy/ Espionage, 84 Rogue Regimes' Hostility to US, 85 Global Peace and Cooperation, 86 Military Budget Cut, 87 Financial Burden on Military Spending, 88 Freedom of Media, 89 US Global Leadership, 90 Non-Proliferation, 91 International Arms Trade/ Transfer, 92 Military/ Defense Industry,

20 Federal Budget Deficit, 21 Issues on Trade, 22 Issues on International Finance & Foreign Investment, 23 Issues on Banking and Stock Market, 24 Employment/ Unemployment, 25 Economic Integration/ Regionalism, 26 Economic (trade/ finance) Crisis of Other Countries, 27 Stable Oil Supply, 28 Natural Resources Except Oil, 29 Economic Sanctions to Other Countries, 30 Foreign Economic Aid, 31 Domestic Economic Stability/ Growth, 32 Global Economic Boom/ Growth, 33 Industrial Development, 34 Stable Energy Management, 35 International Competitiveness of US Industry, 36 Nuclear Energy/ Technology, 37 World Population, 38 International Political & Social Stability, 39 Domestic Infrastructure

40 Drug, 41 Environment, 42 Technology on Computer-Science, 43 Non-Computer Science Technology or In General, 44 Illegal Immigration, or Immigration in General, 45 Social Welfare, 46 Education, 47 Ethic Problem, 48 Racial Conflict, 49 Disease, 50 Religion, 51 Human Right of Foreign Countries, 52 Human Right in the US, 53 Domestic Crime, 54 Academic Freedom, 55 International Crime, 56 Space Science/ Technology, 57 Transportation, 60 NATO, 61 Warsaw Pact, 62 UN, 63 NAFTA, 64 APEC, 65 EU (EC), 66 IMF/ IBRD

**Region**

01 Old Communist Bloc, 02 Soviet Union, 03 Russia, 04 Eastern & Central European countries, 05 Poland, 06 Yugoslavia, 07 Bosnia

10 Canada, 11 Mexico, 12 Columbia, 13 Latin America, 14 Central America, 15 El Salvador, 16 Chile, 17 Caribbean, 18 Peru, 19 Guatemala,

20 Western European countries, 21 British, 22 Germany, 23 France, 24 NATO, 25 Italy,

30 Rogue countries in General, 31 Iran, 32 Iraq, 33 Cuba, 34 North Korea, 35 Libya, 36 Syria, 37 Nicaragua, 38 Granada, 39 Panama

40 Asian countries, 41 China, 42 Japan, 43 South Korea, 44 Taiwan, 46 Vietnam, 47 Cambodia, 48 Indonesia, 49 Pakistan,

50 Middle East countries, 51 Saudi, 52 Kuwait, 53 Jordan, 54 Afghanistan, 55 Persian Gulf, 56 Israel, 57 Palestinian

60 Somalia, 61 Haiti, 62 India, 63 Singapore, 64 Sudan

## Bibliography

### Government Publications

*Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1983, Book II.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.

*Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry R. Truman, 1947.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963.

*Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1947, Volume IX.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 32, No. 32, August 1996.

### Primary Sources: LEXIS-NEXIS Data Base

*The New York Times*, from June 1, 1980 to December 31, 1997.

### Secondary Sources

Acheson, Dean. 1969. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department.* New York: Norton.

Allison, Graham and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. 1992. *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Altschull, Herbert J. 1995. *Agents of Power*. New York: Longman.

Ambrose, Stephen E. 1988. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938.* New York: Penguin Books.

Art, Robert. 1991. A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War. *International Security* 15(4): 5-53.

Ashley, K Richard. 1987. The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics. *Alternatives* 12(4): 403-34.

_____. 1986. The Poverty of Neorealism. In Robert Keohane, ed. *Neorealism and Its*

*Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. 1988. Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematic. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 17(2): 227-62.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

_____. 1997. Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective. In *Critical Security Studies*, eds. Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, 121-46. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Azar, Edward and Chung-In Moon. 1984. Third World National Security: Toward A New Conceptual Framework. *International Interactions* 11(2): 103-135.

Baldwin, David. A. 1995. Security Studies and the End of the Cold War. *World Politics* 48(1): 117-31.

Baldwin, David A. 1997. The Concept of Security. *Review of International Studies* 23(1): 5-26.

Bandow, Doug. 1994. Keeping the Troops and the Money at Home. *Current History* 93(579): 8-13.

Barnet, R. 1980. *Real Security*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Bennett, W. Lance. 1990. Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication* 40(2): 103-125.

Bennett, W. Lance and Jarol Manheim. 1993. Taking the Public by Storm: Information, Cueing, and the Democratic Process in the Gulf Conflict. *Political Communication* 10(4): 331-351.

Bergsten, Fred. 1992. The Primacy of Economics. *Foreign Policy* 87: 3-24.

Berkowitz, Bruce. 1997. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. *Orbis* 41: 299-399.

Bernstein, Richard and Ross H Munro. 1997. China I: The Coming Conflict with America. *Foreign Affairs* 76: 18-31.

Berry, Nicholas. 1990. *Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of the New York Times Coverage of US Foreign Policy*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Betts, Richard. 1992. Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe. *International Security* 17(1): 5-43.

Binnendijk, Hans and Patrick Clawson. 1995. New Strategic Priorities. *Washington Quarterly* : 109-127.

Blair, Bruce. 1993. *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Booth, Ken. 1991. Security and Emancipation. *Review of International Studies* 17(4): 313-26.

_____. 1991. Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice. *International Affairs* 67(3): 527-45.

_____, ed. 1998. *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brock, Lothar. 1992. Security Through Defending the Environment: An Illusion. In *New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined*, ed. Elise Boulding. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Brown, Neville. 1989. Climate, Ecology and International Security. *Survival* 31(6): 519-32.

Buchanan, Patrick J. 1990. American First-and Second, and Third. *National Interest* 19: 77-82.

Buzan, Barry. 1991. *People, States and Fear*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

_____. 1991. New Pattern of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. *International Affairs* 67(3): 431-51.

_____, Ole Waever, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre. 1993. *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter.

Campbell, David. 1992. *Writing Security*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

_____. 1993. *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.

Chandler, Alfred D. 1977. *Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chase, J. and C. Carr. 1988. *America Invulnerable: The Search for Absolute Security 1812 to Star Wars*. New York: Summit.

Chilton, Paul A, ed. 1985. *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate*. London: Pinter Publisher.

_____. 1996. *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Chomsky, Noam. 1989. *Necessary Illusion: Thought Control in Democratic Societies*. Boston: South End Press.

Claude, Inis. 1962. *Power and International Relations*. New York: Random House.

_____. 1971. *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*. New York: Random House.

Cohen, Akiba and Gadi Wolfsfeld, eds. 1993. *Framing the Intifada: People and Media*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Cohen, Bernard. 1963. *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Coll, Alberto. 1993. Power, Principles, and Prospects for a Cooperative International Order. *The Washington Quarterly* 16(1): 5-14.

Connell, Jon. 1986. *The New Maginot Line*. London: Secker and Warburg.

Cox, Michael. 1995. *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower Without A Mission*. London: Pinter.

Cox, Robert. 1986. Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. In *Neorealism and Its Crisis*, ed. Robert Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press.

Crawford, Beverly. 1994. The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence. *Millennium* 23(1): 25-55.

Dalby, Simon and Gearoid O Tuathail, eds. 1998. *Rethinking Geopolitics*. London: Routledge.

Dalby, Simon. 1988. Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union As Other. *Alternatives* 13: 415-442.

_____. 1990. *Creating the Second Cold War*. New York: Guilford Publications.

_____. 1990. American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics. *Political Geography Quarterly* 9(2): 171-188.

_____. 1992. Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemma of Post-Cold War Security Discourse. *Alternatives* 17(1): 95-134.

_____. 1994. The Politics of Environmental Security. In *Green Security of Militarized Environment?*, ed. Jyrki Kakonen, 25-53. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

_____. 1996. Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries: Political Geography and International Relations after the Cold War. In *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, eds. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, 29-42. London: Pinter.

Der Derian, James and Michael J. Shapiro, eds. 1989. *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of Global Politics*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

Der Derian, James. 1995. The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Neitzsche, and Baudrillard. In Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed. *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Derrida, J. 1977. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by G. C. Spivak. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

_____. 1981. *Dissemination*. Translated by B. Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Deudney, Daniel. 1990. The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 19(3): 461-76.

_____. 1992. The Mirage of Ecowar: The Weak Relationship among Global Environmental Change, National Security and Interstate Violence. In *Global Environmental Change and International Relations*, eds. I. H. Rowlands and M. Greene, 169-91. London: Macmillan.

Entman, Robert M. 1993a. Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communication* 43(4): 51-58.

Entman, Robert M. and A. Rojecki. 1993b. Freezing Out the Public: Elite and Media Framing of the US Anti-Nuclear Movement. *Political Communication* 10(2): 151-167.

Fairclough, A. J. 1991. Global Environmental and National Resource Problems-Their Economic, Political and Security Implications. *The Washington Quarterly* 14(1): 81-98.

Feshbach, Murray and Alfred Friendly. 1992. *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege*. New York: Basic.

Finlay, David, Ole Holsti and Richard Fagen. 1976. *Enemies in Politics*. Cambridge: Rand McNally.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____, eds. 1978. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. 1987. *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1994. The Tragedy of Cold War History: Reflections on Revisionism. *Foreign Affairs* 73(1): 142-54.

Gallie, W. B. 1962. Essentially Contested Concepts. In *The Importance of Language*, ed. Max Black. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Galtung, Johan and Richard Vincent. 1992. *Global Glasnost: Toward a New World Information and Communication Order*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Galtung, Johan. 1971. A Structural Theory of Imperialism. *Journal of Peach Research* 8(1): 81-117.

Gamson, William. 1988. Political Discourse and Collective Action. *International Social Movement Research* 1: 219-244.

_____. 1992. *Taking Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gamson, William and David S. Meyer. 1995. Framing Political Opportunity. In *Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing: Comparative Applications of Social Movement Theory*, eds. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zaid. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Garnett, J. 1987. Strategic Studies and its Assumptions. In *Contemporary Strategy: Vol. I Theories and Concepts*, eds. J. Bayliss, Ken Booth, J. Garnett and P. Williams. London: Routledge.

Garthoff, Raymond. 1994. *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon and Reagan.* Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute.

Giltin, Thomas. 1980. *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gwertzman, Bernard G. 1993. Memo to the Times Foreign Staff. *Media Studies Journal* 7(3): 33-34.

Haftendorn, Helga. 1991. The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security. *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 3-17.

Hallin, Daniel. 1989. *The Uncensored War: The Media in Vietnam.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

_____. 1990. Sound-bite News. In *Blurring the Lines*, ed. Gary Orren. New York: Free Press.

_____. 1993. Hegemony, The American News Media from Vietnam to El Salvador: A Study of Ideological Change and Its Limit. In. *Political Communication Research: Approaches, Studies, Assessments*, ed. D. L. Paletz. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

_____. 1994. *We Keep America on Top of the World.* London: Routledge.

Harf, James E. and B. Trout, eds. 1982. *National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.

Harknett, Richard J. 1996. Nuclear weapons and territorial integrity in the post-Cold War world. In *New Studies in Post-Cold War Security*, ed. Ken R. Dark. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company.

Helman, Udi. 1990. Environmental and the National Interest: An Analytical Survey of the Literature. *The Washington Quarterly* 13(4): 193-296.

Herz, John. 1951. *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hoffmann, Stanley. 1977. An American Social Science: International Relations. *Daedalus* 106: 41-60.

Hogan, Machael J, ed. 1992. *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hoge, James. 1993. The End of Predictability. *Media Studies Journal* 7(4): 1-17.
_____. 1997. Foreign News: Who Gives a Damn. *Columbia Journalism Review* 36(4): 48-53.

Holsti, K. J. 1985. *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1992. On the Threshold: Environmental Changes and Acute Conflict. *International Security* 16(2): 76-116.

Huntington, Samuel. 1997. The Erosion of American National Interests *Foreign Affairs* 76(5): 28-49.

Ikenberry, John. 1999. Why Export Democracy?: The Hidden Grand Strategy of American Foreign Policy is Reemerging into Plain View after a Long Cold War Hibernation. *Wilson Quarterly* 23(2): 56-60.

Iyengar, Shanto and Donald Kinder. 1987. *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, Shanto and Adam Simon. 1994. News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing. In *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, eds. W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Jervis. Robert. 1994. What Do We Want to Deter and How Do We Deter It. In *Turing Point: The Gulf War and US Military Strategy*, eds. L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael Mazzar. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Joffe, Josef. 1992. Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends. *Survival* 34(1): 40-43.

Kaldor, Mary. 1990. *The Imaginary War.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Kane, Thomas. 1991. Foreign Policy Suppositions and Commanding Ideas. *Argumentation and Advocacy* 28: 80-90.

Kaplan, F. 1983. *The Wizards of Armagedon.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Katzenstein, Peter J, ed. 1996. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kegley, Charles W. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. 1987. *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*. New York: St. Martin Press.

_____, eds. 1994. *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Kennan, George. 1947. The Sources of Soviet Conduct. *Foreign Affairs* 26: 566-82.

Kennan, George. 1984. *American Diplomacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House.

Keohane, Robert O, Peter Hass, and Marc Levy, eds. 1993. *Institutions for the Earth-Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Keohane, Robert O, ed. 1986. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kirchner, Emil, Christoph Bluth and James Sperling, eds. 1995. *The Future of European Security*. Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing.

Klein, Bradley S. 1988. Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defense Politics. *Review of International Studies* 14(2): 133-148.

Kolodziej, Edward. 1992. What is Security and Security Studies? Lesson from the Cold War. *Arms Control* 13(1): 1-31.

Krippendorf, Ekkehart. 1987. The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 16(2): 207-214.

Krishna, Sankaran. 1993. The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory. *Alternatives* 18(3): 385-417.

Kristol, William and Robert Kagan. 1996. Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs* 75(4): 18-32.

Lapid, Yosef. 1994. Theorizing and the National in International Relations Theory: Reflection on Nationalism and Neorealism. In *International Organization: A*

*Reader*, eds. Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward Mansfield, 20-31. New York: Harper Collins.

Layne, Christopher. 1992. The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise. *International Security* 17(4): 5-51.

_____. 1994. American Grand Strategy after the Cold War: Primacy or Blue Water? In *American Defense Annual*, ed. Charles F. Herman, 19-43. New York: Lexington.

_____. 1996. Less is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia. *National Interest* 43: 64-77.

_____. 1997. From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy. *International Security* 22(1): 86-124.

_____. 1998. Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the Twenty-first Century. *World Policy Journal* 15(2): 8-28.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1992. The Long Peace, the end of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism. *International Organization* 48(2): 249-77.

Leffler, Melvyn P. 1984. The American Conception of National Security and Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-48. *American Historical Review* 89(2): 246-81.

_____. 1992. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman dministartion, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lippmann, Walter. 1943. *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D, ed. 1995. *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. 1995. Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society. *Review of International Studies* 21(3): 389-420.

Luckham, R. 1984. Armament Culture. *Alternatives* 10(1): 1-44.

_____. 1994. *The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Mandel, Robert. 1996. What Are We Protecting? *Armed Forces & Society* 22(3): 335-355.

Mangloa, Peter. 1990. *National Security and International Relations*. London: Routledge.

Mankeiwiez, Frank. 1975. *US vs. Richard Nixon: The Final Crisis*. New York: Quadrangle.

Mastanduno, Michael. 1997. Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War. *International Security* 21(4): 49-88.

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman. 1989. Redefining Security. *Foreign Affairs* 68(2): 162-77.

May, E. T. 1988. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic Books.

McClay, Wilfred M. 1994. *The Masterless: Self and Society in Modern American Thought*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

McCombs, Maxwell and Donald L. Shaw. 1993. The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas. *Journal of Communication* 43(2): 58-67.

_____. 1997. The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61(2): 176-187.

McGwire, Michael. 1991. *Perestroika and Soviet National Security*. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution.

Mearsheimer, John. 1990. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. *International Security* 15(1): 5-56.

_____. 1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.

Meyer, David S. 1995. Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War. *Political Communication* 12: 173-192.

Mische, G. and P. Mische. 1977. *Toward a Human World Order: Beyond the National Security Straightjacket*. New York: Paulist Press.

Mische, Patricia. 1989. Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualized Sovereignty. *Alternative* 14(4): 389-427.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1950. The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions. *American Political Science Review* 44(4): 833-54.

_____. 1951. *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

_____. 1952. Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States. *American Political Science Review* 46(4): 961-88.

_____. 1978. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Mowlana, Hamid. 1985. *International Flow of Information: Global Report and Analysis*. Paris: UNESCO.

Mueller, John. 1993. The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy. In *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Richard N. Rosecrane and Arthur A. Stein, 48-62. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Muravchik, Joshua. 1996. *The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolationism*. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.

Muzzio, Douglas. 1983. *Watergate Games: Strategies, Choices, Outcomes*. New York: New York University Press.

Myers, Norman. 1993. *Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Noonan, Michael. 1997. Exploration in Strategy. *Orbis* 41: 308-321.

Nordlinger, Eric A. *Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Norris, Papa. 1995. The Restless Searchlight: Network News Framing of the Post-Cold War World. *Political Communication* 12(4): 357-370.

Nye, Joseph S and Sean M. Lynn-Jones. 1988. International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference of the State of the Field. *International Security* 12(4): 5-27.

Nye, Joseph S. 1995. The Case of Deep Engagement. *Foreign Affairs* 74(4): 90-102.

O'Heffernan, Patrick. 1991. *Mass Media and American Foreign Policy: Insider Perspective on Global Journalism and the Foreign Policy Process*. Norwood, NJ: Abex.

Onuf, Nicholas. 1989. *World of Our Making-Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Page, Benjamin I. 1996. *Who Deliberates?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Paggi, L. and P. Pinzauti. 1985. Peace and Security. *Telos* 68: 79-92.

Palin, Ronan and Brook M. Blair. 1993. The Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations. *Review of International Studies* 19: 385-99.

Patterson, Thomas E. 1993. *The American Democracy*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

_____. 1994. *Out of Order*. New York: Vintage.

_____. 1997. The News Media: An Effective Political Actor? *Political Communication* 14: 445-455.

Posen, Barry R. and Adrew L . Ross. 1996. Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy. *International Security* 21(3): 5-53.

Potter, James. 1987. News from the Three Worlds in Prestige US Newspaper. *Journalism Quarterly* 64: 73-80.

Pirages, D. 1978. *The New Context for International Relations: Global Exopolitics*. North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press.

Ravenal, Earl. 1991. The Case for Adjustment. *Foreign Policy* 81: 3019.

Reilly, John, ed. 1995. American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995. Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

_____, ed. 1999. American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1999. Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relation.

Riffe, Daniel and Charles F. Aust, Rhonda J. Gibson, Elizabeth K. Vial, and Huiuk Yi. 1993. International News and Borrowed News in the New York Times: An Update. *Journalism Quarterly* 70(3):

Rosenau, James. 1969. Intervention as a Scientific Concept. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13(2): 149-171.

_____. 1990. *Turbulence of World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. New York: Harvest Wheatsheaf.

Ross, Robert S. 1997. China II: Beijing as a Conservative Power. *Foreign Affairs* 76: 34-44.

Rothchild, Emma. 1995. What is Security. *Daedalus* 124(3): 53-99.

Said, Edward. 1982. Opponents, Audience, Constituencies, and Community. *Critical Inquiry* 9(1): 1-26.

Sagan, Scott D. 1993. *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sanders, Jerry. 1983. *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and The Politics of Containment*. Boston: South End.

Schneider, Anne and Helen Ingram. 1993. Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politic and Policy. *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 334-47.

Schultz, Richard, Roy Godson and Ted Greenwood, eds. 1993. *Security Studies for the 1990s*. New York: Brassey's.

Schwarz, Benjamin. 1996. Why America Think It Has to Run the World. *The Atlantic Monthly* 277(6): 92-100.

Shapiro, Michael J. 1981. *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.

_____, ed. 1984. *Language and Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

_____. 1988. *The Politics of Representation*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1996. *Arms and Influence*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.

Schlesinger, Arthur, JR. 1992. Some Lessons from the Cold War. *Diplomatic History* 16(1): 47-53.

Scholte, Jan Aart. 1993. *International Relations of Social Change*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Schudson, Michael. 1995. *The Power of News*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Shulman, Seth. 1992. *The Threat at Home: Confronting the Toxic Legacy of the US Military*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Smith, Steve. 1995. The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory. In *International Relations Theory Today*, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 1-37. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Sorensen, T. C. 1990. Rethinking National Security. *Foreign Affairs* 69(3): 1-18.

Steel, Ronald. 1970. *Pax Americana: The Cold War Empire and the Politics of Counter-Revolution*. New York: Viking Press.

_____. 1995. *Temptation of a Superpower*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

_____. 1997. A New Realism. *World Policy Journal* 14: 1-9.

Stedman, Stephen John. The New Interventionists. *Foreign Affairs* 72(1): 1015.

Tuathail, Gearoid O. 1993. Japan as Threat: Geo-Economic Discourse on the USA-Japan Relationship in US Civil Society, 1987-91. In *The Political Geography of the New World Order*, ed. Colin Williams, 181-209. London: Belhaven.

Tonelson, Alan. 1994. Clinton's World: The Realities of America's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy. In *The Future of American Foreign Policy*, ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Traver, Michael. 1993. Communication Ethinis. In *The Global Media Debate*, eds. G. Gerbner, Howard Mowlana, and K. Nordenstreng. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Tucker, Robert. 1961. Political Realism and Foreign Policy. *World Politics* 13(3): 461-70.

Ulman, Richard. 1993. Redefining Security. *International Security* 18(1): 129-53.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1990. Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13(2): 1-51.

Vasquez, John V. 1983. *The Power of Power Politics: A Critic*. New Bruswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Vincent, R. J. 1974. *Nonintervention and International Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Walker, B. J. 1993. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walker, Martin. 1996. The New American Hegemony. *World Policy Journal* 13(2): 13-21.

Walt, Stephen. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

_____. 1991. Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly* 35(2): 211-39.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Waever, Ole. 1995. Securitization and Desecuritization. In Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed. *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Weaver, Kent R. 1989. The Changing World of Think Tank. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 22(3): 563-78.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 46(2): 391-425.

Whitfield, Stephen. 1991. *The Culture of the Cold War*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wittkoff, Eugene. 1986. On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critic and Some Evidence. *International Studies Quarterly* 30(4): 425-445.

Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. In *Discourse and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics*, ed. Arnold Wolfers. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Woods, Ngaire. 1996. *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Yergin, Daniel. 1977. *Shattered Peace: The Origin of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. *From Wealth to Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zaller, John and Dennis Chiu. 1996. Government's Little Helper: US Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises. *Political Communication* 13(3): 385-405.